OPMS XXI

Final Report

Prepared
for the
Chief of Staff, Army

9 July 1997

Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study

JULY 1997

Executive Summary

> It's now time to take a holistic view of OPMS processes and systems as we know them today.—General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), June 1996.

INTRODUCTION

The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) requires fundamental change. While there are basic issues of pressing concern today, the OPMS XXI Task Force[1] believes that those issues must be resolved in the context of developing an officer corps that will meet the challenges of the early 21st century—to lead Army XXI in mastering the capabilities and functions outlined in *Army Vision 2010; Joint Vision 2010;* and DA PAM 100-XX*, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign*. In short, OPMS must address the needs of the future as well as correct today's problems.

The current OPMS requires field-grade officers to do too many different things today for them to excel at any one of them. The requirements of Army XXI and Army After Next (AAN) will exacerbate this problem. If the purpose of an officer personnel system is to promote organizational excellence—and organizational excellence is directly tied to experience, expertise, and teamwork—then OPMS must be redesigned to give officers the greatest opportunity possible to develop the appropriate skills at each level of responsibility. The Task Force sees the completion of this year-long study and the issuance of this report as merely the completion of the first phase of a continuing effort. OPMS XXI[2] will be a work in progress from this point on. Many details have yet to be filled in, and some of the basic concepts will be transformed into something different from what was originally conceived. That is why the Task Force strongly advocates that OPMS XXI become a living

[1] The OPMS XXI Task Force was chartered by the CSA in June 1996 to study and recommend changes to the current OPMS. The charter appears after the bibliography.

[2] OPMS XXI represents the result of OPMS XXI Task Force-recommended changes to the current OPMS to make it iterative and responsive to change for the 21st century.

system that the Army cyclically reviews and adjusts as necessary. It will become better and stronger through successive refinement.

OPMS XXI will fundamentally change how officers are managed and promoted, including greater promotion opportunities for officers outside of the "command track." OPMS XXI focuses on active component officers within the Army Competitive Category (ACC). It does not address officers within the special branches, such as doctors and lawyers, nor does it directly address the personnel management of Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers. However, the reserve components have worked closely with the Task Force to ensure that their personnel systems are aligned as closely as possible with those of the active component.

Summary of Key Recommendations

The OPMS XXI Task Force recommends the following actions:

- Adopt a strategic approach to human resource system design and management.
- Implement a personnel management system based on career fields, with distinct groupings of branches and functional areas, to reflect the evolving needs of the Army today and into the future.
- Adopt a holistic approach by linking officer personnel management, character and leader development, and the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) into a total Officer Development System (ODS) XXI.
- Develop a mechanism to ensure alignment of authorizations and inventory.
- Establish new functional areas and eliminate others to address changing requirements.
- Assign all Army Competitive Category officers to a career field after they are selected for promotion to the rank of major.
- Conduct promotion boards so that officers compete for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel with other officers in their career field.
- Send all officers selected for promotion to major to resident intermediate-level military education and all officers selected for promotion to colonel to resident senior service college-level education.

These key recommendations are explained in later sections of this summary. The Task Force's detailed recommendations are set forth in the body of the report.

METHODOLOGY AND THE CASE FOR CHANGE

Ready Today/Ready Tomorrow

The Army's mission is to fight and win the Nation's wars. But readiness today does not necessarily translate into readiness tomorrow. Tomorrow's readiness will require a significant commitment of resources and thoughtful planning. The Army needs to acquire the finest weapons and write the doctrine for using them effectively on the battlefield. It also needs to develop officers with the right skills, knowledge, and experience to meet unforeseen challenges of the 21st century. While the warfighting focus must never be obscured or diminished, the institutional Army has a simultaneous requirement for officers possessing other skills and expertise. Therefore, it is time to assess how we develop our officers with respect to the challenges of the world environment today and tomorrow.

Importance of Officership

> The…commissioned officer leads the fight, deciding what is to be done and when. He or she is concerned with the larger goals of the organization, determining when new circumstances dictate change, in accordance with broad conceptual direction. [3]

Officers are the uniformed leaders of the Army. They imbue their units with a warfighting ethos and are the moral examples for their subordinates. They set the professional and ethical tone in every organization to which they belong. Importantly, they develop the professionalism expected of an officer through a balanced sequence of education, training, and experience that prepares them for service at progressively higher levels of responsibility. Officers articulate and embody the Army ethic with their focus on warfighting as the Army's reason for being and their fostering of core Army values. They also provide leadership and long-term vision, establish and maintain standards, take responsibility for organizational outcomes, and maintain trained and ready units or organizations. Officers bring military expertise to the design and management of Army and DoD systems. As the Army focuses on changing and on adapting to the 21st century, the officer corps that will lead it must also change.

Evolving Officer Requirements

The objective of the Officer Personnel Management System is to access, train, develop, assign, evaluate, promote, and separate officers in a manner consistent with Army needs and to enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the officer corps. Therefore, OPMS should procure and designate officers in the right num-

[3] RAND Corporation, Harry Thie et al., *Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers,* 1994.

bers and with the right skills to satisfy current and projected Army requirements. OPMS must also develop the professional capacities of officers through planned schooling and sequential, progressive assignments; assign officers to meet Army requirements; and separate them in a way consistent with Army requirements.[4]

Background

This is not the first time OPMS has had a significant review. Twice before—in 1971 and again in 1984—Army task forces studied OPMS and made recommendations for changing it. The Army has experienced significant changes since the last OPMS study in 1984. The most apparent of them have been the drawdown of the Army at the end of the Cold War and those resulting from three major legislative initiatives: the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, and Title XI legislation for Active Component Support to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. As a result, requirements for officers mandated by law and established by the needs of the National Military Strategy now exceed the supply available.

These events—coupled with the explosion of information technology, with its attendant operational and personnel implications—prompted the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), with the CSA's consent, to assemble a small team of senior field-grade officers and begin reviewing a series of specific issues pertaining to OPMS. Their purpose was to help him determine whether a general review of the entire officer system was warranted. This "Precursor Study Group," directed by the Commanding General, U. S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), reviewed more than 60 issues, 57 of which went forward to the DCSPER. Considered together, these issues convinced the DCSPER that a comprehensive study was needed. In May 1996, he recommended to the CSA that the Army initiate an OPMS Study—OPMS XXI.

Task Force Charter

The OPMS XXI Task Force was convened by the CSA in July 1996. General Reimer instructed the Task Force to review and update the current OPMS to ensure that the system continues to develop officers to meet the challenges of a changing world—officers who can fight and win today's wars and wars of an uncertain future. General Reimer also cautioned the Task Force to keep in mind certain fundamental truths about the Army and its soldiers and values that should not be changed, such as selfless service and loyalty, which lead soldiers to acts of duty, honor, and courage.

[4] DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, 8 June 1995.

General Reimer also directed the Task Force to create a conceptual framework integrating OPMS with the Leader Development System, ongoing character development initiatives, and the new OER. The CSA emphasized that while war-fighting should remain the preeminent skill of the officer corps, it is also important to develop a contingent of officers specializing in how the Army works as an institution. Implicit in this guidance is the requirement to examine focused career paths both in the operational and institutional Army, leading to a new definition of "success" for officers outside the traditional command track. General Reimer also directed the Task Force to look at how the Army should train and educate its officer corps to help transform the Army into a learning organization.

Thirty-five officers representing the Army's various branches and functional areas served as members of the Task Force, applying their individual and collective expertise and leadership experience to the study. The Task Force also sought assistance from various Army and sister service agencies as well as outside consultants to obtain accurate and relevant findings stemming from the best possible information collection, processing, and analysis. These findings formed the basis for recommendations tailored to current and projected future Army requirements. The Task Force also developed analytical models for studying the system and for evaluating its recommendations.

Indicators That OPMS Revision Is Required

The Task Force found multiple indicators that the current OPMS requires revision. Units have experienced high rotational turbulence among their field-grade officer leadership during the past few years. Most branches cannot even provide all of their majors at least one year of field-grade, "branch-qualifying" time in key battalion and brigade positions, because the number of officers in each year group exceeds the number of branch-qualifying positions available. While some officers do get multiple branch-qualifying jobs and spend as much as two years in units, the trend indicates that most majors will have only one key branch-qualifying job and will stay in the unit for about one year. The cumulative amount of time majors spend in key battalion or brigade jobs has declined steadily over the past several years.

A significant misalignment between the number of authorized positions for field-grade officers and the affordable officer inventory has created serious management problems. This misalignment extends across virtually all branches and functional areas. The officer inventory is only enough to fill fewer than 75% of the authorized major positions and only slightly more than 80% of branch-qualified captain authorizations.

During recent years, there has been an increase in field-grade Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) authorizations. These authorizations require branch-qualified officers at the rank of major, and distribution policies have assigned a large portion of TDA authorizations a higher priority for fill than most Table of

Organization and Equipment (TOE) units. In the aggregate, the Army is capable of filling only about 70% of its field-grade authorizations; many organizations are being filled at a level well below 70%.

At any given time, about two-thirds of combat arms field-grade officers serve outside their branch in functional area or immaterial positions. Conversely, most combat support and combat service support officers serve primarily in branch-related jobs and spend relatively little time in immaterial and functional area positions. Some combat support and combat service support branches have experienced a chronic shortfall of field-grade officers. There is no mechanism for cross-leveling officers in the field-grade ranks to rectify this situation.

In recent years, several functional areas have had to depend on promotion floors to ensure that a sufficient number of officers are promoted to fill lieutenant colonel and colonel positions within these functional areas. The current dual-track system is producing relatively few officers with true functional area expertise and experience.

As the time-in-grade period for majors has shortened, the branch-qualified major has only a few months to spare after passing through the number and variety of wickets a successful officer must pass through at that grade. Officers' expectations and concerns about their careers continue to be expressed in a variety of ways, including concern about inflation in the OER system, an inordinate degree of worry about future assignments, and anxiety about career security and about the opportunity to continue pursuing a successful career.

Additional Observations and Selected Findings

The Army is a complex system of systems providing the institutional base from which the operational force is supported. As such, it requires officers able to perform essential functions that fall outside the Army's warfighting role but are absolutely necessary to field an Army that can fight and win. To be performed well, these functions require officers with substantial relevant experience and expertise. Officers engaged in these functions must anticipate the doctrinal, training, and organizational requirements of future operations and prepare the Army to meet them. Accordingly, in addition to being grounded in the operational Army, they must have specialty or technical skills that support the Army's larger systemic needs.

The emerging National Defense Strategy consists of three elements: *shaping* the international environment, *responding* to the full spectrum of crises, and *preparing* for the future. This emerging strategy suggests that the Army will need to produce officers in broad skill groupings that can address and support each of these three elements. That, in turn, means that the Army must have a three-part officer personnel strategy. First, it must provide the kind of officers who will keep the operational force ready to respond to any crisis—today and tomorrow. Second, it must create a cadre of officers who lead units or organizations that contribute to the

shaping of tactical, operational, and strategic conditions. This includes expertise on the use of military force to create or sustain political stability, the ability to understand and advise civilian leaders on the political ramifications of military action, and the ability to shape the information environment—optimizing information as a political-military tool. Finally, the Army must develop officers who can prepare and build the Army of tomorrow by orchestrating complex systems within the Service and across DoD and also by procuring and building future Army systems.

Army systems depend on the skill and heart of the soldiers who use them, and officers play the critical role in the combined integration, synchronization, and employment of those soldiers and the systems they employ. High standards of performance—both individual officer skill and collective organizational skill—are required to maximize organizational performance. Therefore, officers must be given adequate time, education, and developmental experience as individuals to become outstanding leaders. Given the current trends of modern warfare, this entails developing officers with deep experience and expertise to meet all of the Army's complex systemic needs. It further suggests that leadership teams will need to spend a significant amount of time together to develop their collective skills and build cohesion so that the organization—as a whole—will be more effective.[5]

In addition, OPMS must engender experience and expertise for the whole range of skills required now and in the future. The Army will need world-class operational specialists expert at warfighting, capable of operating across the full spectrum of military operations, and competent at integrating Total Army assets in joint and combined operations. Further, the Army will need world-class functional and systems specialists able to design, build, and integrate current and future Army systems within the DoD structure; procure, manage, and provide resources to build the future; and provide technical or functional expertise not developed in the operational Army.

Strategic Vision for OPMS

Starting with a strategic approach, the Task Force first asked what ought to be expected of an officer personnel system that is already accessing and managing the officers who will lead the Army well into the 21st century. Fighting and winning the Nation's wars is becoming increasingly more complex and difficult. Therefore, OPMS XXI must recognize the constantly increasing complexity and difficulty of Army operations and adapt accordingly. Furthermore, the Army must produce officers of character who embrace and personify its values to lead its soldiers effectively under the demands and hardships of combat.

On the basis of its preliminary assessments, the Task Force formulated a vision describing optimum characteristics for OPMS into the 21st century. These characteristics, in order of priority, capture the overarching considerations that must be

[5] *Army After Next Annual Report*, Section 5, "Army After Next Soldiers and Their Units."

integrated into any action plan devised for OPMS. This would be accomplished by first considering the impact on readiness, then on organizational interests, and finally on the individual officer. There will be times when readiness or organizational interests will conflict with individual interests. The characteristics, taken together, serve to give balance to any decision with regard to its priority of importance to the Nation and the mission. Any portion of a plan that proves inconsistent with the goals should be reconsidered or adjusted. These goals are as follows:

Better for the Nation. Maintain readiness for today's warfighters, while building tomorrow's warfighting force. Adhere to sensible stewardship of resources and management of Army organizations.

Better for the Army. Remain uncompromising in supporting the tradition of values-based leadership while producing competent officers and highly trained, capable units.

Better for the Officer. Afford all officers challenging and fulfilling career options and reasonable opportunities for success. Provide them with the constructive, realistic feedback, through regular formal and informal counseling and mentoring, that they need to make informed career choices.

In order to achieve each of the OPMS XXI goals defined above, the Task Force identified the characteristics of a successful officer development system. Figure 1 identifies the 12 OPMS XXI characteristics generated by the Task Force.

Figure 1. OPMS XXI Goals and Their Characteristics

★ *Demonstrates responsible stewardship of national resources* ★ *Represents the diverse society it serves* ★ *Returns quality citizens to the Nation*	***Better for the Nation***
★ *Develops officers who personify enduring Army values* ★ *Integrates the Leader Development System and OPMS* ★ *Fosters sustained unit excellence* ★ *Matches operating inventory to authorizations* ★ *Promotes active component and reserve component interoperability* ★ *Develops officers who perform effectively in a joint environment* ★ *Develops motivated, competent, and experienced officers*	***Better for the Army***
★ *Establishes credible officer career opportunities* ★ *Helps officers form realistic expectations of career outcomes*	***Better for the Officer***

System Design Criteria

The CSA approved the following design criteria for OPMS XXI, which are derived from the 12 characteristics. The design criteria became the critical bench-

marks for the design of OPMS XXI:

- *Enhance the Army's warfighting capability.* This criterion requires that majors spend more time in branch-qualifying assignments such as battalion executive or operations officers. Simultaneously, OPMS XXI must reduce turbulence for officers in units.

- *Provide all officers with a reasonable opportunity for success.* This criterion requires that officers in all career fields have a reasonable—but not necessarily equal—opportunity for promotion.

- *Balance grades and skills at the field-grade level*. This criterion requires better alignment of authorizations and officer inventory. The objectives are to reduce upward grade substitution, increase levels of fill, and improve the experience levels of colonels serving in branch, functional area, and immaterial-coded positions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force formulated a series of recommendations to adapt OPMS to meet 21st century requirements. The recommendations involve how OPMS develops and trains Army officers, how inventory is aligned with officer requirements, and how OPMS fits into the larger officer development and human resource systems.

Career-Field-Based System

OPMS XXI restructures the Army Competitive Category by grouping branches and related functional areas into management categories called "career fields" (CFs). Officers will compete for promotion with other officers in the same CF. This will end the practice of "double counting" during promotion boards, in which selected officers count against promotion floors for their branch *and* their functional area. Under the new system, officers will count only against their branch or against their functional area. Each CF has its own distinct mission and development track for officers, reflecting the Army's readiness requirements today and into the 21st century. Officers in all CFs will be assigned across the Army in TOE and TDA organizations performing a wide variety of jobs. Figure 2 depicts the four CFs recommended by OPMS XXI.

Figure 2. OPMS XXI Four-Career-Field Concept



A description of the CFs follows:

- The *Operations (OP) CF* provides the Army with officers qualified by training, education, and experience in areas directly related to the employment of land forces. It is composed of officers in the ACC's 16 basic branches and two functional areas, FA 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) and FA 90 (Multifunctional Logistics). Officers in this CF will retain a functional area for the remainder of their careers, even if they never serve in it. However, a functional area designation indicates special aptitudes and skills that may provide flexibility for duty assignments at some later point.

- The *Information Operations (IO) CF* responds to the requirements of the 21st century information age, as addressed by *Army Vision 2010*, which identifies "gaining information dominance" as fundamental to all future Army patterns of operation. The IO CF brings together related disciplines with associated functional areas and creates several new ones. The functional areas in this CF are FA24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 46 (Public Affairs), FA 53 (Information Systems Management), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations).

- The *Institutional Support (IS) CF* focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The empha-

the IS CF is on management, planning, and programming of Army resources through the near, mid, and long term. The functional areas in this CF are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Faculty), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis), FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations).

- The *Operational Support (OS) CF* strengthens current readiness while building the future force through its liaison and acquisition specialties. This CF contains FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer) and the Army Acquisition Corps, which includes FA 51 (Research, Development and Acquisition), some FA 53B (Systems Automation Engineering), FA 53C (Systems Automation Acquisition), and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management).

Career Field Designation Process

CFs will be assigned to officers through the Career Field Designation Process. The process that the Task Force proposes will consist of the following steps:

- *OER input.* The new OER (DA Form 67-9) requires the rater and senior rater to recommend a CF for all ACC captains through lieutenant colonels. When recommending CFs for rated officers, rating officials will be advised to consider "the whole person," with factors such as demonstrated performance, undergraduate or graduate training, technical or unique expertise, military experience or training, in-depth understanding of a foreign culture, and so on. Recommended CFs will be one of several factors taken into consideration by the Career Field Designation Board (CFDB).

- *PERSCOM announcement of annual CFDB and guidance.* This announcement will provide information on dates and required procedures, as well as a guidance to the officer as he or she deliberates the best CF choice. This guidance is intended to inform eligible officers about the various CFs by providing the following information: number of CF designations eligible for that year; estimated number of officers, by branch, to be placed in each CF; and skill-level requirements for each of the four CFs. As part of the guidance, PERSCOM will also inform the field of any unique or evolving skills or aptitudes being sought by the various CFs that year that the officer may wish to highlight on the *Officer Career Field Preference Statement*.

- *Officer Career Field Preference Statement.* At the required time, the officer will complete the *Officer Career Field Preference Statement* and forward it to PERSCOM. Officers may change their CF preference in accordance with a schedule announced by PERSCOM. PERSCOM will collect the information and forward the officer's file, along with any additional request for change and supporting documentation, to the CFDB.

- *CFDB convened.* A formal CFDB will review the officer's total file, including the officer's requested preference, any additional information the officer may choose to submit, past performance, assignments, demonstrated skills and aptitudes, and the chain of command's input. The CFDB will have a serving division commander as its president. The members of the board will be colonels, at least 51% of whom will be current or former colonel-level commanders. All CFs will be represented on the CFDB.

- *Final approval.* The CFDB will forward its recommendations to the Office of the Chief of Staff for final approval.

Once a CF has been designated, crossover to another CF would occur only under limited circumstances and on the basis of the Army's needs.

Functional Areas

The Task Force recommends some additions to and deletions from functional areas. New functional areas recommended are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations). Functional areas considered for elimination are FA 41 (Personnel Management) and FA 54 (Operations and Force Development).

Inventory and Authorization Alignment

In FY99, field-grade officer authorizations will exceed the operating inventory by over 2,600. The inventory of officers at each grade is constrained by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), while officer authorizations are not. The DCSPER is presently using the Officer Restructuring Initiative (ORI) as the primary tool to bring authorizations into line with inventory.

Current major command (MACOM) command plans are not executable, since they contain hundreds of field-grade officer authorizations that will never be filled as a result of DOPMA constraints on officer inventory. There is no mechanism for limiting the number of officer authorizations documented by the MACOMs to fit the officer inventory that DOPMA allows at each grade. In addition, there is no means for ensuring that the number of authorizations in each branch and functional area is supportable by the officer inventory allowed by DOPMA. Since MACOMs have no requirement to take branch and functional area structures into consideration when documenting authorizations, the Army-wide aggregate authorizations for a branch or functional area may be unsupportable by the inventory of officers in that particular branch or functional area.

Balancing and aligning the field-grade authorizations is critical to the success of OPMS XXI. Branch and functional area authorizations will be used to determine

CF sizing at the CFDB. Also, authorizations are used to determine floors for promotion boards. What is needed, therefore, is a mechanism for limiting the authorizations that MACOMs are allowed to document so that they do not exceed the officer inventory allowed by DOPMA. In addition, a mechanism needs to be established that enables the MACOM requirements for branches and functional areas to be reviewed and aligned across the entire Army. This will help ensure that the total number of authorizations for a particular branch or functional area can in fact be filled by officers possessing the appropriate skills.

The Task Force, in conjunction with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS), the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) developed a proposal for aligning authorizations with inventory at the grade level of detail and for recoding the force at the skill level of detail. These realignments and recodings will be captured in FY00 TDA and TOE documentation and will take into account current authorization structure issues as well as the ORI results and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-directed cuts. It is intended that grade and skill constraints be applied to each MACOM during each authorization documentation cycle. It is also intended that the Army-wide review process for branch and functional area structures become an annual event, since this review will help in determining the grade and skill-level constraints for authorizations.

Accessions into Branches

Officer accessions into the basic branches will be as they are today, with officers serving their first 8 to 12 years developing the leadership and tactical skills associated with their branch. The branch detailing program for combat support and combat service support will continue. Officers will also continue to wear their branch insignia throughout their military service.

Promotion System

The current promotion system for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel will be replaced by one offering competition for promotion based on CF affiliation. Federal law guides promotion percentages. Centralized promotion boards will remain. At the grade of lieutenant colonel, promotion opportunity would be similar among the four CFs. There will be reasonable opportunity for promotion to colonel in all four CFs.

Command Selection

A board of officers will make selections into command categories. Selected officers will be distributed among four categories of command: (1) tactical, (2) training and strategic support (TSS), (3) institutional (garrison and recruiting

battalions), and (4) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) systems managers (TSMs) (for colonel only). The selection board will slate officers to a category, while PERSCOM will slate individual officers to specific commands. Officers may decline consideration in any or all categories. Primary selection in one category would preclude alternate status in another. To ensure that former lieutenant colonel-level commanders are not disadvantaged for promotion to colonel by the type of command they have held, promotions to colonel would be floored by type of command and by percentages to be determined.

Military Education

The Task Force believes that Military Education Level (MEL) 4 resident education is necessary for all Army officers to face 21st century challenges—but this is not an easy fix. It will require substantial planning, coordination, and commitment of resources to provide the right education and training across the four CFs. TRADOC is examining the feasibility and cost associated with restructuring its resident Command and General Staff College program to provide education to all officers promoted to the grade of major. This program will consist of a common core curriculum coupled with an additional phase tailored for each CF. We estimate that this new system will begin operating between the years 2000 and 2004. Furthermore, the Army is studying the feasibility of sending all officers selected for promotion to colonel to resident MEL 1, as recommended by the Task Force.

LEADER CONCERNS

As the Task Force proceeded in its work, feedback from the leadership and the officer corps in the field raised issues and concerns that needed to be addressed and balanced against the benefits of change. Those most frequently raised focused on facets of Army culture and notions of what it does and does not reward in an officer's career. The Task Force was sensitive to these concerns, since its proposed CF-based management system promised a significant departure from past notions of career opportunities and career success.

The Army culture is derived from its national security mission. Young officers are trained and developed in their warfighting roles from the outset. Through a series of unit assignments, lieutenants and captains are schooled in the "muddy boots" heritage: the knowledge that "soldiering" is a profession driven by technical expertise in the art of war, singleness of purpose, and enduring core values. Leadership and teamwork are emphasized and individual priorities subsumed by the needs of the mission.

OPMS XXI recognizes that the strategic driver for Army decisions and actions is operational readiness—the warfighting core of the Army. It also recognizes that the Army needs to emphasize its technical and specialty expertise to better prepare for the battlefield of today and tomorrow. While operational capabilities are still

paramount, it acknowledges that military specialties outside the operational arena are critical in preparing and shaping the Army for the 21st century world. In developing a CF-based management system, the Task Force addressed the broad areas of concern described below.

Retaining Warfighting Expertise and the "Muddy Boots" Culture

There was much concern in the field and on the part of the Army leadership that increasing career opportunities in specialty fields might deplete the operational/command track ranks. The Army is the preeminent ground fighting force in the world, and its leaders do not want to diminish this capability. However, the Army's leaders also are keenly aware that today's world is changing rapidly and that expertise on the battlefield today is not enough to prepare for tomorrow's faster, smarter, farther fight. The leadership also perceives that operational capability must be augmented with technical and specialty capabilities to invest and manage resources into the future. In studying the proposed changes, the Task Force struck a balance between preserving warfighting capability and increasing opportunities within specialty fields.

Under OPMS XXI, warfighting capabilities will be enhanced by keeping basic branch officers at the rank of major in branch-qualifying positions longer, resulting in greater unit stability and increased job expertise. It is a goal of OPMS XXI to afford every officer at the rank of major serving in the operations (OP) CF at least two years in a branch-qualifying assignment during a three-year stabilized operational tour. Under OPMS XXI, about two-thirds of the officer corps promoted to major will be designated into the OP CF, while the remaining one-third will be designated into one of the three specialty CFs—operational support (OS), institutional support (IS), or information operations (IO).

Officers in four of the combat arms branches (infantry, armor, field artillery, and air defense artillery) will be transferred to the three specialty CFs in larger numbers than those from the other branches. Up to half of the majors designated into the three specialty CFs will be drawn from the four combat arms branches. While at first this procedure would seem to deplete the pool of qualified combat arms officers disproportionately, the current reality is that these branches have fewer branch-specific and combat arms-immaterial jobs at the field-grade level than do the other branches. The result is tremendous competition for the smaller number of branch-qualifying jobs. Consequently, officers are rotated through these jobs in minimum time to get as many as possible branch-qualified. The result is officers with less experience and skill and units with higher officer turbulence and greater instability. With a smaller field-grade population in these four branches, assignment lengths will increase along with unit stability and officer troop experience.

Instilling the "Muddy Boots" Culture in "Specialist" Officers

OPMS XXI recognizes that the first 10 years of an officer's career are critical to instilling the right values and a sense of Army tradition and culture. It is during this time that all ACC officers are branch-qualified and prove their operational competence. Through these early operational assignments, young officers acquire an understanding of and appreciation for the "muddy boots" culture of the Army and its fighting mission. Therefore, any specialization in an officer's career should not occur until after these formative years, after selection to major. Furthermore, officers working in functional area positions are not isolated from troops, and this will not change in the future. At a minimum, the same percentage of functional area jobs existing today will continue to exist in the divisions, corps, and installations.

Link to Other Army Initiatives

Other ongoing Army initiatives are directly linked to OPMS XXI issues. These include the Leader and Character Development initiatives and the newly revised OER. The Army expects its officer corps to be capable warfighters and skilled professionals who also embody its core values and muddy boots culture. Any Army officer development system must also develop the officer's leadership skills and character. Since the OER is a fundamental tool in developing of the officer through his or her career, it also must be a part of the total officer development system. While OPMS XXI is not the proponent for the new OER, the Task Force has been working closely with the proponent to ensure that the new OER and OPMS XXI complement each other in their initiatives. For instance, the new OER will permit the chain of command to recommend a specific CF in which the rated officer may best serve.

Army National Guard/Army Reserve and Joint Assignments

First of all, joint service is directed by law, as is active component support to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Moreover, the reality of the fight—present and future—is that no service can go without its sister services and no active component without its Guard or Reserve. Army officers—active, Guard, and Reserve—are all part of the Total Army. Active component officers will be drawn from all four CFs, in support of Guard and Reserve units, making this integration even more relevant. Furthermore, the Army officer must be able to talk to sister service counterparts, as well as to civilian agencies, to leverage maximum power. "Joint" is not just a requirement—it is the way we fight. Accordingly, officer development must continue to recognize this need for "interoperability" across active/Guard/Reserve, joint, and interagency lines and explore new ways of enhancing this cooperation and integration. One such initiative being fielded is the integration of active component officers into Guard and Reserve units as commanders, operations officers, and executive officers—time that OPMS XXI recommends be branch-qualifying.

Relevance in the Coming Years

Some officers in the field have questioned the wisdom of changing OPMS at a time when so many unknowns on the planning horizon may necessitate additional change. As the uncertain future approaches and gradually reveals itself, today's fixes risk becoming irrelevant. To address the valid concern of preserving relevance and effectiveness into the evolving future, the Task Force has designed a system, through a periodic review process, that is flexible and adaptable as circumstances change.

In addition, the OPMS XXI Task Force believes that the officer personnel development system—which develops officers with the right skills, knowledge, and attributes—cannot be separated from programs focusing on character and leadership development. Therefore, as OPMS XXI plans are implemented, the Task Force recommends that OPMS XXI itself evolve into the next level of officer development system, "ODS XXI." ODS XXI would integrate character and leader development initiatives and work closely with the OER proponent to develop the total officer—in head and heart, in mind and body.

IMPLEMENTATION

As OPMS XXI recommendations are approved by the CSA, implementation will proceed. Starting 1 October 1997, it is expected to be phased in gradually over the subsequent five years. In the first year, implementation actions will be transparent to the officer in the field and will consist of preliminary actions necessary to build the OPMS CF-based management system. During FY98 and FY99, the new functional areas will be developed and positions will be coded in the authorization documents to accommodate the changes. At the same time, the Army will conduct an extensive information campaign to notify and educate the officer corps about OPMS XXI changes and how they will affect officers' careers. After the preliminary developmental work, the first CFDB is expected to be convened in the spring of 1999. By the summer of 2002, the Army will convene its first promotion boards to lieutenant colonel and colonel to consider the first year groups converted to the new system.

During the transition years, captains through lieutenant colonels, including single-track branch officers, may be assigned a functional area. By rank, here are additional actions an officer can expect:

- *Serving colonels and promotable lieutenant colonels.* These officers will *not* be affected. They will not be designated into CFs or have their functional areas reviewed. They can, however, decide to apply for a CF designation.

- *Lieutenant colonels and majors.* These officers will be designated into CFs before their next promotion board.
- *Lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains currently in FA 41 and FA 54.* These officers may have to go through the functional area designation process to receive new FAs before their next promotion board, if FAs 41 and FA 54 are eliminated as proposed.
- C*aptains and lieutenants in year group 1993 and earlier.* These officers will participate in the functional area designation process in their fifth year of service, as before, and will participate in the CF designation process in conjunction with their major's board.

Officers may request a change in their functional area any time before CF designation by coordinating with their PERSCOM branch manager.

Flexible and Adaptable: Officer Development Action Plans (ODAPs)

OPMS XXI concepts and recommendations will remain relevant and responsive, because they are designed to evolve through an annual review, feedback, and update process as requirements change. ODAPs will be initiated to implement and manage OPMS XXI programs, including CFs. These ODAPs will be periodically reviewed and assessed to ensure that they stay on course with their near-term objectives and long-term strategies. As military doctrine and requirements change in response to developments in the world scene and evolving technology, OPMS XXI will respond in turn, adjusting the ODAPs as necessary. Further, OPMS XXI recommends continuous improvement through its own evolution into ODS XXI.

OPMS XXI and ODS XXI are designed to minimize uncertainty by maximizing adaptability to ensure that officers are developed to meet current and future challenges capably—while remaining true to the tradition and core values of the American soldier. The Army is preparing for 21st century military operations through its work in Force XXI, Army 2010, and Army After Next. But even as the Army prepares for the next century, it must remain ready to meet the many security challenges present today. With periodic self-assessment, OPMS XXI and the successor ODS XXI will continue to develop officers that the Army needs to remain ready—ready today and ready tomorrow.

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction 1-1
OVERVIEW 1-1
ADAPTABILITY AND CHANGE 1-2
A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 1-3
CONVENING THE OPMS XXI TASK FORCE 1-3
GUIDANCE 1-3
OTHER GUIDANCE—BACKGROUND RESEARCH 1-5
MISSION AND PURPOSES 1-5
THE CHALLENGE 1-6
A TWO-PHASED APPROACH 1-7

Chapter 2 Task Force Methodology 2-1
OVERVIEW 2-1
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 2-1
KEY PLAYERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 2-2
BROADENING THE FRAMEWORK 2-3
DELINEATING THE PROBLEM 2-5
ASSUMPTIONS 2-5
OPMS XXI GOALS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND DESIGN CRITERIA 2-7
MODELING AND ANALYSIS 2-8
CONCLUSION 2-8

Chapter 3 What's Right Today? 3-1
STARTING WITH WHAT IS RIGHT TODAY 3-1
OPMS PURPOSE AND TASKS 3-1
OFFICERSHIP 3-2
WARFIGHTING IS THE OFFICER CORPS' FIRST PRIORITY 3-3
VALUES AND CHARACTER 3-4
WHAT OFFICERS SHOULD EXPECT OF THE ARMY 3-5

SUCCESS 3-6
COMPANY-GRADE DEVELOPMENT AND CENTRALIZED SELECTION 3-8

Chapter 4 The Case for Change 4-1
ASKING THE STRATEGIC QUESTIONS FIRST 4-1
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND OFFICER REQUIREMENTS 4-4
ASSESSING TODAY'S OPMS 4-4
THE IMPACT OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OFFICER INVENTORY AND AUTHORIZATIONS 4-6
SKILL MISMATCHES BY GRADE AT THE FIELD-GRADE LEVEL 4-7
OFFICER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS 4-10
FIELD-GRADE TURBULENCE, LEADER TEAM INTEGRITY, AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS 4-13
FUNCTIONAL AREA EXPERIENCE IN THE "SPECIALTY SKILLS" 4-14
ASSESSING OPMS FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD 4-15
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 4-15
CONCLUSIONS 4-16
BOTTOM LINE 4-17

Chapter 5 OPMS XXI System Design 5-1
IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 5-1
CAREER-FIELD-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 5-2
CAREER FIELD DESIGNATION PROCESS 5-4
FUNCTIONAL AREAS 5-5
BRANCHES 5-5
PROMOTIONS 5-5
COMMAND SELECTIONS 5-5

Chapter 6 OPMS XXI—A Strategic Approach to Human Resource Management 6-1

Chapter 7 Task Force Recommendations 7-1
CREATING A HOLISTIC SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS 7-1
Strategic Recommendation 1: Adopt a Strategic Approach to Human Resource Management 7-1

Strategic Recommendation 2: Create an Officer Development System as Part of an Overarching Army Development System....7-3

Strategic Recommendation 3: Create an Officer Career-Field-Based Management System....7-5

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 1: Structure....7-7

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 2: Distribute....7-8

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 3: Acquire....7-9

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 4: Develop....7-10

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 5: Sustain....7-13

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 6: Compensate....7-14

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 7: Separate....7-14

Chapter 8 Implementation.... 8-1

Chapter 9 Conclusion—Implications for the Future.... 9-1

Glossary

Bibliography

Charter

OPMS XXI Task Force Members

OPMS XXI Implementation Team Members

Annexes (Published In OPMS XXI Study Final Report Volumes II–IV)

ANNEX A: ..... LIFE-CYCLE FUNCTION ANALYSIS
ANNEX B: .....CAREER FIELD, BRANCH, AND FUNCTIONAL AREA LIFE-CYCLE FUNCTIONS
ANNEX C: ..... MODELING AND ANALYSIS
ANNEX D: .....RECOMMENDATION DECISION PAPERS
ANNEX E: .....PRECURSOR STUDY GROUP ISSUES
ANNEX F:..... AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF AND SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE EDUCATION
ANNEX G: ..... ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OPMS XXI SURVEY RESULTS
ANNEX H: ..... RAND ASSESSMENT OF OPMS XXI
ANNEX I: .....LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 1
Introduction

> It's now time to take a holistic review of OPMS processes and systems—as we know them today.[1]

OVERVIEW

This report is about the need for fundamental change in the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The focal point of the study has been the future, not the present. While there are fundamental issues of pressing concern today, the OPMS XXI Task Force believes that they must be resolved in the context of developing an officer corps that will meet the challenges of the early 21st century—to lead Army XXI in mastering the capabilities and functions outlined in *Army Vision 2010; Joint Vision 2010;* and DA PAM 100-XX*, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign*. In short, OPMS must address the needs of the future as well as correct the problems existing today.

Fundamentally, this report argues that the current officer personnel system requires officers to do too many different things at the field grades to become excellent at any one of them. The requirements of Army XXI only portend to exacerbate this problem. If the purpose of an officer personnel system is to promote organizational excellence—and organizational excellence is directly tied to experience, expertise, and teamwork—then OPMS must be redesigned to give officers the greatest opportunity possible to develop the appropriate skills at each level of responsibility.

Change is difficult, and OPMS XXI asks the officer corps to begin adjusting some of its most fundamental cultural predispositions—perhaps the most difficult aspect of change.[2] It also acknowledges that ultimately the success or failure of any new system depends upon the power of the underlying idea behind it and the execution of the all-important details in support of that idea. This study is extremely ambitious and broad in its scope, and it will take many years before its recommendations are fully realized as mature pieces of a new OPMS.

Accordingly, the OPMS XXI Task Force sees the completion of this year-long study and the issuance of this report as merely the completion of the first phase of a continuing effort. OPMS XXI will be a work in progress from this point on. Many details have yet to be filled in, and some of the basic concepts will be trans-

[1] Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, Army.

[2] Jim Dewar et al., *Army Culture and Planning in a Time of Great Change,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994, 5-19. See also Carl H. Builder's *The Masks of War*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, 39-43.

formed into something different from what was originally conceived. But this is natural and to be expected. That is why the Task Force strongly advocates that OPMS XXI become a living system that the Army cyclically reviews and adjusts as necessary. It will become better and stronger through successive refinement. Thus, it is best to think of OPMS XXI as a voyage with the current study as its first leg.

ADAPTABILITY AND CHANGE

One of the strengths of the Army has been its adaptability and responsiveness to the domestic and world environment in which it finds itself. The past quarter century, in particular, has been testimony to the Army's willingness to reshape itself continually. That period is replete with initiatives designed to move the Army forward by keeping pace with evolving national strategy, new doctrine, emerging technology, and resultant organizational change. Many of these initiatives have focused on the officer corps, and two in particular have looked closely at the Officer Personnel Management System. The OPMS I and II Studies each recommended substantial change that qualitatively improved the officer corps as a whole and the system managing it.

This OPMS XXI Study, the third and latest of these studies since 1971, reexamines the officer personnel management system in the context of the many significant events affecting the Army since the last OPMS study in 1984. The vastly altered strategic landscape brought about by the end of the Cold War, the explosion of new information-age technologies, the increasing use of the U.S. military in non-traditional missions such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, and DoD's evolution toward a fully integrated and coherent joint approach to military operations have spawned new requirements or constraints significantly affecting OPMS. This study assesses OPMS in light of these changes as part of a larger, holistic system—the Army within DoD—in which component subsystems like OPMS must be integrated, mutually supporting, and coherent to achieve the larger organizational goals of the evolving Army.

Ultimately the Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation's wars. The officer corps is entrusted first with the mission to keep the force trained and ready and second to lead that force to win in combat. OPMS, first and foremost then, is about developing officer leaders with the requisite skills, knowledge, and attributes to perform their central role in keeping the U.S. Army the preeminent ground force in the world.

While the precepts and goals have not changed, the environment in which they must be achieved has. It is the purpose of this document, then, to assess the effect on OPMS of the environmental changes generally identified above and make the recommendations necessary to move the system into the 21st century.

A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Over the last 14 years the Army has experienced significant changes that have had widespread effects on the officer personnel system. The most apparent of these changes have been the drawdown of the Army at the end of the Cold War and those resulting from three major legislative initiatives: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, and Title VII and XI legislation for active component/reserve component (AC/RC) support in 1992 and 1993. These events—coupled with a 12-year span since the last formal review of OPMS and the explosion of information-age technology with its attendant operational and personnel implications—prompted the DCSPER, with the CSA's consent, to assemble a small team of senior field-grade officers and begin looking at a series of specific issues pertaining to OPMS. Their purpose would be to help him determine whether a general review of the entire officer system was warranted. This "OPMS XXI Precursor Study Group" fell under the direction of the Commanding General, PERSCOM; it ultimately reviewed more than 60 individual issues, 57 of which went forward to the DCSPER. The collective body of these issues convinced the DCSPER that a comprehensive study was indeed warranted, and in May 1996, he recommended to the CSA, General Reimer, that the Army initiate its third formal OPMS study, OPMS XXI.

CONVENING THE OPMS XXI TASK FORCE

General Reimer convened the Officer Personnel Management System XXI Task Force in July 1996 to review and update OPMS, as necessary, to ensure that the system continues to develop officers who best meet the challenges in a changing world. The Army as an institution must develop officers not only prepared to fight and win today's wars, but also those of the uncertain future. Accordingly, he instructed the Task Force to link its work with the Army's ongoing future planning efforts: Force XXI for the near term, Army XXI initiatives for the mid term, and Army After Next projections for the long-term planning environment.

GUIDANCE

In designing the system for the future, General Reimer directed the Task Force to create a conceptual framework that integrates OPMS with the Leader Development System, ongoing character development initiatives, and the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER). He also emphasized that while warfighting must remain the paramount skill of the officer corps, the Army should begin to foster officers who thoroughly understand how the Army works as an institution. Implicit in this guidance was the requirement to examine the advisability of focused career paths, both in the operational Army and in the institutional Army. A related and equally important issue was how the Army ought to educate and train the officers of the future, ensuring that they will be able to play the leading role in transforming the

Army into a learning organization. Finally, General Reimer directed the Task Force to reexamine what "success" should mean for the officer corps. The OPMS XXI Study Charter, signed by the CSA, appears after the bibliography.

Highlights of additional, specific guidance and implied tasks are as follows:

- The OPMS XXI Study is a top priority and absolutely critical for the future Army. Focus on the post-Cold War world.
- The OPMS XXI Task Force works directly for the CSA.
- OPMS XXI must be linked to the new OER, the update of the Leader Development System and the Leader XXI Campaign Plan, and the Character Development XXI initiative.
- Warfighting must remain the paramount skill of the United States Army. However, warfighting is not the only skill we need. We must have officers who understand how the Army works and those who are able to handle such complex functions as installation management, acquisition, and logistics, among others.
- Broaden the definition of warfighting. It must incorporate the prevention of war.
- Define "success" for Army XXI. Is it rank, or is it contribution of service?
- Development of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) must be country/region-oriented. However, FAOs must also be credible in terms of their knowledge of the United States Army and have operational experience based on assignments in Army warfighting units.
- OPMS XXI must account for the recent major changes our Army has undergone with respect to the interface between Army components: active, National Guard, and reserve. The opportunity now exists to fully integrate all components of the Total Army.
- Examine different approaches to training. Differentiate between skill training (i.e., training that teaches people the skills they need to succeed in the Army as professionals) and cultural training (i.e., training that focuses on understanding the Army as an institution, its values, ethics, purpose, and mission).
- Examine the need to change the Army's Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) from an *operating institution* to an *operating and learning institution*.
- Examine a single track for command.

OTHER GUIDANCE—BACKGROUND RESEARCH

Warfighting doctrine written for military operations in the 21st century envisions very intense, highly lethal, short-duration engagements fought by smaller, leader-intensive units scattered across an ill-defined battle area. Recent experiments involving Force XXI and the Army After Next have demonstrated that the Army must continue to develop leaders with a keen appreciation for and understanding of the historical perspective of war. However, the results also suggest that officers may need to acquire new analytical and cognitive skills for thinking through and solving complex military problems in the future.

The success of Army units will continue to depend upon leaders who are intellectually agile, logical, creative, and innovative in their thinking, and who are also bold and audacious decision-makers. However, the nature of future military problems and operating environments may demand new skills, knowledge, and attributes of officers. For example, recent Force XXI Army warfighting experiments at Fort Hood, Texas, and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, demonstrated the need for officers who are comfortable commanding, leading, and managing in high-technology environments. Mission success of Force XXI units also depended upon how well the leaders managed and operated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems to build and maintain a relevant common picture of the battlespace and synchronize military operations. The importance of these lessons learned cannot be overstated: the extent to which we exploit future advances in military and C4I technologies may eventually determine our effectiveness as a fighting force.

MISSION AND PURPOSES

On the basis of this guidance, the Task Force conducted a detailed mission analysis. The mission that resulted had three major tasks and three purposes. The Task Force's major tasks were as follows:

- Review OPMS and recommend appropriate changes.
- Recommend an executable conceptual framework for OPMS XXI that integrates the Task Force's work with the ongoing Leader XXI, Character Development 2000, and new OER initiatives.
- Design an implementation strategy for the Task Force's recommendations that provides a mechanism for periodic reviews and updates.

To accomplish the first two tasks, the Task Force would have to design a system satisfying three purposes:

- Address Total Army and joint requirements into the 21st century.

- Develop officers with the appropriate skills, knowledge, and attributes to fight the Army successfully and run it expertly as an institution.
- Develop officers whose behavior exemplifies Army values.

This mission entails developing an officer corps that can effectively shape, train, and lead the Army 25 years from now.

THE CHALLENGE

The Task Force's challenge was to create an evolutionary path for an officer corps of an Army that does not yet exist. What Army organizations, doctrine, and training will look like 15 to 20 years from now is a matter of conjecture. They may be very similar to today's, and then again they may be appear completely foreign to those who serve today. Rather than attempting to predict what the future Army and its officer corps will look like over the long term and design the system accordingly, the Task Force chose instead to build an adaptable OPMS that can adjust itself to the conditions of the world in which it finds itself—sustaining what is best about the current system while at the same time shaping itself for the future.

The task then became to chart an azimuth to the future, first by identifying what strategic end OPMS should fundamentally serve for the Army, and then by formulating a coherent and complete set of enduring objectives that will cause OPMS to attain that end. Once these are formulated, the next step would be to begin shaping OPMS as a system to best achieve them. The strategic end and supporting objectives would define what a strong and healthy OPMS ought to do for the Army. Thus, the critical component would be the ends desired, not the specific operating mechanisms to achieve them. The design problem thus would be to identify what elements of OPMS should change to better achieve these objective characteristics. The critical idea was to shape the future force by anticipating potential future skill and developmental requirements and then to address them in the context of achieving the fundamental end and strategic objectives for OPMS.

Whatever changes the Task Force members might consider, however, they had to think of the system-wide impact of these changes. OPMS is a multi-faceted, interrelated, adaptive system whose elements are highly interdependent—much like an ecosystem. It is a complicated network of multiple cause-and-effect relationships in which components react or adapt to each other as one or another piece of the system changes. Many component elements are in direct tension with each other. Further, one change could affect multiple subsystems, which in turn could set off their own set of causal relationships. As in an ecosystem, a well-intentioned change in one region of OPMS could produce unintentional—even disastrous—effects elsewhere if not examined in terms of its system-wide repercussions.

As a result, a strategic systems or holistic approach to design had to be undertaken, ultimately with systemic balance and symbiosis being the most crucial is-

sues. The Task Force realized that in all likelihood none of its design criteria—which were all derived from the objective OPMS characteristics—could be truly optimized. They could only be met to some greater or lesser degree as they balanced in tension with other, competing criteria. In other words, no one criterion could be maximized without jeopardizing the fulfillment of others.

A TWO-PHASED APPROACH

This conceptual understanding of the task at hand led the Task Force to break the study into two stages. During the first stage, the Task Force conducted a thorough assessment of the current OPMS by examining a variety of issues generated by the OPMS XXI Precursor Study Group and other sources. In conducting this assessment, the Task Force asked three basic questions:

- What is right with the current OPMS and should be sustained?
- What is wrong with the current OPMS and should be changed?
- What is right with the current OPMS that could be wrong or inadequate under projected future conditions and thus should be changed?

The primary objective of this first stage was to identify the systemic problems and significant trends that could drive change in OPMS, understand their dynamics, and determine which problems and trends require major change in OPMS.

If a requirement for change could be established, the second stage would then revolve around redesigning OPMS. This stage would include establishing the problem-solving methodology, identifying design alternatives, and conducting the appropriate comparative analysis. The intent of this stage would be to address today's OPMS problems on the way to building an officer corps with the right mix of skills and developmental paths to meet the needs of Army XXI. The product would be a feasible conceptual framework for a new OPMS.

Chapter 2
Task Force Methodology

OVERVIEW

OPMS XXI addresses the need for fundamental changes to the current system. The Task Force addressed issues on two levels: changes to correct near-term operational problems, and those bearing on longer term strategic problems that will confront the officer corps in the early 21st century. This meant developing a highly robust methodology for examining a broad range of officer management and development issues. It also meant incorporating rolling planning horizons for making proactive assessments of Army leader development and providing feedback for senior Army leaders. This approach benefits the personnel community by anticipating leader development and personnel management problems before they arise so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken before the problems become critical.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The Task Force formulated the following high-level objective for this study:

> Design an Officer Professional Management System for the Army of the 21st century (OPMS XXI), within time and cost constraints, that meets future officer management and professional development needs of the Army for staffing a trained and ready Army that is able to successfully conduct future military operations.

To achieve this objective, the Task Force examined four fundamental areas of officer management—officer education, leader development, sustaining the officer corps (sustainment), and distribution of officers by grade and skill (e.g., branch and functional area)—all of which are necessary for meeting the Army's warfighting and institutional requirements. Within each area, the Task Force addressed specific problems stemming from downsizing, congressional legislation, and policy decisions. The Task Force assessed gaps in current leader development created by emerging defense strategy and new military and information technologies. For example, the importance of information warfare and its threat to future military operations suggested the need for a new career field for information operations. The Task Force also addressed grade and skill imbalances across the force created by past policies for accessing and managing officers.

KEY PLAYERS AND STAKEHOLDERS

The decision-maker for this study was the Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer. The clients were the officer corps and commanders and directors of key Army agencies responsible for managing and developing it. These include the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) Commander. Other key players included the Chief of Staff's four-star advisors, referred to as the Board of Directors (BoD), and other general officers and civilian leaders who either advise the Army Chief of Staff on important matters or who can have an impact on OPMS XXI decision outcomes.

The OPMS XXI Study Director, Major General David H. Ohle, routinely briefed the CSA and other key players throughout the Army and DoD to build consensus for officer management changes recommended by the Task Force. Other important stakeholders included the following:

- Selected Members of Congress
- The Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
- The Secretary of the Army
- The Joint Staff
- The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
- The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
- The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management
- The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
- Major Command (MACOM) Commanders
- The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
- The Chief of the National Guard Bureau
- Corps Commanders
- The Inspector General of the Army

- The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research (DUSA/OR)
- The Judge Advocate General
- Division Commanders
- Army Branch School Commandants
- Army Functional Area Proponents

Figure 2-1 depicts the OPMS XXI Task Force organization and its relationship to the decision-maker, clients, and key OPMS XXI players.

Figure Chapter 2 -1. OPMS XXI Task Force Organization and Key Players



OPMS XXI Task Force members represented every Army branch and functional area. Members of the OPMS XXI Task Force Council of Colonels (CoC) represented every MACOM and major subordinate command. The Council of Colonels met quarterly at the request of the Study Director to provide the Task Force with feedback and ideas for improving OPMS XXI.

BROADENING THE FRAMEWORK

Because the Army is an extremely large, complex organization, in studying officer management and development issues, the Task Force found it impossible to separate the people who lead, manage, and staff it from how it is organized, functions, and operates. This made it very important to consider relevant issues from related fields. For example, a review of lessons learned from previous OPMS studies highlighted the importance of carefully considering human resources and human factors from an organizational viewpoint in designing an Army Officer Development System. Background research also made it apparent that generating innovative and

meaningful alternatives for solving current officer management problems would require broadening the scope of OPMS XXI.

Expanding the framework of analysis allowed the Task Force to describe OPMS XXI in terms of a broader, higher level problem—namely, reengineering the Army for military operations in the 21st century. Figure 2-2 below illustrates a top-down view of major components of the Army that might be included in a higher level Army reengineering problem. These are the warfighting component of the Army (i.e., TOE force structure), institutional operations (i.e., TDA structure), management of the Army as a system (i.e., MACOM headquarters and staffs, and lower level commands), and personnel management and development systems for commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted, and civilians. By framing OPMS XXI within the context of a higher level problem, the Task Force better understood how OPMS XXI alternatives might have an impact on one or more of the major Army components shown in Figure 2-2. Responsibility for each area is shown in parentheses. Sections shown in bold represent Army functions and subfunctions directly related to OPMS XXI.

Figure Chapter 2 -2. High-Level Framework for Reengineering the Army



DELINEATING THE PROBLEM

After defining the problem, identifying key players and stakeholders, and expanding the framework of analysis, the next step was to determine the boundaries of the OPMS XXI problem. The CSA chartered the OPMS XXI Task Force to design an officer management and development system to meet the need for both generalist and specialist officers. However, the CSA's charter did not include reengineering other components of the Army depicted in Figure 2–2, even though they are all interrelated and most directly affect officer management in one way or another. This significantly complicated the tasks of delineating the problem and of designing subfunctions for the OPMS XXI officer life-cycle model.

In general, the Task Force examined all aspects of officer professional development, including officer life-cycle functions, selection for promotion, commands, and professional military schools (Military Education Level (MEL) 4 and 1 only). Considerations that helped focus the Task Force's efforts within time, budget, and manpower constraints are discussed below:

- OPMS XXI addressed only the active component, although the Task Force did consider issues of AC/RC alignment and connectivity from a personnel management perspective.
- Within the active component, the scope of the problem was further limited to the Army Competitive Category (ACC).
- Within the ACC of the active component, the Task Force concentrated on field-grade officer development and did not address company-grade, warrant-officer, or general-officer development.
- Balancing the ACC field-grade officer structure was by grade and skill (branch and functional area).
- The Task Force did not examine options for creating, eliminating, or combining Army branches. However, it did consider such options for functional areas.
- The Task Force did not directly address the creation or fielding of the new OER, except for linking it with other components of a comprehensive Officer Development System (ODS).

ASSUMPTIONS

Major assumptions underlying the study came primarily from two sources. First, the Task Force based many assumptions on study guidance from the CSA and other senior Army leaders. Additional assumptions were derived from background

research by the Task Force into potential future officer personnel management requirements. Areas studied included literature on the information age, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), the impact of information technology on Army organizations, and lessons learned from Force XXI Army warfighting experiments (AWEs) and Army After Next (AAN) wargames.

Major OPMS XXI design assumptions used by the Task Force are given below:

- Aggregate Army force structure and officer requirements, as measured by officer authorizations, will not increase over the next three to five years. Thus, new functional areas and career fields will be created from authorizations that exist today.
- Authorizations allocated to MACOMs may be recoded under any OPMS XXI option.
- At some future time, an Army-wide realignment of officer authorizations and inventory will occur by grade and skill through initiatives such as the Management of Authorizations by Grade and Skill (MAGS), currently referred to as the Officer Restructuring Initiative (ORI).
- Recommendations for changing DoD policies and congressional laws governing officer management may not be implemented in the near term. However, they may be in the mid term to long term (i.e., 10 to 20 years).
- The potential impact of external uncontrollable factors on OPMS XXI, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), will not be considered in detail by the Task Force.
- Current funding levels for officer professional development and management will continue into the foreseeable future.
- In the near term, officer career progression will continue as an up-or-out system and will comply with DOPMA promotion constraints for time-in-grade (TIG), promotion opportunity and percentages, and career lengths governing separations and retirements.
- Officer continuation patterns will be consistent with those of the pre-drawdown Army of 1988 and 1989.
- In the future, officer compensation and benefits may vary by Army branch or functional area, depending upon the Army's needs.

OPMS XXI GOALS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND DESIGN CRITERIA

The Task Force, after surveying the current system and articulating the case for change, formulated goals and characteristics for an officer personnel management system for the next century. The three goals formulated by the Task Force for evaluating and prioritizing OPMS XXI alternatives are as follows:

Better for the Nation: First and foremost, maintain national military readiness of the Army. Effectively link the active component with the Army National Guard and Reserve forces, sister services, and civilian agencies to share resources and combine expertise to achieve optimum results in all types of missions.

Better for the Army: Remain uncompromising regarding the tradition of values-based leadership while producing competent officers and highly trained, capable units. Adhere to sensible stewardship of resources and management of Army organizations.

Better for the Officer: Afford all officers challenging and fulfilling career options and reasonable opportunities for success. Provide each officer with the constructive, realistic feedback, through regular formal and informal counseling and mentoring, that they need to make informed career choices.

For each OPMS XXI goal defined above, the Task Force also identified characteristics of a successful officer development system. The characteristics simultaneously served as OPMS XXI design criteria. Table 2-1 identifies the OPMS XXI characteristics generated by the Task Force for each goal.

Table Chapter 2 -1. OPMS XXI Goals and Their Characteristics

★ *Demonstrates responsible stewardship of national resources* ★ *Represents the diverse society it serves* ★ *Returns quality citizens to the Nation*	***Better for the Nation***
★ *Develops officers who personify enduring Army values* ★ *Integrates the Leader Development System and OPMS* ★ *Fosters sustained unit excellence* ★ *Matches operating inventory to authorizations* ★ *Promotes active component and reserve component interoperability* ★ *Develops officers who perform effectively in a joint environment* ★ *Develops motivated, competent, and experienced officers*	***Better for the Army***
★ *Establishes credible officer career opportunities* ★ *Helps officers form realistic expectations of career outcomes*	***Better for the Officer***

The goals and characteristics helped the Task Force formulate officer development action plans (ODAPs) for OPMS XXI. The goals and characteristics were also used to make somewhat subjective evaluations of officer development options in considering the impact of each option on national military readiness, Army organizational interests, the officer corps, and individual officers. For each OPMS option where goals appeared to be in contention with one another, the Task Force resolved differences by weighting (prioritizing) the importance of each option according to its value to the Nation, to the Army, and, finally, to the officer.

MODELING AND ANALYSIS

The Task Force developed a family of models for evaluating the feasibility of options generated for OPMS XXI: a strategic, system dynamics human resources model; exact promotion opportunity and asset utilization models; a heuristic officer inventory projection model; discrete-event officer life-cycle simulation models; and a cost forecasting model. See Annex C for a discussion of each model in the family. The following criteria were used throughout the study to build officer career fields, assess officer life-cycle functions, and evaluate the feasibility of OPMS XXI options:

- Enhance the warfighting capability of the Army, as measured by (1) increased branch-qualifying (BQ) time for Army majors and (2) reduced turbulence (i.e., increased stability) for officers serving in the operations career field.
- Provide officers with reasonable promotion and command opportunity.
- Balance grades and skills at the field-grade level, as measured in terms of the following performance criteria: (1) reductions in the number of officers needed to fill positions coded for officers in the next higher grade, (2) officer utilization and percentage of positions filled across the force, and (3) cumulative experience at the grade of colonel and the time required to achieve requisite experience for that grade.

CONCLUSION

Recent Army warfighting experiments have revealed a need for officers with skills, knowledge, and attributes different from those required in the past. For the Task Force, this meant that the Army must develop officers with appropriate professional military education, civil schooling, training, and military experience to solve a wider range of military problems in the future. To accomplish this by the early 21st century, we recognized that the Army must begin making changes now to how officers are trained, educated, and professionally developed. Over time, this will ensure that the Army has an appropriate mix of generalist and specialist offi-

cers with the with the right skills, knowledge, and attributes to solve future problems—problems that may be substantially different from today's.

Chapter 3
What's Right Today?

> Embracing change does not mean abandoning a core of values and precepts. We must balance our desire for continuity with our desire to be creative.[3]

STARTING WITH WHAT IS RIGHT TODAY

Before embarking on any redesign initiatives, the Task Force examined the current system to determine what features work well today and should be preserved. In this examination, it found much about OPMS that is strong and vital. What follows are the powerful and important features of today's system that must be central to any future OPMS design and that must therefore be preserved.

OPMS PURPOSE AND TASKS

The basic purpose of OPMS is to enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the officer corps. It encompasses all policies and procedures by which Army officers are procured, trained, developed, assigned, evaluated, promoted, and separated from active duty. The current system is designed to accomplish four tasks: First, procure and designate officers in the right numbers and with the right skills to satisfy current and projected requirements. Second, develop the professional capacities of officers through planned schooling and sequential, progressive assignments. Third, assign officers to meet Army requirements. Finally, separate officers in a way that will meet Army needs.[4]

The purpose and tasks just articulated are enduring and relatively unchanging. They clearly define what OPMS ought to do for the Army, and the OPMS XXI Task Force wholeheartedly endorses them. How OPMS accomplishes this purpose and its associated missions is the issue under consideration in this report. Accordingly, the Task Force focused on how the system could better accomplish them in light of current conditions and those most likely to occur in the near future.

---

[3] Interview with Ed Simon, President and CEO of Herman Miller, in Peter Senge's *The Fifth Discipline*, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990, 349.

[4] DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, 8 June 1995.

OFFICERSHIP

Before analyzing the current system, it is useful to review what officers do for the Army and their unique roles and responsibilities. LTG (Ret) Frederic Brown puts it this way:

> The…commissioned officer leads the fight, deciding what is to be done and when. He or she is concerned with the larger goals of the organization, determining when new circumstances dictate change, in accordance with broad conceptual direction.[5]

These words capture the essence of what officers do. Officers are the uniformed leaders of the Army—at all levels. Their primary output is integrating the efforts of soldiers in effective, collective action—both on the battlefield and off. Accordingly, they serve in duty positions associated with leading people and managing the direction, performance, and resources of organizations. Importantly, they are professionally developed through a balanced sequence of education, training, and experience that prepares them for service at increasingly higher levels of responsibility.[6] Implicit here is the requirement to set the professional and ethical tone in every organization they lead or belong to. They imbue the warfighting ethos in their units, and they are the moral exemplars for their subordinates. The Task Force identified the following as key to what officers do for the Army:

- Officers are experts at warfighting and the organized application of violence.
- Officers articulate and embody the Army ethic by their focus on warfighting as the Army's reason for being and their fostering of core Army values.
- Officers provide uniformed, organizational leadership in the following ways:
  - Provide long-term vision and planning for the Army.
  - Establish and maintain the Army's professional standards.

---

[5] Harry Thie et al., *Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, New York: Vintage Books, 8-10. Huntington, in describing the professional character of the officer corps, identifies expertise, responsibility, and corporateness as its defining three key elements. According to him, an officer is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in the art of war and its related activities. The essential and general character of his military service and his monopoly military skill impose on the officer the responsibility to perform his military duties when required by society. He can no longer be a military professional if he refuses to accept his social responsibility. Finally, officers, as members of a profession, share a sense of unity and of being part of a special group apart from others. This collective sense is grounded in the unique discipline, education, training, work, and responsibilities peculiar to the military.

- Assume ultimate responsibility for the organization's actions and their results.
- Maintain trained and ready units or organizations.

- Officers bring military expertise to the design and management of Army and DoD systems.

While warrant officers, NCOs, and Department of the Army civilians can and often do assume one or more of the responsibilities articulated above, they rarely carry out all of them. Officers, on the other hand, almost universally assume all of these responsibilities at some point. The operative words above are "organizational," "uniformed," and "systems," for uniformed, organizational leadership and direction—as well military systems expertise—fall almost wholly in the province of commissioned officers.

Officers, then, are responsible for everything their organization does or fails to do, and this translates either into preparing the Army to perform its operational missions today or into setting the systemic conditions in the institutional Army so that it can successfully perform its mission tomorrow. In sum, then, if the Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation's wars, then the officer corps' primary purpose is to keep that Army trained and ready and then lead it to victory when called upon.

WARFIGHTING IS THE OFFICER CORPS' FIRST PRIORITY

While the Army has been committed to a number of missions at the lower end of the operational spectrum over the past several years, its core purpose remains to fight and win the Nation's wars. The training and development systems in place are all designed to hone warfighting skills across the officer corps and across the force in general. Accordingly, developmental assignment patterns and schooling generally support this end. These are great strengths of the Army that should be sustained and built upon. The key issue for the future is not whether OPMS supports building premier warfighters and operational specialists but how well it will be able to do so in the face of current trends, the evolving strategic environment, and the nature of future warfare.

VALUES AND CHARACTER

An organization's strategic purpose and core values constitute its core ideology.[7] Great organizations take active steps toward suffusing their core ideology throughout the organization. Organizational values must not only support and be coherent with the core purpose—they must also be absolutely essential to its attainment. In the strongest, most visionary, and most adaptive organizations, the core ideology provides the strategic azimuth and guides their goals, strategy, tactics, and organizational design.[8] Hence, officer values and character are central to sustaining the Army if it is to remain unsurpassed.

Fundamental to the Army's officer system are the values it promotes and the behavior it expects of its officers. As a values-based organization, the Army expects its officers to embody its institutional values and expects its officer personnel management system to set the conditions that foster ethical behavior in consonance with the Army's purpose and warfighting ethos. The rigors of combat demand moral judgment and restraint in the face of extreme hardship and mortal danger. And the Army demands leaders with the innate spirit to lead their soldiers under fire with determination and courage, achieving success in combat.

Officers develop moral judgment and assimilate Army values only through habitual practice, guidance, and reflection on their actions over time. Hence, if the Army expects to have officers of character, it must invest in their development routinely over the course of their careers. This requires the Army's leadership to articulate the Army's values clearly, foster them constantly, and enforce them strictly.

All of these conditions occur today, but they still require eternal vigilance, as recent events have clearly shown. Hence, any officer development system—of which OPMS is a major part—ought to have systemic mechanisms to foster the Army ethic. Counseling and evaluating officers regarding their ethical conduct is as important as the training and education they get. Thus, it is important to establish formal systems to provide feedback to individual officers about their moral conduct and personal character development and to the Army leadership about the general moral health of the officer corps. These feedback mechanisms are crucial to the development of a shared set of values across the Army.

---

[7] James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porris, *Built to Last*, New York: Harper Business, 1994, 73. Collins and Porris define core values as "the organization's essential and enduring tenets—a small set of general guiding principles; not to be confused with specific cultural or operating practices; not to be compromised for financial gain or short-term expediency." They define purpose as the organization's fundamental reasons for existence beyond just making money—a perpetual guiding star on the horizon; not to be confused with specific goals or business strategies. While obviously written for the business world, these two concepts have clear application for the U.S. Army.

[8] Ibid.,71.

The Army is currently rewriting its leadership manual, FM 22-100. The forthcoming document proposes a set of values for the officer corps that encompasses the old "Five Cs"—courage, candor, competence, commitment, and caring—and evolves them into a more comprehensive and coherent value system. These values are:

- Loyalty
- Duty
- Respect
- Selfless service[9]
- Honor
- Integrity
- Personal courage

The Task Force endorses this set of values as essential in developing the kind of officers the U.S. Army needs, and it believes that they are enduring, if not timeless. Officers must embody them all if they are to become the kind of officers of character we need to lead our soldiers and represent our Nation.

WHAT OFFICERS SHOULD EXPECT OF THE ARMY

For an officer personnel system to be fully effective, it must meet not only the needs of the Army but also those of the officers who serve that Army. Clearly the requirements of the Army come first, but to the extent possible under this constraint, officers should reasonably expect the Army to provide them with seven basic conditions under which they serve over the course of a career:

- An environment that supports and promotes the Army ethic and the Army's broad, enduring values.
- Professional and personal development, including regular, candid feedback.
- The professional satisfaction of making a meaningful contribution to the Army and the Nation.
- The opportunity to work in jobs that the officer and the Army value.
- Credible opportunities for advancement and other rewards.

[9] FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, author's draft, 26 November 1996, 4-2.

- Adequate compensation, recognition, and prestige for competent job performance.
- Reasonable stability, predictability, job security, and freedom from serious concern about the post-retirement financial future.

SUCCESS

The Task Force endorses a more traditional understanding of "success" for the Army officer—one that focuses on professionalism, selfless service, and contributions more than it does on rank. While some might argue forcibly for measuring success principally by the attainment of a particular rank or position, the Task Force strongly discourages this sort of organizational ethic, for two major reasons. First, such a standard has the potential for motivating behaviors in officers that run counter to the Army's core values. Among the most pernicious of these is officer careerism, a self-serving and self-centered approach to officership that places the officer's interests before those of the Army and of the soldiers. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey made this point very strongly in his 1984 graduation address to the Naval War College:

> …there is no room for a lack of integrity or for those who place self before duty or self before comrades or self before country. Careerism is the one great sin, and it has no place among you.[10]

Second, promotion as the sole measure of an officer's worth is surely too narrow a definition, for it invariably results in officers perceiving themselves as failures when they are not chosen for promotion—an event that invariably occurs to all but a few officers sometime in their careers. Further, such a definition does not give due regard to an officer's competence or contributions to the Army and its soldiers. Nonselection under this definition of success becomes a destructive force that corrodes an officer's sense of self-worth and motivation for long-term service to the Nation. It implies that the officer is a "loser" and casts doubt on the officer's future worth to the Army. Finally, and most important, it causes officers to focus on themselves rather than outward, on their mission and on their soldiers. Thus, given the generally high quality of the officer corps today, the Task Force believes that it would be a grave mistake to begin defining officers' success solely by the rank they wear.

Accordingly, the Task Force advocates instead that the Army and its officers couch success predominantly in less tangible and more personal terms, such as contributions to the profession and professional, selfless service to the Nation. A love of soldiering and soldiers is at the heart of a full and rich career and invariably leads to a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction that is internally generated

[10] General John W. Vessey, Jr., "Graduation Address to the Naval War College Class of 1984," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 37, No. 6, November-December 1984, 17.

rather than externally conferred. What officers *are, know*, and *do* ought to be the focus of their careers rather than what they get.

All this having been said, the Task Force also recognizes fully that achieving career status is directly tied to promotion under the current "up or out" DOPMA system. Typically, promotion to lieutenant colonel ensures an officer's reaching retirement eligibility, obtaining career security, and accruing the significant financial compensation and security that accompany that status. This is no small consideration. Thus, the Task Force believes that promotion to lieutenant colonel is a reasonable career goal—one that is viable and credible for the majority of competent officers in the current force.[11]

In line with this discussion, the Task Force has identified three major elements of success. They are, in order of priority:

- Contributions to the Army and the Nation—including the opportunity to work in professionally challenging and rewarding positions that both the officer and the Army value.
- Career and financial security.
- Recognition and prestige, including rank.[12]

The weighting and assessment of each of these elements is ultimately up to each officer himself, for they must be measured in terms of the officer's own expectations, his assessment of his performance, and his knowledge of the particular conditions surrounding his own career. No one else is in a position to make these particular judgments for him. Thus, what constitutes success for one officer may not satisfy another. The Task Force notes, however, that most officers distinguish clearly between their expectations of externally conferred career rewards—like promotion or security—and career success. The former is only one component of the latter, and arguably one of the lesser elements.

[11] Nearly 70% of the 3,300 officers responding to the OPMS XXI Survey (see Annex G) stated that they would like to stay in the Army beyond the minimum number of years needed for retirement (20 years). This appears to indicate that officers are more concerned about being allowed to serve than about attaining a particular rank. Achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel, then, appears to serve more as a means to career status than an end in itself. Interestingly, 36% of the respondents defined career success as achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel, while 29% defined success as attaining the rank of colonel.

[12] See also COL Thomas N. Sherburne's "Senior Field Grade Officer Motivation and Professionalism Study," done while he was a CSA Fellow at the Army War College, 13.

COMPANY-GRADE DEVELOPMENT AND CENTRALIZED SELECTION

Two more elements of the current system bear mentioning. First, the Task Force's thorough examination of the current system has led it to believe that the fundamental developmental assignment patterns and goals for company-grade officers are about right. The types and variety of assignments articulated in DA Pamphlet 600-3 give junior officers the developmental base and experience they need and prepare them well to perform the functions the Army expects of them, particularly with respect to warfighting and other operational missions. The broad base and variety of assignments officers get under the current system prepare them well for the responsibilities they undertake as field-grade officers. The Task Force felt it particularly important for all officers to be grounded in the operational force as company-grade officers and to be certified in the basics of leadership and Army operations through company command. Company command (or its branch equivalent) is an absolutely indispensable developmental experience and test that all officers with career aspirations must succeed in, no matter what their further career interests may be.

The second feature of the current system that continues to serve the Army well is the centralized selection board process. The officer corps generally believes that it is a fair system that gives the Army what it asks for in the board guidance.[13] Many see it as a central tool for shaping the culture of the officer corps and as a barometer of what is and is not important in officer performance, assignments, and developmental patterns. Hence, it will continue to play an invaluable role in any future OPMS.

[13] The OPMS XXI Survey clearly bears this out in a number of places. For example, 80% of the OPMS XXI Survey respondents said that centralized selection boards pick the officers with the best records.

Chapter 4
The Case for Change

Today's problems come from yesterday's solutions.[14]

ASKING THE STRATEGIC QUESTIONS FIRST

Starting with a strategic approach to its examination and analysis of OPMS, the OPMS XXI Task Force first asked what ought to be expected of an officer personnel system that is already accessing and managing the officers who will lead the Army of 2010. First and foremost, OPMS XXI must be designed to enhance the organizational effectiveness of the Army and, thus, its performance. Organizational performance in the Army has two aspects. The first is continual preparedness today to execute Army missions successfully across the full spectrum of operations. The second is building the Army for the future.

Staying trained and ready today—to perform the full range of Army operations successfully—is clearly the Army's reason for being. Fighting and winning the Nation's wars is the most important mission and is increasingly a more complex and difficult endeavor as the Army proceeds toward Army XXI and the Army After Next. Further, the Army's expertise and effectiveness in warfighting is the fundamental competency that underpins its credibility in performing other roles and missions in support of the National Security Strategy, such as deterrence and stability missions.[15] Thus, building an officer corps highly skilled in the wide variety of tasks required for successful execution of combined arms operations in the joint and multinational environment has to be the Army's first priority. OPMS XXI must recognize the constantly increasing complexity and difficulty of Army operations and adapt accordingly. Further, the Army must produce officers of character who embrace and personify its values to lead its soldiers effectively under the demands and hardships of combat. That, too, requires a rigorous developmental experience that OPMS XXI must not just tacitly support, but actively foster.

---

[14] Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, Currency Doubleday: New York, 1990, 57.

[15] These other functions include "preventative defense" and "deterrence." Preventative defense is a proactive approach to regional security and stability that requires the continuous commitment of U.S. forces to operations in peacetime to establish conditions conducive to peace. Ideally, operations that support preventative defense create the conditions that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary. They resolve budding conflict before it breaks out and build international institutions that assist in settling disputes peacefully. These operations provide the underpinning for security and stability around the world. See "Convergence and Caution: An Analysis of the OSD Strategy for the Quadrennial Defense Review," an unpublished paper, 1-2.

The second component—building the Army for the future—is equally important. The Army is a complex system of systems providing the institutional base from which the operational force is supported, both today and tomorrow. As such, it requires officers able to perform essential functions that fall outside of the Army's warfighting role but are absolutely necessary to field an Army that can fight and win. To be performed well, these functions require officers with substantial relevant experience and expertise. Officers engaged in these functions must anticipate the doctrinal, training, and organizational requirements of future operations and prepare the Army to meet them. Accordingly, in addition to being grounded in the operational Army, they must have additional specialty or technical skills that support the Army's larger systemic needs.

The approach to OPMS just described is consistent with the emerging National Defense Strategy, which consists of three elements: *shaping* the international environment, *responding* to the full spectrum of crises, and *preparing* for the future.[16] This emerging strategy suggests that the Army will need to produce officers in broad skill groupings that can address and support each of these three elements. That, in turn, means that the Army must have a three-part officer personnel strategy. First, it must provide the kind of officers who will keep the operational force ready to respond to any crisis—today and tomorrow. Second, it must create a cadre of officers who lead units or organizations that contribute to the shaping of tactical, operational, and strategic conditions. (This includes expertise on the use of military force to create or sustain political stability, the ability to understand and advise the civilian leadership on the political ramifications of military action, and the capability of shaping the information environment—optimizing information as a military political tool.) Finally, OPMS must produce officers who can prepare and produce the Army of tomorrow by orchestrating the myriad complex systems within the Service and across DoD and also by procuring the necessary resources and building future Army systems.

Ultimately, creating an effective Army is about building an operational overmatch. To build an operational overmatch requires not only a technological overmatch, but also a skill overmatch. Most recent efforts have focused on the technological component of operational overmatch. But recent studies indicate that it is the skill differential between armies that plays a more fundamental role in battlefield suc-

[16] "Convergence and Caution: An Analysis of the OSD Strategy for the Quadrennial Defense Review," an unpublished paper, 2.

cess.[17] That differential plays the essential role in determining who wins on the battlefield and how dramatic that win is.

This conclusion suggests that the Army needs to place a greater emphasis on human development—and hence officer development—in a technologically advanced Army, because the human dimension is at the heart of organizational effectiveness––whether on the battlefield or in the Pentagon. Army systems depend on the skill and heart of the soldiers who use them and the officers who integrate, synchronize, and employ them both.

High standards of organizational performance, then, are at the center of maximizing the tools soldiers employ—whether they be operational or administrative. The officer piece of organizational performance has two components: the development of individual officer skills and the development of collective organizational skills and effectiveness. Though related, they are logically distinct. To attain maximum organizational performance from the organizations they lead, officers must be given adequate time, education, and developmental experience as individuals to become outstanding leaders. Given the current trends of modern warfare, this entails providing officers with the requisite experience and expertise to meet all of the Army's complex systemic needs. It further suggests that leadership teams will need to spend a significant amount of time together to develop their collective skills, grow as a learning organization, and build cohesion so that the organization—as a whole—will be more effective.[18]

In addition, the officer personnel management system must support the whole range of skills required now and in the future. This analysis suggests that the Army of the future will need world-class operational specialists who are expert at warfighting, capable of operating across the full spectrum of military operations, and competent at integrating Total Army assets in joint and combined operations. It also suggests that the Army will need world-class functional and systems

[17] Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: Skill, Technology and What the Gulf War Really Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, Fall 1996. Mr. Biddle argues that the synergistic interaction between a major skill differential and new technology caused the lopsided victory achieved by the Allies over the Iraqis. Further, he suggests that the greater the skill imbalance between opposing armies, the more new technology can magnify the advantage of the Army with the greater operational skill. If this is true, he argues, then a given skill imbalance may be more important today and in the future than in the past.

[18] See Section 5, *Army After Next Annual Report*, "Army After Next Soldiers and Their Units." Majors Biever and Echevarria support this contention by arguing that the unprecedented speed, complexity, dispersion, and lethality of future military operations will challenge the combat effectiveness of AAN units much more than today. To meet the demands of the future battlefield, AAN units will require (1) a "safety net" of psychological resilience provided by tough, realistic training, effective leadership, and unit cohesion; (2) mature, highly experienced leaders capable of exercising superior intuitive judgment and cognitive flexibility; and (3) a learning-oriented organizational culture that promotes rapid, spontaneous adaptability. All of these requirements suggest that officers need to spend greater amounts of time in units, both individually and collectively. They also suggest that officers in the AAN will need to do so more than today.

specialists able to design, build, and integrate future Army systems within the DoD structure; procure, manage, and provide resources to build the future Army; and provide technical or functional expertise not developed in the operational Army. Finally, it suggests that the Army will need the right balance of both.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

This strategic approach the Task Force took centered on improving the Army's organizational performance, rather than just on making the current OPMS operate more efficiently. Improving Army operational units and the organizations that support them thus became the context in which the Task Force examined OPMS. The first point of analysis was to determine how well OPMS currently promotes the development of officers with the right skills and depth of experience necessary to enhance the collective effectiveness of the organizations they lead and manage. This analysis had three distinct pieces. First, does the current system give officers the operational experience they need to become competent and effective field-grade commanders? Second, does the Army develop officers who possess functional area specialty expertise and experience? Third, and perhaps most important to consider, how is individual officer experience contributing to the development of competent, cohesive, and well-integrated leadership organizations across the Army? It is this last dynamic that is key to producing highly effective organizations—warfighting and otherwise.

After assessing the current system under today's conditions, the Task Force turned to future demands that would affect how the Army develops and manages its officers. This analysis had two major components. First, the Task Force asked whether the officer developmental patterns of today will be adequate in the future. Second, and equally important, was whether Army XXI will require new or significantly altered officer skills.

The section that follows summarizes what the Task Force found. It argues that OPMS needs to change—not only to address current dynamics acting on the officer system but also to better develop officers with the right skills and depth of experience and expertise that will be needed in Army XXI. OPMS, though adequate for today, is even now straining to meet all the demands put on it, and the future will place additional requirements on it that it is not well designed to address.

ASSESSING TODAY'S OPMS

As the Task Force assessed OPMS, it found clear indicators that the current system is struggling to answer the officer personnel requirements of the field force

adequately, give officers optimal developmental experience in both their basic branch and functional area, and provide the kind of officer leadership stability that serves to enhance collective organizational performance. The drawdown and a variety of legislative and policy changes have had both tangible and intangible effects on the force.

The first set of indicators came from the officer corps itself. A number of surveys conducted both inside and outside of the Army indicated increased concern among the officer corps about the following career issues: widespread anxiety about career security, considerable concern about attaining the right assignments to remain competitive, a growing "zero defects" mentality across the force tied to OER inflation, a lack of systematic counseling, and an extremely high OPTEMPO coupled with declining quality-of-life compensations.[19] Further, officers were increasingly reporting having too many career requirements and not enough time to do them all justice. High rotational turbulence was, in their view, beginning to have an adverse affect on developing cohesive and effective units, because officers were cycling through units and other organizations at an extremely fast pace. Finally, these surveys reflected very clearly that officers increasingly believe that the "command track" is virtually the only viable and credible path today for promotion and that skills and experience in functional area specialties count for relatively little in career progression. All of these concerns reflect a growing disillusionment with OPMS and manifest themselves in declining officer commitment to the Service and a slow but steady erosion of officer professionalism.[20]

In addition to these intangibles, the Task Force found tangible evidence that supported and complemented the officer opinions cited above. Analysis indicated that, in fact, officer rotational turbulence is high (particularly in operational units). The preponderance of promotions do indeed go to those on the "command track." Moreover, the functional areas are relying on floors to ensure that enough officers are promoted with relevant specialty skills, and relatively few battalion or brigade command selectees have any appreciable experience in their functional areas. The requirements placed on the officer corps are increasing as time-in-grade windows are decreasing. Finally, statistics indicate that falling off the path to battalion command virtually consigns an officer to "also ran" status and career oblivion.

When examined closely, these symptoms of problems invariably led back to three underlying factors: disparities between officer authorizations and inventory resulting from the drawdown, other attendant officer authorizations changes driven by changes in law or policy over the past decade, and chronic structure-inventory mismatches caused by how the Army accesses officers and distributes them to the

[19] OPMS XXI Survey. See also David H. McCormick, *America's Army in Transition*, doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1996, 195-216. See also Betsy Gibson et al., *Army Leadership Survey*, U.S. Army War College, 1994.

[20] Ibid.

branches. While not the source of all the concerns cited above, they are at the root of many, if not most. Thus, it is important to look at these factors in detail.

THE IMPACT OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OFFICER INVENTORY AND AUTHORIZATIONS

While the Army has more officers in its operational inventory than authorizations, they are not in the right grades and skills to fit the Army's needs. First, the Army has more company-grade officers than it needs, even after officers in the trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) account are considered. These excess officers are primarily lieutenants and captains who are not yet branch-qualified. Second, the Army is short approximately 3,500 field-grade officers to fill authorizations after the TTHS account is considered. The most significant shortfall is at the rank of major, which is about 2,300 officers short of being able to fill the jobs. This means that a significant number of lieutenants and captains are filling positions at grades higher than their serving grade. Since significant upward substitution also occurs in the field grades, the problem is compounded cumulatively as one proceeds down through the officer ranks. Thus, many jobs across the Army are filled by officers one grade or more below that established for the authorization.

Further, the composition of officer *authorizations* has shifted in two significant ways. First, since 1988 the TDA authorizations have grown in proportion to TOE authorizations by approximately 2.5%. Second, there has been a like proportional shift from the company grades to the field grades, the most significant increase being at major. The 4.7% proportional increase in TDA majors' authorizations alone translates into about 500 positions. These proportional shifts have occurred while the actual number of major authorizations has remained relatively constant.

There are two main causes for the significant proportional increase in TDA authorizations. The first has been a substantial increase in Joint and DoD field-grade authorizations. The second has been a major increase of field-grade authorizations driven by Title XI AC/RC legislation. Between them, they account for most of the 500 authorizations mentioned above. This shift has been important for several reasons. First, it means that there are proportionally fewer branch jobs in relation to the total number in the past. Second, because Joint/DoD and Title XI AC/RC jobs are typically Personnel Priority Group (PPG) 1 or 2 priority fill, they are filled at or near 100% and at a higher priority than traditional troop unit positions in

FORSCOM, TRADOC, USAREUR, USARPAC, and EUSA, which are typically PPG 3 or 4.[21]

This trend should be of concern because it greatly aggravates the effect of the cumulative shortages described above on medium-to-low PPG units. Of the roughly 10,300 major authorizations, over 3,000 of them are PPG 1 or 2. Only about 8,050 majors are available to fill these jobs, when all officers in the TTHS account are taken into consideration, and 3,000 of them go directly to PPG 1 and 2 jobs, leaving about 5,000 officers to fill the remaining 7,300 authorizations. This means that, on average, the remaining jobs will have an ODP fill of less than 70%.

The cumulative effect is multifold. First, it means that the MACOMs identified above are filled with majors at anywhere between 69% and 79%. Second, it means that divisions will see a shortage of majors. Third, the demand to keep PPG 1 and 2 units at full strength means that there will be a strong pull to move officers who complete the minimum branch-qualifying requirement out of lower priority units to fill higher priority Joint or AC/RC jobs. This combination significantly increases assignment turbulence. Finally, proportionally more of the field-grade force is committed to the TDA Army, making it harder for officers—majors in particular—to get to troop units and stay there for more than two years. None of these effects are good-news stories, and they argue strongly for cutting field-grade authorizations, particularly in the TDA force.

SKILL MISMATCHES BY GRADE AT THE FIELD-GRADE LEVEL

An examination of authorizations at the skill level of detail highlights additional issues. The distribution of officers varies significantly among combat arms (CA), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). This distribution shifts dramatically between the company and field grades. At the company-grade level, combat arms authorizations constitute about 54% of the total, while CS and CSS constitute approximately 21% and 16% of the authorizations respectively. The remaining 9% of authorizations are branch-immaterial or functional area jobs. At the field-grade level, the combat arms portion of authorizations drops to about 31% of the total, while the combat support arms decline slightly to 17% and the combat service support arms increase to about 18%. The largest jump occurs in the rela-

[21] There are nine PPGs—PPG 1 being the highest priority and PPG 9 the lowest—which correlate with the DA Master Priority List. PERSCOM uses the PPGs in designing the annual Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). PERSCOM also has designated many positions as "excepted," in that while they are assigned a PPG lower than PPG 1 or 2, they are still filled at or very near 100%. These "excepted" positions only aggravate the disproportional fill across the Army.

tive number of functional area and branch-immaterial jobs. This portion increases from 9% to 34% of the total authorizations.[22]

The numbers just discussed reflect different needs for officers at each grade. The combat arms branches have, by far, the greatest requirements for company-grade officers, but starting at major, their branch-related authorizations proportionally drop off much more significantly than do the authorizations for the other two career divisions. The opposite is generally true for the CS and CSS branches. They have relatively fewer requirements for company-grade officers, particularly lieutenants, but their requirements for field-grade officers are proportionately much higher relative to the combat arms.

Recognizing these career division differences in requirements between the company and field grades, the Army assesses its officers to meet its requirements for captains, filling the combat arms first. While this accession plan adequately meets all the career division's needs for captains, it introduces significant inventory–authorization disparities between the three divisions at the field-grade level. These disparities stem from the fact that the structure of authorizations in each career division differs significantly from officer continuation patterns, which are a function of DOPMA promotion rates and the historical rate at which officers are separated from the service over time.[23] Officer inventory continuation patterns are

[22] These percentages have not varied significantly over the last 15 years or so. The significant change in between company- and field-grade authorizations is a phenomenon that has been with the Army since the beginning of OPMS, and DOPMA has only served to reinforce the problem. Both previous OPMS studies attempted to come to grips with this issue, with varying degrees of success. OPMS I attempted to solve the problem by designating officers into two specialties—an accession specialty (a branch or "INSPEC") and a secondary, non-accession specialty (an "ADSPEC," many of which were branches that did not have enough field-grade inventory for their requirements). This approach failed for a variety of reasons, the most important being (1) the extreme difficulty of acquiring and maintaining qualification in two branches, (2) accession branch bias of officers, causing them to serve only minimally in their ADSPECs, and (3) two many "unqualified" lieutenant colonels and colonels being counted against specialty promotion floors. OPMS II attempted to address this problem by realigning junior officer accessions among the branches to provide adequate populations to meet both their current and evolving missions and through the replacement of ADSPECs with "functional area specialties." A provision was also created for some officers to "single track" in their functional area.

[23] Officer continuation rates across the branches and functional areas are relatively uniform. Typically, the combined affects of DOPMA promotion rates, the number of year groups in a particular grade (this is driven by DOPMA promotion-point objectives), and historical officer attrition patterns (both voluntary and involuntary) produce an officer inventory that forms a pyramidal structure in each of the branches and functional areas. These officer "pyramids" in each branch or functional area sustain roughly 4.3 majors and 2.8 lieutenant colonels for every colonel. On the other hand, the related authorizations "pyramids" can and do look remarkably different and vary widely across the branches. Some branches and FAs have far more officers in a particular grade than their skill-specific authorizations warrant (typically the combat arms), while others have too few officers to fill their authorizations. Some branches and functional areas have officer overages in one grade and shortages in another grade. Excess inventory in a branch allows it to assign officers to functional area or branch-immaterial jobs.

roughly the same across all the career divisions, but the structure of their authorizations across the grades, as described above, differs greatly.

As a result, the combat arms branches typically have many more field-grade officers than they need to fill branch positions, and the CS and CSS arms typically do not have enough. The excess field-grade combat arms officers can serve in functional area or branch-immaterial positions—and they fill the lion's share of them—but there is currently no mechanism for cross-leveling officers into the CS and CSS branches to make up for their inventory shortages. This last issue has been a chronic problem for OPMS since its inception. Historically, the three logistics branches, along with the signal corps and military intelligence branches, have been those most adversely affected by chronic inventory shortages caused by the combined effects of branch structure, accession policies, and continuation patterns.[24]

The practical effect is that, starting at major, most combat arms officers serve outside of their branch at any given time. Fewer than half of combat arms majors serve in branch jobs at any point, and that number increasingly declines at each succeeding rank. CS and CSS officers, on the other hand, serve primarily in their branch at major, and that trend is consistent at each succeeding rank.[25]

The first important point to remember is that the current dual-track system allows the Army to absorb the tremendous reduction in requirements for combat arms officers as they are promoted from company grade to field grade. Unfortunately, the current system has no mechanism allowing the assignment of combat arms officers to help the other two career divisions address their shortages. Ideally, the dual-specialty system would enable qualified combat arms officers to serve in a functional area that helps alleviate CS- and CSS-related shortages, but it simply does not do that.

The second important point to note is that almost none of the branch authorization structures match their DOPMA-driven inventories. This results from the absence of a balancing mechanism and the relatively undisciplined nature of changing authorizations in the TDA Army. Authorizations can change dramatically from year to year, and there is no Army-wide system of checks and balances to ensure that the inventory can meet additional demands and control them, if necessary.[26] Further, there is no *system-wide* formal mechanism currently in place and operating to ensure that the coding of jobs accurately reflects the skills actually

[24] It is arguable that every one of the three OPMS studies has attempted to rectify this problem in one fashion or another. OPMS I attempted to do this through "additional specialties," while OPMS II attempted to ameliorate the problem slightly differently with "functional area" designations.

[25] FA 90 Multifunctional Logistics positions constitute a significant portion of these authorizations and for all intents and purposes have the same impact on the inventory of logistics officers as branch requirements do.

[26] MG Robert Arter and LTC Richard Goldsmith, "Why Dual Specialties?" *Military Review*, June 1983, 54.

required.[27] The practical result is that virtually every branch either has more or fewer officers than it needs for branch authorizations at any given rank. Overages must be absorbed by functional area or branch-immaterial requirements, and shortages go unfilled by branch officers. The effects of these imbalances within the branches and functional areas are only worsened by the large differential between field-grade authorizations and available inventory.

The ability to produce officer inventory at the field grades is affected by DOPMA promotion objectives, officer propensities to remain on active duty or to separate, and the budget. These factors all serve to limit the supply of officers available at each grade—especially in the field grades. It is not likely that any of these constraints will be relaxed in the next several years; therefore, the only way to redress this problem is to cut authorizations in a way that balances how we grow our inventory against what the system demands. Hence, in addition to cutting authorizations, the Army must look closely at how it codes the force. Such a "recoding" must ensure that the branches can produce the right number of officers with the requisite skills for the jobs to be filled.

OFFICER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS

The dynamics described on the preceding pages have a significant impact on officer development. Theoretically, the current dual-track system should give the Army highly skilled and experienced officers to fill all its branch, functional area, and branch-immaterial requirements. It should give the Army officers who are experienced and skilled in branch functions related to Army operations and also skilled in the variety of other specialties the Army requires. But a close examination of recent trends indicates that OPMS is increasingly ineffective in its ability to do either.

The basic objective of the OPMS XXI Study was to improve the warfighting effectiveness of officers and hence of the units to which they are assigned. A fundamental premise of the study was that building combat-effective battalion and brigade commanders is the focal point of officer branch development for most branches. Two absolutely crucial pieces in the development of effective battalion and brigade commanders are company-level command and the critical branch-qualifying jobs in units (Bn S3, Bn XO, Bde S3, or their functional equivalents in the CS and CSS

[27] The TOE system is very disciplined, but the TDA system is not. More important, there is no mechanism that balances the combined requirements of the TDA and TOE structures against what the officer inventory can really provide in any given year.

branches).[28] Field commanders have told us that 18 to 24 months of experience at each of these two levels of critical branch-qualifying (BQ) positions is preferable and that 24 months in each would be optimal.

Current trends, however, indicate that cumulative branch-qualifying experience is declining, and that the downward trend is greatest at the rank of major.[29] This trend has largely been a result of the large-scale reduction in operational units during the drawdown and the resultant proportionally smaller number of billets in units available to majors. While some officers still get significant experience in multiple BQ jobs, more and more officers are getting only about one year of critical branch-qualifying experience in a single position.[30] There are several reasons for this decline.

First, officers have a four-year window to become branch-qualified before they are considered in the primary zone for promotion to lieutenant colonel, about one year less than in the late 1980s.[31] The number of demands on officers, however, has gone up, giving officers less time to do more. This shorter window makes timing absolutely critical. Typically, successful majors today attend Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for a year, spend another year at division or brigade level in another job waiting to be assigned to a critical branch-qualifying job, and then go to a branch-qualifying job. If they do well and hit the window perfectly or early, they are in reasonably good shape and may have the opportunity to remain for a second year; if they are late into the window, they will be hard pressed to get one year of branch-qualifying time before the lieutenant colonel board meets.

Second, because there are proportionately fewer critical branch-qualifying jobs than in the past, more officers are competing for fewer jobs.[32] This issue is most crucial in the combat arms, where it is impossible to give every officer in a year

---

[28] This report makes a distinction between branch-qualifying jobs and critical branch-qualifying jobs. The latter is a subset of the former. DA Pamphlet 600-3 defines branch-qualifying jobs as that spectrum of branch-related positions that qualify an officer for promotion. There are, however, a narrower set of branch-qualifying jobs in units for majors that officers must successfully perform to be assured promotion to lieutenant colonel and also remain competitive for battalion command. These jobs are primarily found at battalion and brigade level and include S-3, XO, and other functionally similar positions.

[29] For a complete discussion of this issue, see the Precursor Study Group paper titled "Branch Qualification for Majors–Preparation for Battalion Command" in Annex E.

[30] There are exceptions to this general state of affairs. Some divisions are able to give their officers well in excess of a year of BQ time, in many cases two years. But they are in a small minority.

[31] Actually, officers currently have a five-year time-in-grade window, but their primary zone consideration for lieutenant colonel occurs during their fourth year as a major.

[32] In USAREUR, for example, the number of maneuver battalions has decreased from 64 in 1989 to just 16 today. While other MACOMs have been hit less hard, they still have seen significant reductions that affect their ability to rotate officers through the most important developmental jobs.

group one year of critical branch-qualifying time, let alone two.[33] To give officers two years of critical BQ time, most branches would have to reduce their population of majors by half. Thus, resident command and staff college attendance tends to act as a *de facto* screening mechanism, limiting the number of officers competing for critical branch-qualifying jobs because resident MEL 4 graduates get preferential assignment to divisions, and hence key branch-qualifying jobs, before non-resident graduates.[34] Even with this *de facto* screening process, there is still a queue of majors in most divisions waiting to go into battalion jobs. This queue drives divisions to speed officers through the key jobs, the result being a norm of one-year rotations in key branch-qualifying jobs. Only a relatively few talented or lucky officers get more time, and those who do are typically hand-selected by their brigade or division commanders. Thus, the assignment of an officer to a second key billet is usually a clear vote that the officer ought to be a battalion commander.[35]

Finally, the concurrent high demand for branch-qualified majors in PPG 1 and PPG 2 TDA positions (described above) creates a strong need to reassign officers as soon as they are minimally branch-qualified. These high-priority-fill jobs create a "pull effect" that serves to reinforce annual turnover in key branch-qualifying jobs and increases officer assignment turbulence.

All of these factors jointly serve to reduce majors' operational experience and create high officer turnover in units as well as in other organizations, the inference being a concomitant drop in expertise as well. There are too many majors competing for too few branch-qualifying jobs, and there are too many developmental job

[33] Special Forces and Aviation are two notable exceptions to this example. Special Forces, in particular, is easily able today to give its officers well in excess of one year of critical BQ time, a large number getting over two years of critical BQ time. This is so because company commands are majors' positions.

[34] This is a *de facto* PERSCOM policy, and most divisions openly give priority treatment to resident MEL 4 graduates. Some division go so far as to proscribe non-resident MEL 4 graduates from serving in critical branch-qualifying jobs. Two important notes need mentioning here. First, given the degree of inflation in the current OER and the nature of where the MEL 4 selection cut line is drawn (at the midpoint of a year group), it is doubtful that MEL 4 selection boards truly can identify properly which officers ought to be the contenders for battalion and higher commands. At the very best, the distinctions are very fine among officers in the middle of a cohort, and it is often not clear whether there is any appreciable qualitative difference between many of those who make the cut and many who do not. Since this is the single most important selection officers will face in their first 15 years of service, the Army would do well to have a more reliable metric. Second, since resident command and staff college selection is largely a reflection of an officer's performance in company command, usually complete by his or her eighth year of service, one has to question whether too large a decision rides on too little of an officer's career at a too-early point in his or her development. Finally, given the importance of education in Army XXI, one must question the practice of providing a demonstrably superior resident education to only half of a year group.

[35] Interviews with numerous serving brigade commanders and branch assignment officers at PERSCOM have substantiated this trend.

requirements in the five-year time-in-grade window. Bernard D. Rostker, a noted personnel expert, describes this dynamic pointedly:

> High billet throughput lowers the quality of tour experiences. The "dash for the top"…has resulted in limiting opportunities for officers to fully develop needed proficiencies by trying to do too much in too little time.… In order to position top candidates for upper military leadership positions, individuals often serve for a limited time in certain assignments to satisfy necessary career milestones. While high billet throughput may afford some individuals a broadened experience base, true expertise and competence can not be achieved except for only basic or elementary tasks.[36]

FIELD-GRADE TURBULENCE, LEADER TEAM INTEGRITY, AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS

Shorter branch-qualifying tours and rapid turnover in key billets do not just have an impact on the officer's individual development. They also have an organizational effect because they jointly contribute to a degradation in the commander's ability to build a cohesive, well-trained, and effective leadership team in the unit.[37] While field-grade officers could ideally spend up to 14 or so months together on average in battalion- or brigade-level staffs—even under today's rotational system—they do not, because officers enter and leave units at different times during the year. Battalion commanders, for example, typically have two XOs and two S-3s during their two-year command tour. It is not uncommon for many to have three in one or both of these important jobs. If one of these critical majors is assigned to the battalion four or five months after the other, then the three field-grade commanders have about nine months together to develop as a team. The process of developing a new command team then begins again. When the rotational pattern of company commanders and other key battalion staff officers is taken into consideration, the assignment overlap between officers for effective team building decreases even more.

If one then lays a typical unit's training/operational cycle over this sort of rotational pattern, the issue at stake becomes readily apparent. Most units operate on an annual training cycle punctuated roughly once every two years with a rotation to a Combat Training Center (CTC) or an actual operational mission.[38] The result

[36] Bernard D. Rostker, unpublished working paper on Management of the Officer Career Force, 13 June 1997, 1.

[37] The Task Force recognizes that a wide variety of factors contribute to a unit's overall effectiveness and cohesion, but most of these factors are a function of training or leadership and thus largely outside of the personnel system's ability to control.

[38] Actually, the frequency of major CTC or operational missions varies widely across major commands and types of units. But, on average, units can expect to rotate through these missions at least as frequently as identified above. Some divisional artillery and aviation units, for example, have a much higher rotational frequency at the CTCs than other types of units.

is that field-grade officers individually get about one rotation through an annual training cycle, but as a leadership team they often get significantly less time together, and that time may be anywhere in a unit's preparation for, execution of, or recovery from a training or operational mission. Recent RAND Corporation analysis has shown that brigade staffs typically average about six months or less together before National Training Center (NTC) rotations. About a third of the staffs spend two months or less together before these missions.[39] Battalion staff statistics do not vary significantly.[40] Clearly this analysis indicates that current staffs have little time to develop team skill and integrity before being subjected to demanding and stressful operational conditions.

While little research data exist indicating just how long leadership teams need to train together before reaching proficiency, there is ample evidence that many units are not arriving at the CTCs with the depth of collective training and skill integration they need to excel, or even perform well.[41] Reports from a variety of sources repeatedly express concern about staff officers' ability to synchronize their efforts in effective plans and operations. Almost always, a significant factor is staff turbulence and its impact on its staff integrity, integration, and collective performance. Thus, while this research identifies no optimal amount of time key members of battalion and brigade staffs should spend together, it certainly argues against shortening of XO and S3 tours and suggests that field-grade officer tours in key positions should be longer. It also implies a much greater need for time together in overlapping tours.

FUNCTIONAL AREA EXPERIENCE IN THE "SPECIALTY SKILLS"

The dual-track system is not producing very many officers with true dual-track expertise and experience. First, the vast majority of officers making battalion command hold FA 41 and FA 54, two skill areas that require neither formal advanced civil schooling nor formal training. Very few officers with specialty "hard skills"

---

[39] See Mike Hix et al., "Assignment Stability: An In-Progress Review," annotated briefing by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, October 1995, 31-33.

[40] ARI data confirm this thesis of limited continuity of battalion staffs. The mean time Command Groups (Cdr, XO, S3) spent together in a series of light infantry battalion rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was about 4.6 months. See Holz et al., "Determinants of Effective Unit Performance," 191. Interesting to note, of the 14 task forces in their sample, three had undergone a change of command in the last six months preceding their rotation. All three were in their lowest performing group of their task forces.

[41] A number of books, briefings, and papers document staff skill and synchronization problems at all the CTCs. Further, there is a widespread belief across the Army that tenures are hindering readiness. See Robert F. Holz et al., "Determinants of Effective Unit Performance," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, 1994. See also MPRI's study on high-performance battalions, *Information Management Processes in High Performance Units*, 21 July 1995.

have made recent command lists, and only a relatively small percentage of them have spent any appreciable time (more than three years) in those functional areas. Since a very small number of single-track functional area officers are promoted to colonel, and since colonels are selected predominantly from former battalion commanders, the vast majority of officers who make colonel have neither the cumulative nor recent experience to prepare them well to step easily into senior functional area positions and perform well. Typically, their last functional area job was as a senior captain or junior major, some eight to 10 years before their next functional area assignment.

ASSESSING OPMS FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD

Power Projection Force. First, as the Army becomes even more of a power projection force, it will be critically important that individual officers and their units be prepared to deploy with very little preparatory time and perform missions across the full operational spectrum.

Organizing Around Information. The Army has become an information-based organization in which information dominance—both on the battlefield and in the institutional base—is central to the Army's success. It requires officers with a wide variety of information-related skills to perform effectively in the next century. This requirement argues strongly that the Army should create and sustain a viable career field for information operations specialists who can lead the Army's full organization around information. Further, the accelerating pace of technical knowledge and the associated shorter shelf life of knowledge will require that officers have longer tours and more repetitive assignments to gain the deep expertise and experience required.

Complexity and Operational Tempo on the Future Battlefield. Recent studies highlight the need to deploy rapidly and perform well on a confusing, high-tempo battlefield. Army After Next research confirms this thesis and strongly suggests that even those who remain in the command track will increasingly have to become "specialists." Maturity, expertise, and experience will become even more important than today on the high-technology, fast-paced, and complex battlefield of the future. An analogous argument applies to those specialty skills that help the Army prepare itself for and shape the new strategic and operational environment.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

- Officer experience in key branch-qualifying jobs is declining, with the average tour in a particular job averaging about one year. While some officers are still getting multiple branch-qualifying jobs, their numbers are declining. Essentially, a brigade or division commander providing an officer with a second branch-qualifying job constitutes a significant vote for that officer to eventually become a battalion commander.

- The Army is not producing deeply experienced specialists in both branch and functional areas.
- The Army needs to cross-level excess combat arms officers to mitigate shortages in CS and CSS specialties.
- The Army has an increasing need for specialization both in its operational force and in its institutional force. The current system is unable to give its officers developmental time in units to hone their operational skills, and it discourages the development of any significant specialty experience and expertise.
- Recent experience indicates that deployments require you to come as you are—no train-up time.
- The increasing complexity of needed skills and the short shelf life of state-of-the-art knowledge require more frequent assignments and longer tours.
- This dynamic has a significant effect on the collective performance of units, because leader teams have little time to develop into cohesive, integrated units. As a result, they typically find themselves continually relearning basic collective skills rather than moving on to higher order tasks
- The Army has a significant grade/skill mismatch—particularly for branch-qualified (BQ) captains and majors—that causes turbulence and has a corrosive effect on unit cohesion and effectiveness.
- Officer continuation patterns do not match structure.
- The increase of must-fill jobs in TDA HQs is exacerbating the problems identified above.
- The current promotion system promotes operators almost to the exclusion of functional area specialists. Dual counting masks this problem.
- This examination also projected new skill requirements and systemic requirements that will force OPMS to manage and develop officers differently from the way it does today.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding findings argue for the following conclusions:

- Reduce the number of authorizations to a number that the inventory can fill.

- Reconcile officer authorizations with the ability of branches and functional areas to grow their inventories—recode as necessary.
- Through longer and more frequent repetitive tours, reduce the number and variety of assignment demands on individual officers to give them more time to focus on the key skills they need to possess.
- Provide selected officers with more branch-qualifying time in key battalion and brigade assignments—particularly at the rank of major—to develop better battalion and brigade commanders.
- Build a sufficient pool of true "hard skill" specialists to meet the Army's functional area requirements and give them a viable career path.
- Begin to develop the information-systems-related skills the Army will need in the 21st century by creating viable career paths for information operators.

BOTTOM LINE

All of these findings and conclusions support the creation of a career-field-based OPMS that does the following:

- Develops an officer corps skill overmatch that complements and enhances the Army's technological overmatch.
- Delineates skill sets for officers so they can focus their experience and achieve excellence.
- Allows for greater individual experience and leader team integrity to produce unit excellence. The Army needs outstanding officers across the full range of skills, because they are all necessary to make complex organization like the Army function properly—not just today, but also in the future.

Chapter 5
OPMS XXI System Design

IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The preceding chapters conclude that in order to meet the Army's needs into the 21st century, an officer management system must achieve the following:

- Reduce the number and variety of assignments an officer must fill, in order to allow for the development of greater experience and depth of knowledge in a specialty.
- Provide the opportunity for more time in key developmental positions at the battalion and brigade level, particularly at the grade of major, in order to develop better battalion and brigade commanders.
- Build a sufficient pool of skilled specialists at the field grades, in order to meet the demands of an increasingly technological, information-oriented Army.

The primary task of the Task Force, in keeping with the CSA's initial guidance, was to improve the warfighting effectiveness of the Army. This became the basic premise, from which the Task Force began developing a concept for an officer development system. As discussed in the previous chapter, one way an officer management system can contribute to improving the warfighting effectiveness of units is by providing for decreased field-grade officer turbulence. Specifically, this means longer assignment stability for battalion and brigade S3s and XOs.

It is unlikely that the number of units in the Army will increase in the foreseeable future. Thus, from a management perspective, one of the main impacts of leaving the S3s and XOs of units in place for two years is that fewer majors will have this opportunity. This particularly holds true for the combat arms branches, where the Task Force's analysis indicated that only about half of each cohort would have the opportunity to hold a key branch-qualifying job at the grade of major, if officers were stabilized in these assignments for 24 months.

A significant factor that comes into play at this point is the command-centric, "muddy boots" culture of our Army today. The propensity of promotion boards to select officers with a warfighting background (commonly referred to as the "command track") over those possessing functional area skills is well documented.

Thus, if fewer officers are provided the opportunity to branch-qualify as majors, alternative career paths are needed for those who do not. Otherwise, these officers will have very little chance for promotion, particularly when viewed in the context of the current Army culture. This need is most acute for combat arms officers, although the CS and CSS officers are also affected to a lesser degree.

Another consideration is the increasing requirement for greater depth of knowledge and experience in functional area skills as the Army increasingly relies on information-age technology and depends to a greater extent on its ability to shape the international environment for success in achieving its strategic mission. In view of these trends, having enough officers with functional area skills, particularly at the senior field grades, takes on even greater importance. However, it takes time to develop the requisite experience and expertise in the institutional Army functions. Officers who would be experts in a specialty can no longer afford to spend a considerable amount of time (e.g., three years on a divisional installation, with 24 months of branch qualification—three-fifths to three-quarters of their availability as majors!) in units. At the same time, however, the Army can no longer afford to deny these officers promotion and thus lose their expertise.

This creates a dilemma for the Army. In the interest of improving warfighting effectiveness, fewer officers will be able to follow the developmental and assignment patterns that result in being selected for promotion under the current system. By the same token, those officers who are not promoted (as a result of their developmental paths and assignments in functional areas) are the ones the Army will increasingly rely on in the future.

What the Army needs, therefore, is a mechanism by which officers possessing expertise in the Army's institutional and strategic functions compete amongst themselves for promotion, rather than against officers with a warfighting, operational background. Linked to this is the need to provide alternative developmental and career paths for those who do not have the opportunity to serve as S3s and/or XOs. These career paths should be created not only in areas that exist today, but also in fields that are needed to execute Army Vision 2010 and the Army After Next.

CAREER-FIELD-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In order to achieve these objectives, the Task Force developed an officer management system based on career fields. Under OPMS XXI, development of company-grade officers will continue to follow the same pattern as it does today. Upon selection for promotion to major, however, OPMS XXI restructures the Army Competitive Category by grouping interrelated branches and functional areas into management categories called "career fields." Officers will compete for promotion with other officers in the same career field. This will end the practice of "double counting" during promotion boards, in which selected officers count against pro-

motion floors both for their branch and for their functional area. Under the new system, officers will satisfy only their branch *or* functional area requirement. Each career field has its own distinct developmental track for officers, reflecting the readiness requirements of the Army today and into the 21st century. Officers in all career fields will be assigned across the Army in TOE and TDA organizations performing a wide variety of jobs. A description of the recommended career fields (CFs) follows:

1. **The Operations (OP) CF** provides the Army with officers qualified by training, education, and experience in areas directly related to the employment of land forces. It is composed of officers in the Army's 16 branches and two functional areas, FA 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) and FA 90 (Multifunctional Logistics). Officers in this CF will retain a functional area for the remainder of their careers, even if they never serve in it. However, designation for a functional area indicates special aptitudes and skills that may provide flexibility for duty assignments at some later point. Officers designated as FA 90 officers will continue to dual-track between branch and functional area positions in a manner similar to the way in which they are assigned today.

2. **The Information Operations (IO) CF** responds to the requirements of the 21st century information age, as addressed by Army Vision 2010, which identifies "gaining information dominance" as fundamental to all future Army patterns of operation. The IO CF brings together related information-related disciplines by combining existing functional areas with several new ones. The functional areas in this CF are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 46 (Public Affairs), FA 53 (Information Systems Management), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations).

3. **The Institutional Support (IS) CF** focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis of this CF is on management, planning, and programming of Army resources through the near, mid, and long term by projecting requirements and developing capabilities. The functional areas in this CF are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Faculty), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis), FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations).

4. **The Operational Support (OS) CF** strengthens current readiness while building the future force through its liaison and acquisition specialties. This CF contains FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer) and the Army Acquisition Corps, which includes FA 51 (Research, Development and Acquisition), some FA 53B (Systems Automation Engineering), FA 53C (Systems

Automation Acquisition),and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management).

CAREER FIELD DESIGNATION PROCESS

Career fields will be assigned to officers through the Career Field Designation Process. The process that the Task Force proposes will consist of the following steps:

1. **OER Input**: The new OER (DA Form 67-9) requires the rater and senior rater to recommend a career field for all Army Competitive Category captains through lieutenant colonels. When recommending career fields for rated officers, rating officials will be advised to consider the "whole person," with factors such as demonstrated performance, undergraduate or graduate training, technical or unique expertise, military experience or training, in-depth understanding of a foreign culture, and so on being taken into account. Recommended career fields will be one of several factors taken into consideration by the Career Field Designation Board.

2. **PERSCOM Announcement of Annual Career Field Designation Board and Guidance**: This announcement will provide information on dates and required procedures, as well as guidance to the officer as he or she deliberates on the best career field choice. This guidance is intended to inform eligible officers of their probable chances of getting into the various career fields by providing the following information: the number of officers eligible for career field designation for that year; and the estimated number of officers expected to be designated into each of the skills, within each career field, to satisfy current and future needs. As part of the guidance, PERSCOM will also inform the field of any unique or evolving skills or aptitudes being sought by the various career fields that the officer may wish to highlight on the Officer Career Field Preference Statement.

3. **Officer Career Field Preference Statement**: At the required time, the officer will complete the Officer Career Field Preference Statement and forward it to PERSCOM. Upon conclusion of the promotion board and before commencement of the Career Field Designation Board, PERSCOM will combine the preference statement with the officer's file so the board members will be able to assess the "whole officer."

4. **Career Field Designation Board Convened**: A formal Career Field Designation Board will review the officer's total file, including the officer's requested preference, any additional information the officer may choose to submit, past performance, assignments, demonstrated skills/aptitudes, and the chain of command's input.

5. **Final Approval**: The board will forward its recommendations to the Office of the Chief of Staff for final approval.

Once a career field has been designated, crossover to another CF would occur only under limited circumstances and on the basis of the Army's needs.

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

To meet changing needs and to align officer management and development with evolving Army XXI and Army After Next doctrine, OPMS XXI recommends some additions and deletions to functional areas. New functional areas recommended are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations). Functional areas recommended for elimination are FA 41 (Personnel Management), which would be partially replaced by FA 43, and FA 54 (Operations and Force Development), which would be partially replaced by FA 50.

BRANCHES

Officers will be accessed into the basic branches and serve their first 10 to 12 years learning the leadership and tactical skills associated with that branch. Officers will continue to wear their branch insignia throughout their military service.

PROMOTIONS

The current promotion system would be replaced by one offering competition for promotion based on career field affiliation. But Federal law guides promotion percentages, and centralized promotion boards will remain. At the grade of lieutenant colonel, promotion opportunity would be similar among the four career fields. However, unlike today, there will be greater potential for officers to be promoted to colonel in the IO, IS, and OS career fields. This greater promotion potential would be provided by a minor reduction in the promotion-to-colonel opportunity of former battalion commanders.

COMMAND SELECTIONS

Only officers from the Operations CF will be considered for command selection. While an order-of-merit list (OML) would still be compiled by a centralized command selection board, the Task Force recommends that the matching of officers to the command billets change. Selected officers would be distributed among four categories of command: (1) tactical, (2) training and strategic support (TSS), (3) institutional (garrison and recruiting battalions), and (4) TRADOC systems man-

agers (TSMs) (for colonel only). Officers may decline consideration in any or all categories. Primary selection in one category would preclude alternate status

in another. Promotions to colonel would be floored by type of command, to ensure that officers from each category are promoted. This is important to preserve reasonable opportunity and to ensure that a pool of qualified commanders exists at the next higher grade in each category.

Chapter 6
OPMS XXI—A Strategic Approach to Human Resource Management

OPMS XXI is the third major review of officer management to take place since 1971. The OPMS I and II Studies focused primarily on specific issues or perceived problems within the framework of the existing officer management system, and they recommended changes that improved the effectiveness of that system. In contrast, the OPMS XXI Task Force used the approach advocated and pioneered by the 8th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) and took a strategic approach to analyzing the current OPMS. A strategic approach, rather than concentrating on improving the near-term effectiveness of systems, is one that focuses on improving the effectiveness of the *organization*.[42] Such an approach requires a broader scope of analysis than is offered by the existing management framework. Rather, the fundamental goals and objectives of the organization form the basis from which a management system is derived.

As described in Chapters 1 and 2, the Task Force used as its starting point the Army leadership's strategic vision for the future as articulated in Army Vision 2010 and the emerging work of the Army After Next project. From these it derived the roles and requirements that officers can be expected to fulfill in the future, and then it translated them into a set of behaviors and outcomes that the officer corps should exhibit. The next step was to design an officer development system to achieve the desired outcomes, and finally to recommend a set of specific policies and practices to implement the management system.

This process followed by the Task Force is the human resource manager's equivalent of the Army's training management system, in which specific unit plans and resource decisions are derived from a mission analysis process that begins with the National Security Strategy, and in which each subsequent level of decision-making is driven by determination of how to support the higher level goals and objectives. Unlike the training management system's quarterly training briefs, however, the Army's current human resource management systems have no regular, cyclic feedback mechanism to assess not only how well the components of the system are functioning, but also whether the *system as a whole* is adequately supporting the next higher level goals and objectives.

The Task Force believes that its most significant and important outcome is that OPMS XXI will continue to ensure that the officer corps fulfills its role of keeping the Army trained and ready to fight. It achieves this by adopting a strategic ap-

[42] Executive Summary, 8th QRMC.

proach to officer management system design and by continuing this strategic approach into the future. This is accomplished in the following manner:

1. Combine all systems concerned with officer development into one overarching Officer Development System (ODS), of which OPMS is only a part. The ODS will encompass OPMS and also Leader Development, Character Development, and the Officer Evaluation Reporting System, to ensure their synchronization and integration towards achieving the Army's mission and vision.

2. Conduct annual reviews and updates of the ODS, called Officer Development Updates (ODUs), for the CSA. Their purpose will be to assess not only the effectiveness of each of the systems associated with officer development, but also the effectiveness of the ODS *as a whole* in providing competent officer leadership to the Army. This entails taking the same top-down, strategic approach the Task Force used in designing the ODS: First, reviewing the Army's mission and role, as well as the part the officer corps will play in accomplishing that mission and the officer behaviors needed to support that role; next, reviewing whether or not the ODS is adequately achieving those outcomes; and, finally, making policy adjustments and decisions as needed to ensure that the strategic requirements of the Army as an organization are being met.

Taking this strategic approach to human resource management allows the Army's senior leadership to continuously adapt officer development to the changing environment and evolving requirements. *It allows decision-making to be* ***proactive*** *rather than reactive*. There is no longer a need to wait until a problem arises before taking steps to correct it. By continuously reassessing the outcomes expected from the ODS and its subsystems, leaders can address the system's success in meeting the desired outcomes, and can *determine whether or not those outcomes are the correct ones to achieve* in view of the organizational goals and objectives. Thus, if the Army's expectations of officers change, the officer development system can also be changed in order to meet the new requirements.

By the same token, even policy corrections and adjustments that are reactive in nature, brought about in response to a particular set of circumstances, should be addressed holistically, in the context of the Army's organizational goals. Linear course corrections have a tendency to magnify their effects over time. In addition, policy changes layered over one another, while fixing current symptoms or problems, can cause outcomes to veer significantly from the originally intended course. By viewing the effects of particular "fixes" comprehensively in the context of the strategic, long-term objectives of the Army, deviations from the senior leadership's vision and intent caused by a particular policy revision can be addressed and rectified.

This strategic approach to human resource management works in two dimensions. Vertically, a strategic approach helps align policies with the strategy and vision that they support, ensuring that the outcomes produced by a particular policy or practice will result in the Army's organizational goals being achieved. Horizontally, a strategic approach will help to align policies and practices across systems, so that different areas and systems of officer development support each other and are not working at cross-purposes.

The vehicle by which the officer development updates will be conducted is the Officer Development Action Plan (ODAP). ODAPs are the concrete plans for achieving specific objectives derived from the Army's strategic vision. The focus of each ODAP is a specific long-term goal or objective whose attainment is needed in order to produce a particular outcome. For each of these long-term goals, there are specific near-term objectives that must be met in order to get to the long-term goal. And each near-term objective, in turn, has a series of associated tasks and sub-tasks that support its achievement. During the ODU each year, the status of each ODAP is reviewed, and its impact on each subsequent level of officer development is assessed. The following example serves as an illustration of the concept described above:

In order to support the Army's vision of information dominance in the 21st century, officers must have superior critical thinking skills and be intellectually flexible. The best way to develop cognitive skills is through education, and thus one of the Task Force's recommendations is to provide a resident MEL 4 education for all field-grade officers. This recommendation becomes the basis for an ODAP with 100% resident MEL 4 attendance as its long-term goal.

To achieve this goal, several near-term objectives must be met, such as expanding instructional facilities and increasing faculty. Each of these objectives, in turn, has several tasks that must be accomplished before the objective can be met. In the case of expanding instructional facilities, for example, building space must be allocated, renovations must be planned, money must be appropriated and allocated, and contracts must be awarded to perform the work.

At the annual ODU, then, the status of each of these tasks is assessed and reviewed. The impact of that status on the next higher level objective is also assessed, and this assessment continues all the way up to the strategic vision. Thus, if the money necessary for facility renovations has, for some reason, not been allocated, the impact of that shortfall on the ability to increase instructional facilities is evaluated. If the shortfall is enough to cause a delay in the planned expansion of instructional facilities, then the impact on the ability to meet the long-term goal of 100% MEL 4 attendance is assessed. And if it is deemed that 100% resident MEL 4 is unattainable for a given period of time, then the effect it has on officer cognitive abilities, and thus on the Army's ability to execute an information-dominant doctrine, is assessed. At this point, the senior leadership can decide that the impact is minimal enough to accept the delay; can decide to divert resources from other,

less important projects to ensure that this task is accomplished; can decide to develop an alternative, non-information-based doctrine; or can decide to explore alternative means to impart the necessary education to the officer corps.

The most significant part of the ODU, however, is not the vertical assessment just outlined, but the horizontal assessment across systems. Returning to the MEL 4 example, the other officer development systems are also assessed in light of the inability to achieve the long-term goal of universal attendance. In the case of the new OER, for example, a determination is made regarding whether non-attendance at a resident MEL 4 is creating an artificial evaluation trend. This emerging trend can then be analyzed in terms of promotion boards' ability to select the best-qualified officers for advancement in each career field and in terms of assignment officers' ability to match officer qualifications with job skill requirements. Appropriate policy changes can then be made to ensure that that the system-wide long-term goal of increased colonel-level experience and depth of knowledge in all career fields continues to be achieved.

OPMS XXI is driven by the future and is designed to support proactive decision-making. Thus, ODAPs are not created simply to ensure the implementation of the Task Force's recommendations and the successful transition to OPMS XXI. New ODAPs can be created at any time to address evolving requirements and the Army's changing strategic vision. If the senior leadership determines, for example, that future requirements would best be served by a unified logistics corps, an action plan can be written to implement that change, and its effects on the other aspects of officer management and development—and on readiness as well—can be monitored. By the same token, if new legislation concerning military compensation is passed, an ODAP can be put into place to take advantage of the management flexibility it offers—perhaps by tailoring compensation differently for each career field—to elicit particular officer behavior, all geared toward improving the organizational effectiveness of the Army as a whole.

As can be seen from the above discussion, adopting a strategic approach to officer development and human resource management is critical not only to the long-term health and viability of OPMS XXI, but also to the Army's ability to continue to shape and influence events, rather than merely respond to them. Thus, the greatest contribution of OPMS XXI is not merely an improved system for managing officers, but the establishment of a method by which officer development can be directly tied to supporting the Army's strategic vision and organizational effectiveness.

Chapter 7
Task Force Recommendations

CREATING A HOLISTIC SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding chapters have argued strongly for a set of interrelated and integrated changes that address future officer development and personnel management in a comprehensive way. In this chapter the Task Force summarizes its recommendations for change. They are designed to be adopted as a set because collectively they work to ensure that OPMS XXI is internally coherent and is synchronized and integrated with other important initiatives affecting officer development, such as Character Development XXI, Leader XXI, and the new OER. In some cases, seemingly disparate recommendations complement and support each other and thus should be jointly implemented for OPMS XXI to work effectively. Choosing to act on one recommendation and not on another could, in some cases, actually be counterproductive.

The Task Force has organized these recommendations into three sets of strategic recommendations for change, with their supporting components:

- Create a strategic human resource management (SHRM) system.
- Create an Officer Development System (ODS) as part of a larger Army Development System.
- Create a career-field-based management system.

In addition, the Task Force has made a number of recommendations for each life-cycle function that complement or support the three main strategic recommendations. Further, a new life-cycle function has been proposed. The three strategic recommendations prescribe new systems that improve upon OPMS by (1) tying officer personnel management policy to desired systemic outcomes; (2) ensuring that officers can develop greater experience and expertise in focused, viable career paths while at the same time meeting Army needs; and (3) reassessing OPMS XXI and related initiatives annually to assure they are working as designed and are properly integrated with each other.

Strategic Recommendation 1: Adopt a Strategic Approach to Human Resource Management

- Adopt a holistic, strategic human resource management (SHRM) approach to officer development and personnel management for the 21st century, us-

ing the 8th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation's conceptual framework for human resource system design. Use the 12 ODS characteristics as the Army's strategic human resource system's objectives, and link Army SHRM evolution to DoD's SHRM development. Ensure that the new system meets the following design objectives:

- ➤ Ties SHRM objectives to strategic personnel policy options.
- ➤ Describes the systemic impact of policy options in a holistic way to include system tradeoffs between proposed policy options and other policies either already in place or also proposed.
- ➤ Tailors sets of policy options to achieve the unique desired behaviors and organizational outcomes for the officer corps as a whole and by career field as needed.
- ➤ Recognizes that policy decisions must take into consideration system-wide effects.
- ➤ Assesses the system-wide impact of future policy options or changing human resource objectives.

- ◆ The DCSPER serves as the Army's proponent for strategic human resource management.
- ◆ The DCSPER adopts and refines an integrated family of models prototyped by the OPMS XXI Task Force for assessing the impact of future officer personnel management policy decisions on the Army as a system.
  - ➤ Embed the 12 ODS characteristics in the Task Force's family of models through the SHRM system's design criteria, decision criteria, and measures of effectiveness and performance.
  - ➤ Update and refine the family of models as necessary.
  - ➤ The DCSPER, with the assistance of the appropriate agency, verifies, validates, and accredits the family of models.
- ◆ The DCSPER provides the CSA an annual SHRM system assessment at the annual Officer Development Update (ODU) using the Task Force's family of models.

Strategic Recommendation 2: Create an Officer Development System as Part of an Overarching Army Development System

- Institute a comprehensive Officer Development System (ODS) that encompasses and integrates officer leader development, character development, evaluation, and personnel management.

- Institute review and feedback mechanisms to measure the status and relative health of each ODS component system and to ensure that all four components are integrated and synchronized.

- Establish comparable development systems for warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians.

- Establish an Army Development System that integrates the officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and DA civilian development systems into a single, overarching system.

- The DCSPER serves as the Department of the Army's proponent for the Army Development System.

- Begin phased implementation of the Officer Development System in FY98, with full implementation complete no later than FY02.

  - ODS implementation occurs in two phases. During Phase 1, four major activities take place and must be complete before the initiation of Phase 2. The major Phase 1 activities are: (1) recoding and restructuring officer authorizations to support OPMS XXI with TDA and TOE authorizations in place by FY00; (2) adjusting, reengineering, or creating AR 600-3 branch and functional area life-cycle functions, as necessary; (3) thoroughly educating and counseling the officer corps on OPMS XXI and its effect on their careers; and (4) designing and preparing the FY99 Career Field Designation Boards. The CSA will decide whether or not to make the transition into Phase 2 at the May 1998 Officer Development Update. Once initiated, Phase 2 will cover three major activities: (1) Redesignating the officer corps over four years into OPMS XXI specialties and career fields; (2) making the transition to the new career field, promotion, and command selection boards; and (3) making the transition to the new Professional Military Education (PME) system for MEL 1 and MEL 4 education.

  - Assign proponency for the components of ODS implementation as follows:

    - Officer Development Support System (ODSS): CSA, with the DCSPER as the executive agent

- OPMS XXI: the DCSPER
- Career field development: Career field proponents, in conjunction with their respective subordinate branch or functional area proponents
- Officer PME: TRADOC
- Restructuring officer authorizations for OPMS XXI: the DCSOPS
- Recoding officer authorizations for OPMS XXI: PERSCOM
- Educating the officer corps on OPMS XXI: the DCSPER, with PERSCOM as the executive agent
- Selection boards: the DCSPER, with PERSCOM as the executive agent.

◆ Create an Officer Development Support System (ODSS) to ensure the implementation of the Officer Development System.

➤ Institute a support system with the following elements:

- Officer Development Action Plans (ODAPs) for each career field that map significant actions to be completed, provide attendant timelines, establish measures of effectiveness or performance for each significant component of the plan, and identify potential conditions that would require a reassessment or redesign of the ODAP.
- Life-Cycle Master Plans (LCMPs) for each life-cycle function that map significant actions to be completed, provide attendant timelines, establish measures of effectiveness or performance for each significant component of the plan, and identify potential conditions that would require a reassessment or redesign of the LCMP.
- Annual Officer Development Updates (ODUs) occurring in the late spring each year that provide the CSA with a cyclic review process to assess the status of ODS and identify future ODS initiatives.
- An annual Officer Survey that provides feedback to the Army's senior leadership by assessing the effectiveness of ODS/OPMS XXI-related initiatives in terms of the 12 ODS characteristics and related measures of effectiveness or performance.
- An OPMS XXI/ODS Implementation Team to plan ODUs and coordinate ongoing OPMS XXI initiatives.

- An ODS Council of Colonels.
- An ODS General Office Steering Committee (GOSC).

➤ Establish the ODSS and ensure that it is fully operational no later than the first ODU.

➤ Conduct the first ODU in the spring of 1998.

Strategic Recommendation 3: Create an Officer Career-Field-Based Management System

◆ The DCSPER develops and implements an officer career-field-based management system composed of four career fields: (1) Operations (OP CF), (2) Operational Support (OS CF), (3) Institutional Support (IS CF), and (4) Information Operations (IO CF). Officers will be designated into a single career field at the grade of major and begin service in their designated CF from that point on. Career field designation will be performed by a centralized Department of the Army board. Once designated into a career field, officers will compete for promotion in that field only. Designation into the Army Acquisition Corps will be the lone exception to this policy; that process will continue under today's rules. This career-field-based system will be designed with the capability of uniquely tailoring the officer life-cycle functions for each career field to best meet the Army's needs and accomplish the career field's organizational functions.

➤ *Operations Career Field*. TRADOC is the proponent for developing the Operations Career Field, which will be composed of all the current branches, FA 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs), and FA 90 (Multifunctional Logistics). Under OPMS XXI the Combat Arms composition will remain the same as today but FA 39 will join the Combat Support Arms. This career field will comprise no less than 60% of the entire field-grade officer inventory. Further, at least 50% of the combat arms officers selected for major will remain in the OP CF. All centrally selected commanders except those associated with the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) will be chosen from this career field. Finally, up to 20% of officers receiving Foreign Area Officer training will remain in the OP CF to ensure that the Army has a ready pool of operationally experienced officers to use in FAO positions in the senior field grades.

➤ *Operational Support Career Field*. The U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) Commanding General is the proponent for developing the Operational Support Career Field, which is composed of FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer) and the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC), consisting of FA 51 (Research, Development and Acquisition), some FA 53B (Systems

Automation Engineering), FA53C (Systems Automation Acquisition), and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management). Concurrent with OPMS XXI implementation, all three functional areas constituting the AAC will be combined into a single functional area, FA 51. The current accession policy for the AAC will remain in effect and will be the lone exception to the proposed career field designation process.

- *Institutional Support Career Field*. The Director of the Army Staff (DAS) is the proponent for developing the Institutional Support Career Field. This career field is composed of four existing functional areas and two new functional areas. The existing functional areas assigned to this career field are FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Faculty), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations). The new functional areas in the IS CF are FA 43 (Human Resource Management) and FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development). The two new functional areas will be fully operational no later than FY00.

- *Information Operations Career Field*. TRADOC is the proponent for the Information Operations Career Field. The IO CF is largely composed of newly created functional areas that address a wide range of information-related functions the Army will need in the 21st century. The five new functional areas are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations). The existing FAs joining the IO CF are FA 46 (Public Affairs) and FA 53 (Information Systems Management).

- PERSCOM assumes proponency for designing and implementing a career field designation process that most effectively places officers in the career field for which they are best qualified and suited. This process should, at a minimum, possess the following characteristics:

  - Career field designation should be linked to the officer's functional area designation and experience, manner of performance in both the basic branch and functional area, aptitude, education, preference, and rater and senior rater input on the OER.

  - Career field designation boards should be composed of representatives of all four career fields. All members should be brigade-level commanders or their counterparts in the OS, IS, and IO CFs. At least 51% of the board should be serving or former brigade commanders from the OP CF.

◆ The DCSPER revises and rewrites, as necessary, AR 600-3 and DA Pamphlet 600-3 to reflect changes in OPMS brought about by instituting a

career-field-based officer management system. Both documents should be revised and rewritten no later than the beginning of FY99.

- All designated career field proponents are responsible for developing and implementing officer development action plans for their respective career fields. In addition, they are responsible for integrating and synchronizing their respective ODAPs with each of the life-cycle master plans.

- The DCSPER examines how OPMS XXI could best complement and be complemented by the general officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and DA civilian personnel management systems, including the feasibility of creating career fields for these other categories of personnel that align with the officer system.

- The DCSPER and TRADOC annually assess the impact of the new career-field-based management system on company-grade development and determine whether adjustments in either company- or field-grade development are necessary.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 1: Structure

- The DCSOPS and the DCSPER jointly develop a process to support and sustain ongoing efforts at establishing a DA-level central accounting mechanism for all officer authorizations. This initiative should establish a regular, disciplined process that reconciles officer authorizations by grade and skill with officer inventory. Further, it should create a disciplined system that regularly validates and balances TOE and TDA authorizations at the same point in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. In bringing officer authorizations into alignment with inventory, two major steps should be taken:

  - Cut or downgrade authorizations to align the field-grade officer corps at the grade and skill level of detail for documentation no later than FY00.

  - Recode field-grade officer positions, as necessary, to build healthy and viable branches and functional areas that can be supported at each grade by expected inventory continuation patterns under the new career-field-based management system. All recoding should be complete to ensure documentation no later than FY00. Under this initiative, all FA 41 and FA 54 authorizations will be recoded. To achieve maximal system flexibility, as many 01/02 positions as possible should be created in the field grades, the greatest proportion being found at the grade of O-6.

- Each branch or functional area proponent will be responsible for ensuring that its authorizations are aligned properly with its inventory under OPMS XXI, thus creating healthy and viable career fields.

- The DCSPER will assume proponency for all 01A/02A authorizations, and PERSCOM will serve as executive agent. Rename 01A/02A positions as "functional integrator" positions to reflect their importance in providing officers with broadening developmental experience outside of their branch or functional area and ensuring that the Army develops a pool of officers capable of integrating multiple army systems or programs at the senior-field-grade and general-officer level. Identify the most important functional integrator jobs and use them methodically to develop those officers with the highest potential through a sequenced developmental pattern of assignments.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 2: Distribute

- PERSCOM establishes a career-field-based officer distribution system to meet Army skill needs, reduce unit turbulence, and promote officer professional development within OPMS XXI. To accomplish this end, OPMS will make the transition from a "dual-track specialty" system to a "dual-track assignment" system with the following features:

  - In the company grades, all officers will belong to the Operations Career Field.

  - Upon promotion to major, approximately one-third of the promotable cohort will be redesignated into one of the other three career fields—Operational Support, Institutional Support, and Information Operations. No more than 50% of promotable combat arms officers will transfer from the OP CF to the other three career fields.

  - Once designated to a career field, field-grade officers will serve in only two kinds of jobs—branch and functional integrator jobs if the officer belongs to the OP CF, and functional area and functional integrator jobs if the officer belongs to one of the other three career fields.

  - Officers will have three-year stabilized tours as majors.

  - OP CF majors will have the opportunity to serve two years in one or more "key" branch-qualifying jobs at battalion or brigade level.

  - Officers will serve repetitive tours in their designated career field.

  - All field-grade officers should serve in functional integrator assignments to gain broader experience and knowledge of the Army as a sys-

tem of systems and to develop skill at integrating multiple, diverse systems or programs. Officers in the IO, OS, and IS CFs should be assigned periodically to functional integrator positions in the operational force to gain operational experience. OP CF officers will serve periodically in functional integrator positions in the institutional force to bring their operational experience to Army-wide decisions. Ultimately the purpose of functional integrator jobs will be to develop a sufficient pool of officers with broad, multifunctional experience to serve at the Army's highest levels.

- The ODU will assess annually how well the career-field-based management system distributes officers in accordance with the Army's personnel priority groups.
- The ODU will assess annually how well the career-field-based management system distributes women and minorities across the four career fields and their respective branches or functional areas.
- The results of the ongoing U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) AC/RC initiatives will be integrated into OPMS when they are complete.
- The results of the ongoing Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Review and related joint officer requirements reduction initiatives will be integrated into OPMS XXI when they are complete.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 3: Acquire

- TRADOC reviews pre-accession training to ensure that it meets the needs of OPMS XXI.
  - Examine the feasibility of building stronger ties between Cadet Command, the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) to achieve greater consistency and coherency in their respective military instruction, leader development, and character development programs.
  - Change pre-accession civilian education requirements to better align Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship students' undergraduate degree programs with future Army career field needs where it is practical to do so. In particular, adopt the Army Science Board recommendations to increase the science, math, and engineering requirements for both USMA and ROTC scholarship cadets.
  - Sustain today's accession programs and policies. Specifically, retain current capabilities for direct commission, lateral transfer, recall, and

activation. Further, retain ROTC, OCS, and USMA as the Army's primary accession sources with the missions to (1) provide high-quality, professional officers who personify the Army's standards for leadership, character, and competence; (2) acquire a diverse mix of individuals from across America; and (3) provide superior soldiers a way to become officers.

- The DCSPER examines how the Army should access officers to meet the needs of a career-field-based management system. Consider the following and make recommendations, if any, to the CSA as part of the FY99 Officer Development Update:
  - Whether the process for designing officer accessions should change.
  - Whether a career-field-based management system requires the Army to apportion branch accessions differently from the way it does today.
  - Whether a career-field-based management system requires a new approach to branch detailing. In particular, this examination should consider whether the length of branch-detail assignments will need to change over time and whether the Army will need to branch-detail officers for specific functional areas as well as branches.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 4: Develop

- TRADOC broadens the current life-cycle function of training to encompass all officer training, education, and professional development and titles this wider function "develop." Concerned with developing the whole person, the develop life-cycle function includes both leadership and character development as well as training and education. The purpose of widening this concept is to fully develop officers mentally, morally, emotionally, and physically. The following are the key features of the develop life-cycle function:
  - Sustain today's proven Mission Essential Task List (METL)-based training philosophy epitomized by training rigor revolving around (1) strict adherence to the "task, condition, and standard" model; (2) the use of combat training centers to learn and practice collective combined arms skills; and (3) the standard use of after-action reviews as an essential teaching and learning device for all units.
  - Expand today's well-developed, institutionalized system focused primarily on training warfighting skills to include the development of moral judgment and advanced cognitive skills revolving around analysis and creativity.

- ➤ Increase the role of self-development in producing skilled and competent officers by substantially increasing the role of distance learning made possible by information-age technology, integrating self-development into unit and institutional training, and increasing the availability of intermediate developmental modules between military education levels.

- ➤ Increase joint development by interweaving joint education and training into all levels of officer development through a comprehensive joint education and training curriculum. The goal is to make joint development a way of life, not just a wicket to pass through. There are four key components of a holistic approach to joint development.

  - ■ Increase the window of opportunity for joint assignments by reducing the number of competing assignment requirements on officers and widening the amount of time between MEL 1 and MEL 4 education.

  - ■ Progressively increase the requirement for joint-qualified battalion and brigade command selectees annually.

  - ■ Continue board guidance to reduce the number of joint-duty waivers for "the good of the service."

  - ■ Send former brigade commanders who are not joint-qualified to key joint jobs.

- ◆ TRADOC changes the current paradigm of progressive and sequential training and assignments to progressive, sequential, and continuous development. The intent of this recommendation is to foster adaptive and effective organizations Army-wide. To achieve this end, the Army will need to foster a "learning organization" environment and revise the current officer education system.

  - ➤ The DCSPER supports the fostering of learning organizations through the following means:

    - ■ Increasing leadership team integrity in units and organizations through longer tours and greater tour overlap between key leaders.

    - ■ Improving mission-essential experience through "continuous development" gained by increased individual expertise acquired before arriving in the organization, repetitive assignments in branch or functional area jobs, and shared experience derived through live, virtual, or constructive experience.

- Develop programs to create a cooperative learning environment in organizations through counseling and evaluation that measures teamwork and cooperative behavior and by increasing time available to commanders to focus on team-building activities.

➤ TRADOC revises the Officer Education System as follows:

- Combined Arms Services Staff School ($CAS^{3)}$. Revise CAS^3 in accordance with the current "Captain PME" Plan.

- MEL 4. Develop and implement a resident MEL 4 program consisting of pre-resident instruction, entrance qualification requirements, core instruction, career-field-related instruction, and post-resident modules for all Army Competitive Category majors. In line with this concept, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth will become the developmental center for majors and lieutenant colonels. These expanded missions will require an increased investment in classroom learning technology, an expanded physical plant, and instructor development at Fort Leavenworth.

- MEL 1. Develop and implement for all Army Competitive Category colonels resident MEL 1 consisting of the current core curriculum covering strategy and expanded study in the operational level of war, particularly as it relates to strategy. The Army War College will become the development center for all colonels and general officers.

- MEL 1 and MEL 4 selection boards. PERSCOM eliminates MEL 1 and MEL 4 selection boards except for the special branches such as the Judge Adjutant General Corps, the Chaplain Corps, and the various Army Medical Department (AMEDD) specialties.

- Advanced Educational Requirements System (AERS). Review the AERS and align it with emerging Advanced Education Requirements Board (AERB) requirements under OPMS XXI. Provide (1) enough advanced civil schooling (ACS) opportunities to meet the Army's needs for officers with career-field-related specialty skills and (2) higher order cognitive development to prepare officers to perform well in complex and difficult positions of high responsibility.

- Science, Math, and Engineering (SME) requirements. Increase officer precommissioning science, math, and engineering requirements. Tie these requirements to emerging skill needs under OPMS XXI.

- Distance learning and simulations. Increase investments in distance learning and simulations to supplement and complement institutional and unit training.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 5: Sustain

- The DCSPER develops and implements a career-field-based promotion system with the following features:
  - Officers compete against other officers from the same career field for promotion to meet requirements.
  - Board guidance for promotion requirements is established for each branch and functional area, and officers can satisfy a requirement only in one Career Management Field (CMF). Eliminate the policy of double-counting selected officers to satisfy both branch and functional area requirements.
  - Skill requirements (floors) are established for the promotion of former battalion commanders in each functional command category on the basis of requirements at the next higher echelon of command.
  - Reduce the percentage of below-the-zone officer promotions to 5% to 7.5% of a promotion list, and limit the number of below-the-zone considerations at each field-grade rank to one.
- The DCSPER establishes a command selection list (CSL), to take the place of the command-designated position list (CDPL), with the following features:
  - Organize the CSL into four functional categories: Tactical (warfighting units); Training and Strategic Support (TDA functional commands such as TRADOC, AMC, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)); Institutional (garrisons and U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) commands); and TRADOC Systems Managers (colonel level only).
  - Continue to allow officers to choose the category in which they are considered for selection, and to decline consideration in any of the categories.
  - Revise the slating process so that the selection board slates officers to one of the categories of command, while the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) slates to a specific unit within the category.

- Establish joint-duty floors for the selection of officers who are joint-qualified or serving in a joint assignment at each grade of command. Initially, these requirements should be 25% for lieutenant colonel-level commanders and 50% for colonel-level commanders.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 6: Compensate

- The DCSPER establishes compensation as a separate and distinct life-cycle function.
- Analyze and assess the effectiveness of the of the current compensation system and methods. Pay particular attention to possibly tailoring compensation separately for each career field, in order to elicit the particular officer traits and behaviors needed to support organizational effectiveness.

Life-Cycle Function Recommendation 7: Separate

- The DCSPER should examine extended career lengths as part of a DoD-wide initiative and investigate other initiatives such as vesting officers after a specified time in service. Recommendations should be made before the FY99 Officer Development Update.

The next chapter will address how to institutionalize OPMS XXI in an integrated, synchronized manner, using a coordinated implementation strategy that operationalizes the concepts proposed above.

Chapter 8
Implementation

Since OPMS XXI is designed as an integrated, holistic system—rather than as a series of policy-level "fixes" to the existing management framework—a piecemeal approach to implementation clearly will not achieve the desired outcome of institutionalizing OPMS XXI. In addition, as the Task Force conducted its study, it became evident that implementing OPMS XXI would be a very difficult task requiring broad institutional changes to Army authorization structures, policies, and procedures. Thus, the Task Force developed a comprehensive implementation strategy and plan to ensure that the OPMS XXI decisions would be successfully implemented. The plans focus on overcoming the Army's institutional and cultural resistance to change, and on educating the officer corps and stakeholders about the OPMS XXI philosophy and future changes to officer career management and development.

The implementation strategy consists of a two-phased plan to be implemented over five years. Phase 1, to be implemented in FY98 and FY99, is the preparation phase, during which the groundwork will be laid for the transition to OPMS XXI. It will encompass those preliminary actions necessary to build the OPMS career-field-based management system. During this phase, four major tasks will be accomplished:

1. The Army and the officer corps will be informed and educated about OPMS XXI and its implications, as well about how these changes will affect officers' careers. The information plan will have the following key elements:

   - An officers' guide to OPMS XXI will be published in a "frequently asked questions" format and distributed to every officer in the Army.

   - A chain teaching kit containing detailed information about OPMS XXI will be published and distributed.

   - Briefing teams will visit Army installations worldwide to present OPMS XXI to the officer corps and provide an opportunity for officers to ask questions.

   - An OPMS XXI homepage will be maintained on the Internet, providing updated information to the officer corps concerning the status of implementation and the transition process.

- Other information sources such as *The Army Times*, Soldiers' Radio and Television, and *Stars and Stripes* will be updated on a regular basis as further decisions concerning OPMS XXI are made.

2. The DCSPER and PERSCOM will plan for and prepare to execute career-field designation boards and promotion boards under the OPMS XXI concept. PERSCOM will also reorganize as needed to manage field-grade officers by career field.

3. Branch and functional area life-cycle designs and officer development plans will be revised to reflect the impact of a career-field-based management and promotion system. The new functional areas recommended by the Task Force will be created, and proponents for the new functional areas will be established. In addition, DA PAM 600-3 and AR 600-3 will be revised and updated to include OPMS XXI concepts.

4. The Army's TDA and TOE authorization structures will be reviewed and recoded. The purpose of this process is four-fold. First, the new functional areas must be integrated into the Army documentation system in a manner that ensuring that viable developmental paths exist for officers with these skills. Second, the authorized positions must be reviewed to assure that they are in the proper career management field, branch, or functional area with the skills necessary to perform the duties in that position. Third, the authorization structures of individual branches and functional areas need to be aligned to best support their respective populations. Finally, officer authorizations and inventories at both the grade and skill level of detail must be aligned, in conjunction with other initiatives such as Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-directed cuts and the Officer Restructuring Initiative (ORI). This effort is critical to the overall success of OPMS XXI, since without such an alignment, no management system will be able to match inventory to authorizations.

These objectives will be accomplished in the following manner:

- First, the DCSOPS will determine how many officer authorizations each MACOM must eliminate as part of the QDR-directed cuts. In addition, the DCSPER will assign authorization ceilings for each MACOM by grade to ensure that the Army's aggregate authorization structure is aligned with the officer inventory allowed by DOPMA at each grade. This involves not only cutting authorizations, but also "rolling them down"—that is, changing the documentation so that the position calls for an officer of the next lower grade.

- Each MACOM will then execute the cuts and rolldowns, deciding which jobs to eliminate entirely and which ones to downgrade to the next lower rank. This process is cumulative, starting with colonel authorizations and progressing down through all of the officer ranks. Upon completion, it will result in the

alignment of the number of jobs and the number of officers available to fill them, not only at the aggregate Army level, but also at each grade.

- At the same time, the OPMS XXI Implementation Team, together with each branch and functional area proponent, will review and revise the Army's existing authorization documents to integrate the new functional areas and to ensure that viable developmental paths exist for all officer skills. In addition, the focus will be on ensuring that the authorized position is in the branch or functional area with the skills necessary to perform the duties of that position.

- Finally, the results of the MACOMs' restructuring and of the personnel proponents' recoding will be reconciled. The goal is for the authorization structure of each branch and functional area to be as close as possible to the inventory structure under OPMS XXI. Attaining this goal will be an iterative, give-and-take process between the restructuring and recoding efforts. The results of this process will be reflected in the FY00 authorization documents.

At the completion of Phase 1, the first Officer Development Update (ODU) will be held for the CSA. Since the Army's ability to begin the next phase requires successful completion of Phase 1, this first ODU's primary purpose will be to assess the status of the preparations conducted during this phase. The ODU will therefore serve as an in-process review for the CSA to assess the transition to the OPMS XXI system, as well as the decision point to begin conducting career field designation boards and promotion boards in accordance with the OPMS XXI concept. Other issues that may arise during the preparation phase concerning officer development will also be addressed.

Phase 2 of implementation will result in the transition of officers into the career-field-based management system of OPMS XXI. This will be accomplished over a four-year period, from FY99 to FY02, with the following guidelines and considerations:

- Multiple year group (YG) cohorts will be designated into an OPMS XXI career field (CF) using the methodology finalized by PERSCOM during the preparation phase. Two YGs will be designated during each of the transition fiscal years.

- The CF designation for each YG will be timed so that those officers will have at least two years to serve in their CFs prior to consideration by the subsequent promotion board. This is being done to allow all officers designated into a CF the opportunity to serve in that CF before facing an OPMS XXI promotion board, and to ensure that selection boards have a common frame of reference for all officers being considered for promotion in a particular CF.

- If the considerations above cannot be satisfied for a particular YG, that cohort will not undergo CF designation until after it has been considered by a lieutenant colonel-level command selection board twice. Once again, this is in the interest of fairness, to ensure that all officers have the opportunity to compete for command under the rules and concepts they "grew up" with.

The following charts outline the career field designation and promotion board schedules for the transition years:

LTC & COL Transition

OPMS Task Force XXI

YG's	OPMS FY98	TRANSITION (FY99-02)				OPMS XXI	
COL's	COL BD	LTC CFD	COL CFD	COL BD	COL CMD	COL BD	COL CMD
YG 67-76			A				
LTC's							
YG 77	98		A		99		
YG 78		A	A	99	00		
YG 79		A	A	00	01		
YG 80		99		01	02		
YG 81		00		02			03

A --Applicants accepted for CF based on officer request and Army needs. Completed NLT FY02.

...Leaders for the 21st century Army

MAJ Transition

OPMS Task Force XXI

YG's	OPMS FY98	TRANSITION (FY99-02)				OPMS XXI			
MAJ's	LTC BD	MAJ CFD	LTC BD	LTC CMD	LTC CFD	LTC BD	LTC CMD	COL BD	COL CMD
YG 82	98			99	01			03	04
YG 83			99	00	01			04	05
YG 84			00	01	02			05	06
YG 85			01	02	02			06	07
YG 86		99				02	03	07	08
YG 87		00				03	04	08	09

...Leaders for the 21st century Army

MAJ Transition

OPMS Task Force XXI

YG's	OPMS FY98	TRANSITION (FY99-02)				OPMS XXI			
MAJ's	LTC BD	MAJ CFD	LTC BD	LTC CMD	LTC CFD	LTC BD	LTC CMD	COL BD	COL CMD
YG 82	98			99	01			03	04
YG 83			99	00	01			04	05
YG 84			00	01	02			05	06
YG 85			01	02	02			06	07
YG 86		99				02	03	07	08
YG 87		00				03	04	08	09

...Leaders for the 21st century Army

The charts above highlight a few key officer cohorts. Year Groups 80 and 86 will be the first cohorts to undergo transition in FY99. Year Group 80 will also be the first cohort to be selected for promotion to colonel under the career-field-based promotion system, and YG 86 will the first cohort to be selected for lieutenant colonel under the same conditions. Year Group 89 will be the first cohort to enter the field grades completely according to the OPMS XXI system design, being selected for promotion to major and then subsequently undergoing career field designation in FY99.

The revised field-grade Professional Military Education will be the final part of OPMS XXI system redesign to be put in place. The recommendations concerning MEL 4 and MEL 1 will be phased in by FY04.

As stated in Chapter 6, the implementation of the OPMS XXI concepts and recommendations will be managed and monitored using Officer Development Action Plans (ODAPs). As the CSA formally approves the OPMS XXI recommendations, an ODAP will be initiated to implement and manage each OPMS XXI program, including the establishment of the four career fields and the new functional areas, as well as for each of the life-cycle functions.

ODAPs will address long-term goals and the near-term objectives required to achieve the goals, and will identify the specific tasks to be accomplished. Using the "task-conditions-standards" format, responsible agencies will be identified and formally tasked, completion deadlines will be assigned, resources will be allocated, and desired outcomes will be clearly articulated.

These ODAPs will be periodically reviewed and assessed to ensure that they remain on course with their near-term objectives and long-term strategies. As the National Security Strategy changes, technology continues to evolve, and military doctrine and requirements change accordingly, OPMS XXI will respond in turn, adjusting the ODAPs or initiating new ones as necessary.

To synchronize, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of OPMS XXI, the Task Force will make the transition to an Implementation Team comprising both original OPMS XXI Task Force members and newly assigned officers. The Implementation Team will be responsible for those high-level staff and administrative actions necessary to formally document and put into operation the CSA's decisions concerning OPMS XXI. These actions will include activities such as ensuring that all of the implementation tasks outlined above are successfully carried out, publishing and distributing the Task Force's final report, and conducting the first ODU in May 1998.

Following the first ODU, the Implementation Team will make the transition into ODCSPER, where it will become the Office of Strategic Management (OSM), charged with continuing the work of the OPMS XXI Task Force and Implementation Team. This will include not only implementation, but also assessing OPMS

XXI from the holistic and strategic perspectives discussed in Chapter 6. The OSM, then, will oversee the overall integrated implementation mechanism for OPMS XXI, called the Officer Development Support System, which consists of the following components:

- The Officer Development Action Plans (ODAPs).
- The annual Officer Development Update (ODU).
- The Officer Development System (ODS), which includes the Officer Management, Leader Development, Character Development, and Officer Evaluation systems.

As the responsible agency for all of the above, the OSM will serve as the focal point for integrated strategic human resource management activities in the Army. Its efforts will be directed primarily toward long-range, strategic issues and planning, rather than toward day-to-day personnel management activities. It will provide the link between the Army's warfighting doctrine and projects such as Force XXI and AAN, and officer development.

As the Army evolves and the concept of taking a strategic approach to officer development matures and is institutionalized, the OSM will take the same approach to warrant officer, enlisted, and civilian development systems as well. This, in turn, opens the way for combining all of these personnel systems into an overarching Army Development System (ADS), with commissioned officer, warrant officer, enlisted, and civilian development all considered together to increase each other's and the Army's organizational effectiveness.

Chapter 9
Conclusion—Implications for the Future

This report should end where it began—looking toward the future. No system that concentrates solely on fixing today's problems can long endure. The vision of the OPMS XXI Study from the very beginning has been to develop an officer corps to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Throughout the study, the Task Force has always stayed focused on the concept that winning the Nation's wars is the Army's reason for existence, and changes to the Officer Personnel Management System must thus improve the Army's warfighting capability. In addition, the reshaping of OPMS was done with the vision of producing competent officers of character, leading the finest Army in the world, and selflessly serving the Nation's interest always at the forefront.

The Officer Personnel Management System is just one of many systems making up the Army. What the OPMS XXI Task Force discovered very early was that these systems interact very much like an ecosystem, with the outcomes from one portion of the system affecting the operation of numerous other areas. It became clear that OPMS must take a holistic, strategic approach to planning and problem solving. The goal of OPMS XXI is not just producing better officers, but better organizations. Thus it is the goals and missions of organizations that form the system's basis. This places the system in a state of dynamic tension that constantly balances the needs of the officer and the needs of the organizations. It also means that some aspects must be consciously sub-optimized in order to optimize the overall system. For example, the learning curve of a battalion S-3 is greatest during his or her first year and then begins to level out. From a purely officer development perspective, one could conclude that one year as an S-3 is about right. From a unit perspective, however, that same S-3 would be far more effective during his or her second and third years in the job because he or she is now much more competent in the job. From an organizational viewpoint, then, it would be better for the S-3 to stay perhaps three years or longer in the job. The right answer for the Army is a sub-optimization of both individual officer development and unit effectiveness, in order to balance both in such a manner as to benefit the Army in the long run. Ultimately, this means that the S-3 should probably stay about two years. The key is to make the personnel decision not in the tactical sense of what is best for the officer, but from the strategic perspective of what is best for the Army as a whole.

As stated at the outset of this report, the focus of OPMS XXI is the future, not the present. OPMS XXI is designed to be an integrated, comprehensive system that provides a direct link between the Army's primary mission of fighting and winning the Nation's wars and the officer management and development policies that ultimately support the Army's organizational goals and objectives in carrying out this

mission. As such, OPMS XXI is analogous to the Army's training management system, in which all resourcing and policy decisions are derived from and ultimately support the warfighting mission, goals, and objectives.

This is the essence is of a strategic approach to human resource management—thinking in terms of direction instead of problem solving. What good does it do to solve a problem if the Army is not better off as a result? The only way to know whether or not the Army as a whole will benefit is to have a clear vision, a set of goals and objectives, and a plan of action to get there. In that way each problem can be viewed as a part of the whole and not a separate entity. It is then possible to begin to work on particular action plans that not only address today's problems but also drive solutions in the direction the Army wants to go.

If history has taught us one thing, it is that the world of tomorrow will be different from the world of today, and any system appropriate for today's conditions may not be able to meet the challenges of the future. Therefore, the cyclic review process embedded in OPMS XXI is essential to its success. It is only by continuously assessing the effectiveness of the policies and practices in meeting evolving needs that OPMS XXI will be able to support the Army's warfighting mission, especially a continuously changing world.

Within this framework, the OPMS XXI Task Force began its work by clearly articulating a vision of what roles officers will be expected to fulfill in the Army, and what skills, knowledge, and attributes officers of tomorrow must possess in order to fulfill their mission. It is to be expected that in some respects the officer of tomorrow will not be the same as the officer of today. However, there are some enduring, timeless values and characteristics that the Nation and the Army will always expect officers to embody.

With a clear vision of the officer corps of the future, the Task Force was then able to design a set of management and development policies and practices to achieve the desired vision. In the course of doing so, many of the issues confronting officer development and management today were also addressed.

Several elements of OPMS XXI serve this two-fold purpose. First and foremost is the revised promotion methodology, which will eliminate the current practice of dual-counting officers selected for promotion against both branch and functional area requirements. In addition to recognizing the Army's growing reliance in the future on specialists with increased knowledge and experience, this change will go a long way towards easing the misalignment between officer inventory and Army requirements for officers holding a particular branch or functional area.

Ultimately, however, no officer management system in will be able to meet all of the Army's requirements for officers if those requirements exceed the officer inventory allowed by law. Therefore, the OPMS XXI initiative to align

authorizations with inventory at both the grade and the skill level of detail is also a crucial step in ensuring the viability of OPMS XXI into the future.

If projections about the nature of future operations hold true, officers will need to be more intellectually flexible and capable than ever before. In order to prepare officers for this, the Professional Military Education system must evolve to better serve the educational needs of the officer corps. The universal resident MEL 1 and MEL 4 recommendations, besides better preparing the officer corps for future operations, will also serve to eliminate the "haves" and "have-nots" dichotomy plaguing today's OPMS.

Finally, regardless of how well any system meets the Army's needs, no matter how well designed it is, no matter how well it articulates a vision for the organization's future, it will not achieve those ends if it is not implemented. There must be a plan to institutionalize the vision, a practical method for putting into operation the concepts and accomplishing the tasks required to reach the goals and objectives determined at the outset. And so OPMS XXI, although it began by looking toward the future, will succeed in improving the warfighting effectiveness of Army units and institutionalizing its vision for developing an officer corps for the 21st century only if positive steps are taken in that direction today.

Glossary

Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC)—Active component officers working in reserve component units as trainers and evaluators. Most commonly used for those positions, which must be filled under either Title VII or Title XI.

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI)—Identifies specialized skill(s) that may require significant education, training, and experience. A skill can be related to more than one branch or functional area. Any authorized position may require up to two ASIs in the documentation. Each officer may have up to six skills recorded in the Officer Record Brief (ORB). Progressive assignments and repetitive tours are not required, except for 4M/Z, Acquisition Manager. (Modified from DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995)

Area of Concentration (AOC)—A subset or subdivision of either a branch or functional area. Each authorization within the Army is coded with the branch or functional area and the appropriate AOC. An officer generally earns AOCs through schooling, training, and/or assignment history and may maintain up to five in the ORB. Identifies a requirement and an officer possessing a requisite area of expertise (subdivision) within a branch or functional area. An officer may possess and serve in more than one area of concentration. (Modified from DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995; AR 310-25, 21 May 1986; validated w/Internet)

Army Acquisition Corps (AAC)—A dedicated corps of acquisition specialists. Complies with Public Law 99-145, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, and Public Law 101-50: The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA).

Army Competitive Category (ACC)—Under OPMS, all officers 2LT through COL who are either in one of the 16 basic branches or single-tracked in one of the functional areas, including the Army Acquisition Corps.

Army Development System (ADS)—A holistic system concept combining officer, warrant officer, soldier, and civilian development systems. Each system is composed of character development, performance evaluation, leader development, and personnel management subsystems. (OPMS XXI TF)

Army Life-Cycle Functions—A set of functions within the Army's strategic human resource management system through which an individual or cohort progresses from accession to separation, and the dynamics involved in that progress. The OPMS XXI life-cycle functions (LCF) are: Structure, Acquire, Distribute, Develop, Sustain, Compensate, Separate. (OPMS XXI TF)

Asset Utilization Model (AUM)—An optimization model that develops a projected ODP at the aggregated level of two-digit skill, rank, and Army priority. It does not consider the stabilized population of officers, or AOCs, nor does it develop MACOM levels of fill.

Attributes—One of three elements of character in the Army leadership model. Attributes are the pre-dispositional part of the leader that determine, to a large degree, parameters that are more or less permanent (or long-standing), yet can be developed over time through correct and habitual practices. Attributes are divided into three groups: mental, physical, and emotional. (FM 22-100, April 1997)

Below-the-Zone (BZ)—Officers selected for promotion one year prior to their primary selection board are considered below-the-zone. IAW 10 U.S.C., no more than 10% of those selected may be BZ selects without waiver. Under OPMS XXI, the percentage is modified between 5% and 7.5%. There is opportunity for one below-the-zone selection at each field grade rank for a total of three for any one officer. (OPMS XXI TF)

Bench—An inventory of officers initially selected for MAJ and designated into a career field with a common base of experience established during the company-grade years. This inventory is built of qualified officers prepared for the next level of responsibility and/or promotion on the basis of specific assignment experience, skill, specialized training, or education. This inventory supports the fill of requirements within a current grade or the next higher up through COL. (OPMS XXI TF)

Branch—A grouping of officers that comprises an arm or service of the Army in which an officer is commissioned, transferred, trained, developed, and promoted. Most ACC officers hold a single branch designation and may serve repetitive and progressive assignments associated with that branch. (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995; AR 310-25, 21 May 1986; validated w/Internet). Officers may request a branch transfer at any time in their careers. Special Forces is a unique branch, since officers are not commissioned in it but must volunteer for and successfully complete rigorous additional training prior to entering the branch.

Branch-Immaterial Position—This term is a functional integrator under OPMS XXI/ODS, a duty position not identified with or limited to one specific branch of the Army; a position that any commissioned officer may fill. It is coded as "01A." (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995; AR 310-25, 21 May 1986; OPMS XXI TF)

Branch Qualification (BQ)—AR 600-3 outlines for each branch and rank what qualifies an officer for the next grade within that branch. Certain jobs within each branch are considered branch-qualifying jobs, starting at the rank of CPT. Officers must hold these jobs for a specified minimum period (currently 12 months) in order to be considered branch-qualified within their respective branches. Under

OPMS XXI/ODS, branch-qualifying jobs are in the Operations Career Field. (OPMS XXI TF)

Branch-Qualified (BQ) Officer—An officer possessing the following qualifications: (1) is technically qualified for a variety, but not necessarily all of the assignments in his branch; (2) is physically qualified to meet the demands of many, but not necessarily all, assignments normally expected of officers of his grade and branch; (3) has demonstrated either the ability or the potential to command at an echelon appropriate to his present grade, with the indicated ability to command at the next higher echelon (if a specialist, has demonstrated in his specialty the ability or potential to perform at the next higher echelon); (4) possesses an ability to work for and/or with others; (5) evidences a desire for or has exhibited self-improvement; (6) has the ability to lead; (7) and has successfully completed, or has had sufficient branch assignments to receive equivalent credit for, branch schools commensurate with grade and years of service. (AR 310-25, 21 May 1986; validated w/Internet)

(ODS) Campaign Plan—A plan that articulates the Chief of Staff, Army's intent and concept for the future Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS XXI), which will ultimately become the Officer Development System (ODS). This plan is built and executed on a set of structured, integrated, and synchronized taskings. It is a hierarchical pyramid supported by the four career field Officer Development Action Plans (ODAPs), which are in turn supported by a foundation of master plans developed around the life-cycle functions (LCF). It is annually updated. (OPMS XXI TF)

Career Field—A grouping of interrelated branches and functional areas into management categories. (CFDB instructions; OPMS XXI TF)

Career-Field-Based Management System—A field-grade officer management system of interrelated branches and functional areas with an inventory assigned, developed, and promoted within the designated career field. Initial designation occurs after selection to MAJ and is announced concurrently with the MAJs list. Officers would compete for promotion to LTC and COL (to requirements) only against other officers in the same career field or in the same functional area within that career field.

Career Field Designation Board (CFDB)—A Department of the Army centralized advisory board that selects the best qualified officers for the appropriate career fields to serve their field-grade years of service. Board results are approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army. This board is conducted after the MAJs board, with the results published together.

Career Field Designation Process (CFDP)—A process whereby officers are designated into one of four career fields using weighted factors through a centralized board selection. The officer's preference statement has significant weight,

with other factors such as aptitude, qualifications, experience, education and training, and rater and senior rater recommendations contributing to the designation decision,. The process begins with functional area designation in the fifth year of service and culminates with a career field designation board after the MAJs board. The process ensures distribution of quality across the officer corps. (OPMS XXI TF)

Career Field Preference Statement—A statement indicating the individual officer's choice or preference regarding the career field in which the officer will serve his or her field-grade years of service. It is a significant factor considered during the career field designation process and board.

Career Focus—Synonymous with "specialization." Depth and breadth of experience and expertise in a particular operational branch or specialist functional area. (OPMS XXI TF)

(ODS) Characteristics—Twelve broad, enduring characteristics that encompass the derived outcomes for the Officer Development System (ODS) of the 21st century. (OPMS XXI TF)

Cohort—A term usually used to refer to a group of officers who entered active duty in the same fiscal year.

Combat Arms Immaterial Position—This term is obsolete under OPMS XXI/ODS and is replaced by "functional integrator position." The previous definition, under OPMS II, was: an authorized position that is not identified with one specific branch of the Army but is limited to officers of the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, Engineer, or Special Forces branches. The position possesses a code of "02A." (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995; AR 310-25, 21 May 1986)

Command Designated Position List (CDPL)—This term is obsolete under OPMS XXI/ODS and is replaced by "command selection list" (CSL) and a new approach. The previous definition, under OPMS II, was: a listing of all the battalion and brigade command positions or equivalents that are centrally board-selected in both TOE and TDA.

Command Opportunity—The opportunity (represented by a percentage) for an officer to be selected for command within a grouping of officers.

Command Selection List (CSL)—Under OPMS XXI, a functionally categorized list of commands and command equivalent positions in the Operations Career Field (OP CF). The list is organized in four categories: Tactical (including AC/RC battalions), Training and Strategic Support, Institutional (garrison and USAREC battalions and brigades), and TRADOC System Manager (TSM). Selection is

determined by a centralized board process. The selection board slates to a category, while PERCOM slates to the unit. (OPMS XXI TF)

Continuation Rate—The percentage of officers expected to remain on active duty in a given FY. Calculated by comparing officers on active duty at the beginning of a FY with those on active duty at the conclusion of the same FY or longer period of interest. Those remaining each count as one continuation for their branch, functional area, rank, year of service, and any other attribute of interest. The continuation rate is the number of continuations divided by the initial inventory.

Critical Branch-Qualifying (BQ) Positions—Those positions at the rank of MAJ generally recognized by a promotion board as difficult and challenging, and therefore key to an officer's development. Successful completion of a tour in one of these positions sets an officer above his/her contemporaries when officers are considered for advancement or choice assignment. These positions are a subset of all branch-qualifying (BQ) positions.

Crossover—A transfer out of the Operations Career Field to one of the specialist career fields after the initial designation following selection for MAJ. It can occur at any time to support Army needs. Army requirements, or officer qualifications at the rank of LTC or COL. This is a personnel action modeled after the current branch transfer procedures.

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)—Provides for a single active duty promotion system for all officers (RA and other than RA), thus eliminating the previous dual (AUS/RA or AUS/USAR) system of promotions. The intent is for promotions to be made with fairly uniform promotion timing and opportunity goals, as vacancies occur. It also determines allowable inventory by grade.

Distance Learning—The delivery of standardized individual, collective, and self-development training to soldiers and units at the right place and right time through the application of multiple means and technologies. (The Army Distance Learning Plan, April 1996)

Dual Track (under OPMS II)—Describes an officer who is developed and serves in branch and functional area skills during the period of his/her career from the functional area designation until leaving the service. The officer serves in assignments of increasing responsibility in both of these skills. All officers were occasionally assigned to branch-immaterial or combat-arms-immaterial (as appropriate) positions as required to satisfy the needs of the Army.

Dual-Track Assignment (under OPMS XXI)—Under OPMS XXI, an arrangement under which an officer in the Operations Career Field serves in either

branch or functional integrator positions, or an officer in one of the specialty career fields serves in a functional area or functional integrator position.

Functional Area (FA)—A grouping of officers (by career field other than service or branch) possessing interrelated groupings of tasks, skills, knowledge, and attributes that usually require significant education, training, and experience. Officers serve repetitive and progressive assignments within a functional area. Development, training, and education for a functional area may influence selection to a particular career field that includes that functional area after selection for MAJ. An officer may not hold more than one functional area at a time. (Section II, DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995, validated w/Internet, and OPMS XXI TF)

Functional Area Designation (FAD)—The process used by the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), PERSCOM, to designate officers to a functional area during their fifth year of service. The process begins with submission of a preference statement with the officer's choices prioritized. The designation process at PERSCOM considers the following: academic degrees, disciplines, undergraduate and graduate transcripts, language proficiencies, related job/assignment experiences, and the Army's future needs. (Para 3-5f, DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995, and OPMS XXI TF)

Functional Integrator Positions—Positions not related to a branch or to a functional area that are designated 01/02 authorizations. In these positions, officers gain broadening developmental experience outside of their branch or functional areas. These positions require the skills, knowledge, and attributes common to all Army officers and are critical Army functions such as training, education, and AC/RC programs.

High-Potential Officers (HPO)—Officers selected for repetitive branch-qualifying positions and other positions of greater responsibility for future troop leading and leadership assignments. Positions that produce HPO are included in BQ jobs but are those selected positions considered most important for that branch (critical BQ).

Immaterial Positions—This term is obsolete under OPMS XXI and is replaced by "functional integrator positions." It is a collective term used to refer to either a branch-immaterial or combat arms immaterial position. A branch-immaterial position may be filled by any officer, while combat arms immaterial positions should be filled by Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, Special Forces, or Engineer officers.

Implementation Plan—An overarching plan that synchronizes all the ODS components and related supporting action plans on a timeline through the POM years and beyond. It is a two-phased plan. (OPMS XXI TF)

Information Operations Career Field (IO CF)—Information Operations promotes information dominance and contributes to the emerging strategic information operations missions. It is the management and employment of information to accomplish Army Vision 2010 Patterns of Operations—including information dominance and shaping the battlespace—as well as core processes such as information management within operational and institutional requirements. Contains functional areas FA24, Information Systems Engineering; FA30, Information Operations; FA34, Strategic Intelligence; FA40, Space Operations; FA46, Public Affairs; FA53, Information Systems Management; and FA57, Simulations Operations. (OPMS XXI TF)

Institutional Support Career Field (IS CF)—Institutional Support promotes, defends, secures, manages, and supports Army programs, resources, and requirements for DoD and Congress, while managing and operating the institutions of the Army. The career field is composed of functional areas FA43, Human Resource Management; FA45, Comptroller; FA47, US Military Academy Permanent Faculty; FA49, Operations Research/Systems Analysis; FA50, Strategy and Force Development; and FA52, Nuclear Research and Operations. (OPMS XXI TF)

Key Functional Integrator Jobs—A select number of critical jobs integrating systems and programs that influence decisions and have an impact on events within the Army, JCS, and OSD. These jobs are coded as key functional integrator positions designed to develop officers able to manage complex systems and programs across the Army. (OPMS XXI TF)

Leader Development Action Plan (LDAP)—A plan for developing leadership skills that consists of an issue or issues with a distinct completion date. (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995)

Leader Development Office (LDO)—The operating agency of the Leader Development Support System. It provides a systematic means of monitoring all leader development issues from concept through completion and accommodates the effects of change on leader development. (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995)

Leader Development Support System (LDSS)—A support system that contributes to the sustainment of future Army leader development while ensuring that issues are integrated and resolved at the appropriate levels. The system assesses, develops, coordinates, and prepares leader development actions for decision and implementation. (DA PAM 600-3, 8 June 1995)

Learning Organization—An organization in which there is continuous testing of experience and the transformation of that experience into performance and supporting skills/knowledge. This learning is accessible to the whole organization and is relevant to its core purpose. (Official definition from TRADOC)

Learning Organization (continued)—A committed, resilient organization that fosters strong bonds, mutual trust, and respect between its members; an organization that can quickly adapt to changing opportunities by encouraging creativity and innovation through an open, free flow of information and by employing the diverse individual talents of members and leaders while maintaining a clear sense of purpose, discipline, and mission. It is recognized by growth derived from positive command climate, honest evaluation, straightforward counseling, and selfless service. (Ltr 25 March 1994, GEN Sullivan, CSA; OPMS XXI TF)

Life-Cycle Master Plans—These plans are built on the Army life-cycle functions (Structure, Acquire, Distribute, Develop, Sustain, Compensate, and Separate). The plans provide guidance for specific programs either at a point in time or over time to change to accommodate the strategic environment. Each life-cycle function has a responsible proponent. The integration and synchronization of the master plans is executed by the Officer Development Office (ODO) and reviewed and updated annually. (OPMS XXI TF)

ODS Review Process—An annual decision brief to the Army's senior leaders and the CSA on the current status and direction of ODS and the ODAPs, initiatives, and master plans. It is coordinated by the Director, ODO. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Characteristics—Skills, knowledge, and attributes. (DA PAM 22-100, drafted 26 November 1996; OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development Action Plan (ODAP)—A document identifying objectives, milestones, required resources and responsible agencies for achieving an officer development objective. The objective supports the achievement of one or more of the OPMS XXI characteristics, adapts to changes in the environment, and has one or more policy or program decisions tied to it.(OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development Decision Network (ODDN)—An informal network of individuals and organizations with the need, expertise, and resources to consider and recommend officer development issues and execute guidance from the Army leadership. Issues and recommendations are incorporated in appropriate action plans. Permanent members are the ASA (MRA); the CG, TRADOC; the DCSPER; and the DCSOPS.

Officer Development Initiatives (ODI)—Focused programs that prescribe exact and detailed execution of both ODAPs and life-cycle master plans. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development Office (ODO)—This office is responsible for assessing, developing, coordinating, synchronizing, and monitoring the ODS issues, initiatives, life-cycle master plans, and ODAPs from concept through implementation. The Director, ODO is the executive agent for Army officer development. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development Support System (ODSS)—The system that applies strategic human resource management to Army officer development. It involves the Army leadership, ensuring that issues of the four ODS components are integrated and resolved at the appropriate level. It consists of three operating elements: senior commanders, the Officer Development Office (ODO), and the Officer Development Decision Network (ODDN). It employs bi-annual conferences of senior advisors/commanders to review and update initiatives while providing both focus and direction in advance of the annual ODS Review brief to the CSA. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development System (ODS)—A human resource management system for officers that is holistic, integrated, and forward-looking in approach. It integrates the separate programs of Leader Development, Character Development, Personnel Management, and Performance Evaluation systems. It is designed to support Army Vision 2010 and continues to change over time as the strategic environment changes. It incorporates a feedback loop and a cyclic review and update process. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Development Update (ODU)—A cyclic, annual review of ODS for the Chief of Staff, Army. (OPMS XXI TF)

Officer Distribution Plan (ODP)—A planned level of support to each MACOM dictating the number of officers, by skill, that the command is expected to have at the end of the fiscal year. The annual plan is developed by the Programs Branch, Distribution Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, PERSCOM. The plan incorporates the expected number of officers on active duty, the portion in TTHS, projected board results, the stabilized population, and the Army's priorities.

Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI—One of four components of the Officer Development System (ODS) in the 21st century. The future purpose is to continue the evolution of enhancing warfighting with increased "career" focus, giving reasonable opportunity for success while balancing grades and skills within the field-grade level and adapting to meet the needs of a changing strategic environment. Officers serve in their basic branch and branch-immaterial or functional area and branch-immaterial positions, but not in both. (OPMS XXI TF)

Operations Career Field (OP CF)—Operations focuses on functions associated with training for and executing Army Vision 2010 Patterns of Operations (Decisive Operations, Shape the Battlespace, Protect the Force, Support the Force) as well as the core processes of Train the Operational Force and Maintain, Sustain Land Operations and Acquire and Sustain Infrastructure. The OP CF includes all 16 basic branches and two functional areas: FA39, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs and FA90, Multifunctional Logistics. This career field contains both battalion- and brigade-level command opportunities. (OPMS XXI TF)

Operational Support Career Field (OS CF)—Operational Support promotes the building of Army systems for the future, performs the core process of acquiring sustaining infrastructure, and performs emerging strategic missions. This career field includes the functional areas of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) and the Foreign Area Officers (FA 48). (OPMS XXI TF)

Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD)—A document built from semiannual updates of the force structure reflected in the HQDA ODCSOPS Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and TAADS files.

Promotion Opportunity—The opportunity (represented by a percentage) for an officer to be selected for promotion within a grouping of officers. The opportunity is based on the number of officers competing for promotion in the career field or functional areas in relation to the requirements.

Promotion Opportunity Model (POM)—A spreadsheet-based model that develops a steady-state objective force by branch or functional area, rank, and year of service.

Promotion Share—A percentage of the total promotions available in a career field, or in a branch or functional area within a career field. The share is based on the total number of promotions available/expected.

Recoding—The process of changing an authorization from one grade/skill combination to another grade/skill combination. (OPMS XXI TF)

Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB)—A centralized board convened to select officers to be retired from active duty involuntarily.

Skills (competencies)—The term identifies a requirement and an officer possessing specialized skills to perform duties of a specific position that may require significant education, training, and experience. A skill can be related to more than one branch or functional area. An officer may have more than one skill. Progressive assignments and repetitive tours are not required (AR 310-25, 21 May 1986). One of three elements of character in the Army leadership model. Skills are those abilities that people develop and use with people, with ideas, and with things—hence, their division into interpersonal, conceptual/cognitive, and technical. The fourth skill, tactical, requires skill in all three domains. It is synonymous with competence. (FM 22-100, April 1997; validated w/Internet)

Specialist—An officer exceptionally well qualified in a specific functional area and/or technical discipline through specialized training, advanced education, and comprehensive professional experience. (OPMS XXI TF)

Survival Rate—The percentage or ratio of officers who will remain in the Army after a given period of time, based on the number who entered service. Calculated as a product of continuation rates corresponding to the time period of interest.

Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)—A document prescribing the organizational structure for a unit having a support mission for which a TOE does not exist; it may include civilian positions.

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)—A document prescribing the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several levels of organization options for a particular type of unit.

The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS)—Organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements and authorizations data maintained in an authorizations document.

Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS)—The Army's personnel "overhead" account. It includes those soldiers in training, hospitals, or confinement and those undertaking PCS moves or separating from the Army. TTHS personnel are not counted against operating strength, since they are not in units or organizations.

Updated Authorizations Document (UAD)—This document makes adjustments to PMAD authorizations based on decisions and changes made after the Management of Change (MOC) window.

Utilization Rate (U rate)—The average proportion of the inventory required to fill the given requirements. Utilization rates can be derived for branches or for functional areas, or they can be more encompassing with the inclusion of immaterial positions in the calculation. As the resultant ratio nears "one," it will be more difficult for the inventory to meet the requirements as defined. When this ratio exceeds one, the inventory cannot meet the requirements as defined and shortages exist. The utilization rate is calculated by dividing the total number of requirements by the total inventory.

Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program (VERRP)—A personnel management program under which, in order to increase the losses for the fiscal year, officers are released from active duty before completing all their commitments. LTs and junior CPTs are usually allowed to waiver one or more years of their initial active duty obligation. Officers eligible for retirement are usually granted either waivers for PCS "paybacks" or time-in-grade waivers. Generally speaking, these officers would be leaving the Army of their own volition within a year anyway, but this program allows their loss to count in the current fiscal year.

Year Group (YG)—Used for referring to the group of officers who entered the service in a given fiscal year. While BZ or above-the-zone (AZ) promotions mean that officers will no longer compete for promotion with their original YG, their YG designator will not change.

Bibliography

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1996.

A Review of Education and Training for Officers (Vols. 1-5). HQDA, Washington, DC, 1977.

"Advanced Civil Schooling Information Briefing." PERSCOM, undated.

Allard, Kenneth. *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1990.

"America's Army Leader Development Support System, Process, Procedures, and Products," *ODCSOPS Staff Guide*. 7 November 1994.

Anthony, William P. et al. *Strategic Human Resource Management*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, Inc., Ft. Worth, TX, 1993.

Appendix A, "A Short History of Officer Personnel Management." Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, undated.

Armstrong, James E., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel H. Jay Brock. "Systems Engineering Force XXI: Experimental Analysis Integration and Systems Engineering Support to the Force XXI Design Effort," presented at the United States Military Academy Digitization Symposium held at the Operations Research Center, West Point, NY, January 1996.

Army Command, Leadership, and Management: Theory and Practice. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995-1996.

"Army Focus 94, Force XXI: America's Army in the 21st Century." HQDA, Washington, DC, September 1994.

AR 600-20, "Personnel—General, Army Command Policy." HQDA, Washington, DC, 30 March 1988.

Army Vision 2010. HQDA, Washington, DC, 1996.

Arter, Robert and Richard H. Goldsmith. "Why Dual Specialties?" *Military Review*, June 1983.

Baldy, Thomas et al. *An Assessment of U.S. Army Command and Staff and Senior Service College Education*. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), McLean, VA, 2 May 1997.

Baynes, John. *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage*. Avery Publishing Group, Inc., Garden City Park, NY, 1967.

Beay, Austin. "Military Creativity." *Army*, January 1995.

Bett, Michael et al. "Independent Review of the Armed Forces' Manpower, Career and Remuneration Structures Managing People in Tomorrow's Armed Forces," *Report to the Secretary of State for Defence*. UK, 1995.

Biddle, Stephen. "Victory Misunderstood: Skill, Technology and What the Gulf War Really Tells Us About the Future of Conflict." *International Security*, Fall 1996.

Biddle, Stephen. "The RMA and the Evidence: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare." Unpublished paper for the Institute for Defense Analyses, August 1996.

Block, Peter. *Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-Interest*. Berrett-Kohler Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, CA, 1993.

Bolman, Lee G. and Terrence E. Deal. *Reframing Organizations: Artistry Choice and Leadership*. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1991.

Bracken, Paul. "The Military After Next." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1993).

Brehm, Philip A. "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992.

Brinkerhoff, John R. and Willam A. Lindsay. "A Comprehensive Model for a Total Force Military Personnel System." *Defense Management Journal*, July 1978.

Brown, Frederick J., Lieutenant General (Ret). *The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age*. Brassey's Inc., 1993.

Brown, Walter T. "OER Inflation, Quotas, and Rating the Rater." *The Air Review*, Vol. 26.

Builder, Carl H. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1989.

"Building Competent, Confident Officers for the Future: The Officer Education System." Briefing by Combined Arms Center (CAC), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996.

Burnette, G. "Information: The Battlefield of the Future." *Surface Warfare*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1995).

Campen, Alan D., ed. *The First Information War*. AFCEA International Press, Fairfax, VA, 1992.

Cheney, Dick et al. *Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 12 July 1996. (Draft)

CJCS Instruction 1800.01, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy." Washington, DC, 1 March 1996.

CJCS Instruction S-3210.XX, "Joint Information Warfare Policy (Draft)." Washington, DC, August 1995.

Cohen, Eliot A. "What To Do About National Defense." *Commentary*, November 1994.

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. By William S. Cohen, SecDef. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, May 1997.

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. *Directions for Defense*. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, May 1995.

Cooper, Jeffrey R. "Dominant Battlespace Awareness Implications for the Future Conduct of Warfare." Unpublished paper, 12 December 1994.

Cooper, Jeffrey R. "Implementing Coherent Operations: An Action Plan for the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) United States Army." Unpublished paper.

Cooper, Jeffrey R. *The Coherent Battlefield—Removing the "Fog of War": A Framework for Understanding an MTR of the Information Age*." SRS Technologies, June 1993.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "Compensating for Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means Through Technology." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992.

Covey, Stephen R. *Principle-Centered Leadership*. Fireside, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1990.

"CPT PME--Captains Career Course Concept and Action Plan." Briefing from TRADOC, undated.

"CPT PME Overview." Briefing from Individual Training Directorate, ODCST, TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, undated.

"CPT PME (Phase III) Council of Colonels (COC)." Briefing from CAC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21-22 January 1997.

"CPT PME." TRADOC Decision Brief for General Dennis J. Reimer, CSA, Washington, DC, 30 April 96.

DA PAM 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*, *The Enduring Legacy*. HQDA, Washington, DC, 13 October 1994.

DA PAM 360-846, *Commanders Call*, "*OPMS Study Group After Action Report October 1984*." Washington, DC, September- October 1984.

DA PAM 360-846, *Commanders Call, "OPMS Status Report, Special Edition*." Washington, DC, May-June 1979.

DA PAM 360-863, *Commanders Call, "Update '81: OPMS and DOPMA*." Washington, DC, July-August 1981.

DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*. Washington, DC, 8 June 1995.

DCSPER Briefing to the Pre-Command Course. "America's Army Quality Soldiers: The Essence of America's Army." Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

De Bono, Edward. *Serious Creativity: Using the Power of Lateral Thinking to Create New Ideas*. Harper Perennial, Toronto, 1993.

De Caro, C. *Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War Handbook*. AEROBUREAO Corporation, 1994.

Deichman, S. "Future Battlefield Requires Cyberspace Warfare Strategy." *Signal*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (November 1995).

Dewar, James et al. "Army Culture and Planning in Time of Great Change." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, July 1994.

Dewar, Jim, Carl Builder, William Hix, and Morlie Levin. *Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA,1993.

Dimancescu, Dan and Kemp Dwenger. *World Class Product Development*. AMACOM, New York, 1996.

DoD Directive 1300.19 (Draft), "DoD Joint Officer Management Program." Washington, DC, 26 March 1996.

DoD Directive S/NF-3600.1, "Information Warfare (Draft)."

DoD Directive TS-3600.1, "Information Warfare." Washington, DC, 21 December 1992.

Doughty, Robert A. *The Seeds of Disaster*. Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1985.

Drea, Dr. "Historical Information about the Living TOE." Information paper, DAMH-RA, Washington, DC, 12 January 1995.

Drucker, Peter F. *Landmarks of Tomorrow*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1957.

Druckman, Daniel and Robert A. Bjork. *In the Mind's Eye: Enhancing Human Performance*. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1991.

Druckman, Daniel and Robert A. Bjork. *Learning, Remembering, Believing: Enhancing Human Performance*. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1994.

Dubik, James, Colonel, USA. "What are the Roots of the Army of 2015?" Memorandum for Record to CSA (General Sullivan), 1993.

Dubik, James M., Colonel, USA, and General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA. "War in the Information Age." *Landpower Essay Series AUSA*, May 1994.

Final Report: Information Management Processes In High Performance Units for the Director, Battle Lab Integration, Technology, and Concepts. 21 July 1995.

Flannery, Thomas P., David A. Hofrichter, and Paul E. Platten. *People, Performance & Pay*. The Free Press, New York, 1996.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. Final Draft. Washington, DC, April 1997.

FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*. Washington, DC, 27 September 1994.

FM 34-40, *Electronic Warfare Operations*. Washington, DC, 9 October 1987.

FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC, June 1993.

FM 100-6, *Information Operations*. Washington, DC, August 1995.

FM 100-11, *Force Integration*. Washington, DC, January 1995.

FM 100-XX, *Final Draft: Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign*. Washington, DC, 12 August 1996.

"Force Conversion, A Reenginerering Proposal for the Department of Defense, Working Draft." Office of the Secretary of Defense, ASD (C3I), 19 April 1995.

"Force XXI, America's Army of the 21st Century Meeting the 21st Century Challenge," HQDA, OCSA, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, Ft. Monroe, VA, 15 January 1995.

"Force XXI Training and Education System." Briefing by the ODCST, TRADOC, 20 August 1996.

Fuller, Major General J. F. C. *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure*. Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1936.

"Functional Area Information Brief for MG Ohle," briefed by LTC(P) Joe Hollenbeck, Functional Area Management and Development Division, PERSCOM, 27 August 1996.

Gall, John. *Systemantics: How Systems Work and Especially How They Fail*. Pocket Books, New York, 1978.

Gray, Colin S. "The Changing Nature of Warfare?" *Naval War College Review,* Spring 1996.

Gates, Bill. *The Road Ahead*. Viking Penguin, New York, 1995.

Gabriel, Richard A. *Military Incompetence*. Hill and Wang, New York, 1985.

Gingrich, N. *Information Warfare: Definition, Doctrine, and Direction*. National Defense University, Washington, DC, 3 May 1994.

Gorman, Paul F. *The Secret of Future Victories*. Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA, February 1992.

Graves, Howard D. and Don M. Snider. "The Reform of Professional Military Education Under the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation of 1986." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, special edition, Fall 1996.

Hackett, John. *The Profession of Arms*. MacMillan Publishing Company, New York, 1983.

Hadley, Arthur. *The Straw Giant*. Random House, New York, 1986.

Harbeck, Herb and Uli Keller. "Learning Leader XXI: The Key to Successful Leadership in the 21st Century." Paper presented by CSA Fellows to CSA, 1994.

Harvey, Jerry B. *The Abilene Paradox*. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1988.

Hatcher, Donald L. "Critical Thinking and the Postmodern Critique of Rationality." Unpublished paper, 20 January 1995.

Hawkins, Glen R. "United States Army Force Structure and Force Design Initiatives 1939-1989 (Advanced Copy)." Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History.

Heiffetz, Ronald A. *Leadership Without Easy Answers*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994.

Heller, Charles E. and William A. Stofft. *America's First Battles: 1776-1965*. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1986.

Hernstein, Richard J. and Charles Murray. *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*. Free Press Paperbacks, New York, 1994.

Hiam, Alexander Watson, ed. "The Portable Conference on Change Management." HRD Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1997.

Hix, William M. "Assignment Stability: An In-Progress Review." RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, Washington, DC, 28 September 1995.

Hix, William M. and Richard Sortor. "Strategic Planning for the United States Army Personnel Function." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1991.

Hix, William M. and John D. Winkler. "Assessment of OPMS XXI." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, June 1997.

Hock, Dee W. "Institutions in the Age of Mindcrafting." A paper presented at the Self Organizing Systems Seminar, Park City, UT, 17 October 1994.

Holmes, Richard. *Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle*. The Free Press, New York, 1985.

Holz, Robert, Joseph Miller, and Howard McFann. *Determinants of Effective Unit Performance: Research on Measuring and Managing Unit Training Readiness*. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, July 1994.

Hunt, James G. and Robert L. Phillips. "Research Note 96-63, 1996 Army Symposium: Leadership Challenges of the 21st Century Army, Executive Summary," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, May 1996.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State*. Vintage Books, New York, 1957.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations?* Olin Institute project on "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests." *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

Hust, G. *Taking Down Telecommunications*. Air University Press, September 1994.

"The MEL 4 Study." *Intermediate Level Military Education, The Final Report*. 31 January 1989.

Ippolito, Dennis. "Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense." The Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 1994.

Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. The Free Press, New York, 1960.

Janowitz, Morris, ed. *The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization*. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1964.

Johnson, Edgar M., Dr., and Dr. Zita M. Simutis. "Army 1995 Survey Comments." *Army Assessment 1995*. Comments published by U.S. Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA, 1995.

Joint Duty Assignment Study. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Washington, DC, June 1995.

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare for the US Armed Forces*. 11 November 1991.

Joint Pub 1.02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. December 1989.

Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Operations (Draft)*.

Joint Vision 2010. CJCS, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 1996.

Katzenback, Edward L., Jr. "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response." *Public Policy 7* (1958).

Keegan, John. *The Mask of Command*. Viking Penguin Incorporated, New York, 1987.

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat, Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, Boston, 1982.

Kelly, Kevin. *Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and Economic World*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 1994.

Kitfield, James. *Prodigal Soldiers*. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995.

Klein, Gary A. "Strategies of Decision Making." *Military Review*, May 1989.

Kleiner, Art. *The Age of Heretics: Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change*. Currency Doubleday, New York, 1996.

Knowlton, William A., Jr. "OPMS: Flawed, But Fixable." *Army*, January 1989.

Kotter, John P. "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1995.

Krause, Michael D., PhD., and Jay D. Aronowitz. "The Revolution in Military Logistics," 1996.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.

Kwinn, Major Michael J., Jr. "Force XXI: Directions In Digitization." Report from symposium conducted at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 21 August 1996.

LaBerge, Walter B. "Traditions Die Hard: The Relevance of the Indian Wars to the U.S. Army of the Year 2000." *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1.

Lamb, Christopher. "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions." *Special Warfare*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1995).

"LDDN Simulations." TRADOC, undated.

"Leader Development Action Plan." HQDA, OCS, Washington, DC, April 1988.

"Leader XXI Campaign Plan Workshop.": Materials from workshop held by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12-14 September 1995.

LeHardy, COL Ward M. et al. *Functional Study of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS II) Volumes 1-3*. HQDA, Washington, DC, 1984.

Leland, Joe, Jon Grossman, Doug Merrill, and Brian Nichiporuk. "Characteristics of High Performance Units: Implications for Force XXI." RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, Washington, DC, October 1995.

Libicki, Martin C. *What is Information Warfare?* National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1 February 1995. Available via http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/actpubs/act003/a003cont.html; INTERNET.

Libicki, Martin C. *The Mesh and The Net: Speculations On Armed Conflict In An Age Of Free Silicon*. National Defense University Press, 1994.

Libicki, Martin C. and James A. Hazlett. "Do We Need an Information Corps?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 2 (Autumn 1993).

Lohnmann, Ursula G., PhD., and Grenville C. King, PhD. "Integrating Content, Context, Organization and Experience to Develop Leaders, Army Management Staff College Abstract." Leader Development Conference, Boston, 14-16 October 1996.

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Pentagon and the Art of War*. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985.

Macgregor, Douglas A. "Setting the Terms of Future Battle for Force XXI." *The Land Warfare Papers,* The Institute of Land Warfare, USA, No. 20, June 1995.

Management of Strength Reductions. Report to the Committees on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Washington, DC, January 1990.

Matthews, LTC. "The Breaking of Dual Specialty Development: Or How OPMS Jumped the Dual Track." Unpublished paper, 20 July 1984.

Matthews, Lloyd J. and Dale E. Brown, eds. *The Parameters of Military Ethics*. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, DC, 1989.

McCormick, David Harold. "America's Army in Transition: The Politics, Mechanics, and Ramifications of Downsizing." PhD. diss., Princeton University, November 1996.

McMaster, Michael D. *The Intelligence Advantage: Organizing for Complexity*. Knowledge Based Development, Celtic House, Douglas, Isle of Man, UK, 1995.

Meyer, Edward C., General, USA, and R. Manning Ancell, with Jane Mahaffey. *Who Will Lead: Senior Leadership in the United States Army*. Praeger, Westport, CT, 1995.

Morgan, Mary E., Colonel, USA. "Officer Personnel Management System Study," Memorandum for the DCSPER. HQDA, PERSCOM, Alexandria, VA, 30 May 1995.

Moran, Lord. *The Anatomy of Courage*. Avery Publishing Group, Inc., Garden City Park, NY, 1945.

Moskos, Charles and Frank Wood, eds. *The Military: More than Just a Job*? Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA.

MOU, The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), March 1995.

Mumford, Michael D. et al. *Cognitive and Temperament Predictors of Executive Ability*: *Principles for Developing Leadership Capacity*. Technical Report 977, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, May 1993.

Murray, Williamson and Barry Watts. "Military Innovation in Peacetime." Unpublished paper, 11 January 1995.

Nichiporuk, Brian. *Information Technologies and the Future of Land Warfare*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February 1994.

"1984 OPMS Survey Technical Report & Data Source Book." Survey conducted and analyzed by ARI for the OPMS Study Group. HQDA, Washington, DC, 1984.

"1996 Survey of Officers Careers." Comments by category published by ARI, Alexandria, VA, 1996.

Northrop, John H., Colonel, USA. "Resdesigning Army Branch Training." *Military Review*, July-August 1995.

Nowowiejski, Dean A., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "A New Leader Development Paradigm." *Military Review,* July-August 1995.

"Officer Education and Training for the 21st Century--Reengineering TRADOC." HQ, TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 4 February 1994.

"Officer Education System, Historical Perspective." Undated briefing.

Officer Management Legislation: Why Needed? Report to the Committees on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Washington, DC, February 1990.

Officer Personnel Management System Update Briefing. "Quality Leaders for America's Army."

Ogilvie, D. T. and Frances E. Hauge. "Decision Making Requirements for Future Organizational Leaders: A Creative Action-Based Approach." A paper presented at the Leadership Challenges of the Twenty First Century Army Symposium, 27-29 March 1996, and a project for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, chapter draft: 1 May 1996.

O'Neill, Hugh M. and D. Jeffrey Lenn. "Voices of survivors: Words that downsizing CEOs should hear." *Academy of Management Executives.*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1995).

"OPMD Assignment Officer Smart Book." United States Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA, 1 June 1995.

"OPMS XXI January 1997 Survey." Results published by ARI, Alexandria, VA, 27 February 1997.

Parlier, Greg H., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "Cultural Planning Impediments to OPMS XXI." Organizational Culture (142j) course, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 31 May 1996.

Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman. *In Search of Excellence*. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1982.

Peters, Tom and Nancy Austin. *A Passion for Excellence: The Leadership Difference*. Random House, New York, 1985.

Petersonrich, R. "What is DBS?" DBS Online! Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.dss.digifix.com/DBS/DBS_Online_FAQs.htmld/index.html, 1995.

Philpott, Tom. "Shaping the Army of Tomorrow." *The Retired Officer Magazine*, December 1995.

Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1996. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. November 1996.

"Psychological-Sociological Profile of Successful Special Forces Candidates." Results of a study conducted by ARI, Alexandria, VA, 21 December 1995.

Quinliven, James T. "Force Requirements in Stability Operations." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1994.

Record, Jeffrey. "Ready for What and Modernized against Whom?" Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995.

Reimer, Dennis J. "Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment, and the Golden Rule." *Military Review*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January-February 1996).

Report to the Officer Corps, "Results of the Professional Development of Officers Study Surveys." OCPA, HQDA, Washington, DC, April 1985.

Report of the Panel on Joint Professional Military Education of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Strategic Vision for the Professional Military Education of Officers in the Twenty-first Century.* Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, March 1995.

Riedel, P. E., Colonel, USA. "Improvements to the Officer Selection Process." USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, An Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 March 1993.

Robbert, Al et al. *Differentiation in Military Human Resource Management*. RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA, July 1996.

Rokke, Ervin. "Military Education for the New Age." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 9 (Autumn 1995).

Rosen, Stephen P. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991.

Rostker, Bernard and Glenn Gotz. *Officer Personnel Management Systems: The Up-or-Out Promotion and Tenure Policy*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1975.

Rostker, Bernard et al. *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment*. RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA, 1992.

Ruiz, Daniel, Jr., Major. "Leadership, A Combat Multiplier; The Officer Personnel Management System, An Achilles' Heel." Master of Military Art and Science thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1982.

Schmitt, John F., Major, and Gary A. Klein. "Fighting in the Fog: Dealing with Battlefield Uncertainty." *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1996.

Segal, David. *Organizational Designs for the Future Army*. Special Report 20, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, 1993.

Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. Currency Doubleday, New York, 1990.

Sherburne, Thomas N. "Senior Field Grade Officer Motivation and Professionalism Study." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 July 1985.

Simpkin, Richard. *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare*. Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1985.

Slotwinski, David L., LTC, USA. "The Method Used to Select Recruiting Battalion Commanders." USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 April 1997.

Smith, Christine B. et al. "An Assessment of Knowledge and Skill Requirements of Navy Shore-Based Installation Management." Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1996.

Smith, DeWitt C., Jr. "An American Warrior's Code: 'National Security' Means More Than Buying Fancy Weapons." From a speech given to ROTC cadets at the George C. Marshall Center, undated.

Smith, Perry M. *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1986.

Snider, Donald M. "The Coming Defense Train Wreck." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996).

Spencer, Lyle M., Jr., PhD., David C. McClelland, PhD., and Signe M. Spencer. *Competency Assessment: Methods History and State of the Art*. Monograph, Hay McBer Research Press, New York, 1994.

SOF Vision 2020. HQ, USASOC, Ft. Bragg, NC.

Spiller, Roger. "The Theory and Practice of Post-Industrial Conflict." Unpublished paper, 1995.

Starry, Donn A., General (Ret.). "On Making Our Smaller Army a Better One." Fire For Effect Senior Leaders Speak Out, *Field Artillery*, February 1991.

Stoll, Clifford. *The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage*.New York, Doubleday, 1989.

"Study on Military Professionalism." U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1970.

Sullivan, Gordon R. and Anthony M. Coroalles. "Seeing the Elephant: Change and America's Army." National Security Paper Number 18, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, June 1995.

Sullivan, Gordon R., General, USA, and Colonel James M. Dubik, USA. "War in the Information Age." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 6 June 1994.

Szafranski, Richard. "A Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020." *Airpower Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1995).

Taylor, Charles W. "Creating Strategic Visions." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1990.

Technology Tutorials and Overviews and Vocabulary. Global Network Intelligence, McGraw-Hill, 1993.

"The Army After Next Concept Paper." Strategic Assessment Center, Science Applications International Corp., 1 June 1995.

The Military Education Level-One Study (MEL-1 Study) A Group Study Project USAWC Military Studies Program to the Chief of Staff, Army (GEN Carl E. Vuono). By Gary L. Gresh, Colonel, Director, et al. and sponsored by MG Paul G. Cerjan, Commandant, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4 May 1990.

The Race to Global Information Super-Skyway. Mobile Satellite Services, Iridium, Inc., http://www.mot.com, 1995.

"The Science and Engineering Requirements for Military Officers and Civilian Personnel in the High Tech Army of Today and Tomorrow." *Ad Hoc Study Final Report to the Army Science Board,* HQDA (ASA-RDA), Washington, DC, January 1996.

Thie, Harry et al. *A Future Officer Career Management System: An Objectives-Based Design*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1996.

Thie, Harry et al. *Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers*. RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA, 1994.

Thornton, Paul. "Analysis of a Graded Hierarchical Organization." PhD. diss., UMI Press, Spring 1997.

TITLE 10, United States Code Armed Forces TITLE 32, United States Code National Guard and Selected Additional Provisions Of Law. 103d Congress 1st Session Committee Print. Washington, DC, April 1993.

Toffler, Alvin. *The Third Wave*. Bantam Books, New York, 1980.

Toffler, Alvin. *Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century*. Bantam Books, New York, 1990.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1993.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century." Ft. Monroe, VA, 1 August 1994.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, "Operational Capability Requirement." Ft. Monroe, VA, 1 December 1994.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, "Concept for Information Operations." Ft. Monroe, VA, August 1995.

"Training With Industry." Briefing presented by PERSCOM, undated.

Trefry, Richard G., LTG (Ret.). "Soldiers and Warriors—Warriors and Soldiers." Unpublished paper, undated.

"US Army Character Development XXI Planning Meeting." Workbook from meeting held by the ODCSPER, Ft. Belvoir, VA, 9-10 July 1996.

"US Army Core Competencies." Paper delivered to HQDA, ODCSOPS, RMD by Military Professional Resources, Inc., Alexandria, VA, 5 December 1995.

US Army Digitization Master Plan (Draft), July 1995.

USSOCOM Pub 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War*. 25 January 1996.

van Aller, Chris, PhD. "Defense Redesign After the Cold War." Unpublished paper, undated.

van Crevald, Martin. *Command in War*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985.

van Crevald, Martin.. *Technology and War*. The Free Press, New York, 1989.

van Crevald, Martin.. *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. The Free Press, New York, 1990.

van Crevald, Martin.. *The Transformation of War*. The Free Press, New York, 1991.

Vandergriff, Donald E., Major. "Proposals for Creating the Officer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg: Toward a New Institutional Culture." Unpublished paper, 15 August 1996.

von Glinow, Mary Ann, Michael J. Driver, Kenneth Brousseau, and J. Bruce Prince. "The Design of a Career Oriented Human Resource System." *Academy of Science Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1983).

Waldrop, M. Mitchell. *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos*. Touchstone, New York, 1992.

Waller, Douglas. "Onward Cyber Warriors." *Time*, Vol. 146, No. 8 (August 1995).

Wardynski, Major Casey, CPT Joe Gleeson, and CPT Dave Youngberg. *Army Advanced Civil Schooling*. Department of Social Sciences, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 May 1996.

West, Togo D., Jr., and General Dennis J. Reimer. *U.S. Army Posture Statement FY97: Meeting the Challenges of Today, Tomorrow, and the 21st Century*. Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 104th Congress, 1996.

Wheatley, Margaret J. "Reinventing the 21st century army—Can the US Army become a learning organization?" *Journal of Quality and Participation*, March 1994.

Wheatley, Margaret J. *Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an Orderly Universe*. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Incorporated, San Francisco, 1992.

Wong, Leonard and Jeff McNally. "Downsizing the Army: Some Policy Implications Affecting the Survivors." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 1994).

Zander, Alvin. *Making Groups Effective*. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1994.

UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

25 SEP 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Officer Personnel Management System XXI Task Force, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 23331-0009

SUBJECT: OPMS XXI Study Charter

1. America's Army must have leaders at every level prepared to meet the challenges of the future. They must possess the requisite professional skills, understand our society and the world in which we live, and embody the values essential to providing our soldiers and the Nation unsurpassed military leadership. Accordingly, we must develop an Integrated Leader Development and Management System through which the Army will relook all of our programs for preparing tomorrow's leaders. A vital part of this plan is a careful study of our Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). I want you to lead this study effort.

2. Several significant events have occurred since the last formal study of OPMS in 1984. The most important of these have been the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the formation of the Army Acquisition Corps in 1989, and Congressionally-mandated support to the Reserve Component in 1992. Requirements generated by these mandates -- in combination with the Army drawdown over the past six years -- have created significant internal challenges to the management and development of the officer corps. It is now time to conduct another comprehensive review of OPMS.

3. As we approach the 21st Century, new missions, technological advancements, and demands for different kinds of expertise require us to reexamine our current officer procurement, leader development, assignment, evaluation, promotion, and separation systems. I would like you to focus on the following three essential tasks:

a. Review OPMS and recommend appropriate changes to ensure the Army develops officers whose behavior reflects Army values and who possess the right skills, knowledge, and attributes. This system must satisfy Total Army, Joint, Coalition, and Interagency requirements.

b. Recommend an executable conceptual framework for OPMS XXI that integrates your work with the ongoing Leader Development XXI, Character Development XXI, and new OER initiatives.

c. Design an implementation strategy for your recommendations that provides a mechanism for periodic reviews and updates.

4. To accomplish these three tasks, the Task Force must view OPMS from a strategic context and look across traditional boundaries -- understanding where the officer corps has come from and where it needs to go. Accordingly, the Task Force must look into the future, going well beyond today's issues. This must be done with an appreciation of the Army's fundamental values and its warfighting focus. At a minimum, the study must accomplish the following:

a. Provide an assessment of how the officer corps in a dynamic, more technologically advanced Army should be organized as a full spectrum force to meet national security needs both in the near term and well into the next century.

b. Describe reasonable career expectations for the officer corps given force structure changes and resource considerations.

c. Develop viable career paths that provide opportunity and choice while balancing branch, functional area, and branch immaterial assignments across all grades.

d. Determine the proper relationship between military education, advanced civil schooling, self-development, and assignments -- taking different career paths into consideration.

e. Develop an integrated, disciplined system that anticipates and balances the competing demands of leader development requirements, authorizations, law, and policy.

5. I want you to conduct in-progress reviews with me on a bi-monthly basis and consult periodically with members of the OPMS XXI Select Advisory Group. Brief me on your findings no later than 1 July 1997.

6. In sum, I want you to chart the course for building an officer corps that can effectively shape, train, and lead the Total Army into the 21st Century. OPMS XXI must be a "win-win" system for both the Army and the individual officer. It is one of my highest priority projects. Nothing is more important than developing the Army's future leaders.

Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OPMS XXI Task Force Members

Director's Group

MG David H. Ohle
COL Jeffery Wagonhurst
LTC Caryl Tallon
MAJ David Wisecarver
SSG John Roane
SGT Tonia Van Tassel
SPC Wilma Wilkins

Career Management Division

COL Linda Norman
LTC John Custer
LTC James Hodge
LTC Vandetta Smith
LTC Mark Williams
MAJ Peter Curry
MAJ Terry Lee

Leader Development and Training Division

COL James Beauchamp
LTC Don Burnett
LTC Frank Pedrozo
LTC Randy Treiber
MAJ Zsolt Szentkiralyi
MAJ Wayne Stultz

Structure and Distribution Division

COL Bobby Little
LTC Freddie Blakely
LTC Jack Dees
LTC Jack Faires
LTC Craig Morehead
LTC Lonnie Stith
MAJ Theodore Schiller

Operations Research and Analysis Division

MAJ Paul Thornton
MAJ Ken Riddle
MAJ Michael Teague

G-3 Division

COL Hugh F.T. Hoffman III
COL Gregory C. Gardner
LTC Donna Coffman
LTC Rhett Hernandez
LTC Aleks Rhode

USMA Adjunct Members

LTC Michael McGinnis
LTC Casey Wardynski
MAJ Joseph Gleeson
MAJ Robert Phelan

SAIC Adjunct Members

Mr. John McDonald
Mr. Bill Brooks
Mr. Thomas Baldy

LMI Adjunct Members

Mr. Colin Halvorson
Mr. Carl Jensen
Mr. Norman O'Meara
Mr. Steve Shupack
Mr. Dennis Wenzel

RAND Corporation Advisory Members

Mr. Michael Hix
Mr. Harry Thie
Mr. John Winkler

OPMS XXI Implementation Team Members

COL James Beauchamp
COL Allen Baker
LTC(P) Donna Coffman
LTC Anda Strauss
LTC Mark Henscheid
LTC Freddie Blakely
LTC Don Burnett
MAJ(P) Peter Curry
MAJ Theodore Schiller
MAJ Zsolt Szentkiralyi
CPT(P) Levern Eady
SSG John Roane
SGT Tonia Van Tassel
Ms. Cynthia McLain

MPRI Adjunct Members
LTG(R) Richard Treffry
MG(R) Vincent Falter
Mr. Duane Clark
Ms. Barbara Douglas
Mr. David Hamilton
Mr. Wayne Johnson
Mr. Arnold Laidig
Mr. Peter O'Connor
Ms. Marilyn White